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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines moral visions of the political economy of mainstream
Christian social ethics through a liberationist and postcolonial analysis of the work of three
leading political economic ethicists, Daniel Finn, Max Stackhouse, and Philip Wogaman.
Constrained by their subject position within modernity/coloniality and a commitment to a
neoclassical understanding of the political economy, mainstream Christian ethicists have
stopped short of condemning the inextricable complicity of the capitalist political economy to
colonialism and its racist, patriarchal, and oppressive power relations. This dissertation argues
that the moral visions of mainstream Christian social ethicists must be decolonized and points to
Latina/o thinking and heterodox economic thought as two starting points for such a
decolonization of the moral imaginary.
The project makes contributions to both Christian social ethics and Latina/o religious
cultural studies. It contributes to Christian social ethics by examining the underlying
commitment to neoclassical economic thought of mainstream Christian social ethics, deploying
postcolonial hermeneutics to construct ethical frameworks that move beyond collusion with
colonialism and complicity with empire, and offering a more careful analysis of political
economy than is generally found within the liberationist strand of Christian social ethics. In
applying the insights of Latina/o thinking to political economic ethics, it contributes to Latina/o
religious cultural studies by moving beyond the stagnated discussions of identity politics, selfdetermination, and minority rights. It also contributes to the field by empowering Latina/o
ii

religious cultural scholars to engage in non-capitalist economic theorizing by providing new
analytical tools to combat the hegemonic conceptualization of capitalism as co-terminus with
the political economy.
Mainstream Christian moral visions of the political economy must be decolonized to
remain Christian and moral. Christian social ethics must draw on economic analyses that
acknowledge the exploitative record of capitalism and its inextricable complicity with the
modern/colonial complex. It must also avoid the hegemonic suppression of subjugated
knowledges by theorizing from multiple places at once, taking on a subaltern perspective in
addition to its unavoidably modern/colonial perspective.
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INTRODUCTION: SITUATING MYSELF
As a work of a religious researcher with liberationist leanings, this project takes seriously
the ways in which social location is profoundly epistemologically relevant to the scholarship of
any individual. Some might consider this introduction a manifestation of the project’s
capitulation to identity politics. While identity politics usually refers to theorizing from a place of
shared injustices, it has as its goal the greater self-determination of the group in question. This
project is not interested in the goal of gaining Latina/os a seat at the table of modernist/colonial
oppression. The attention given to social location in this introduction and the rest of the project
is not based on belief of a one-for-one correspondence between one’s social location and
scholarship. Social location is but one of the factors that influence what can be known. Social
location is crucial to the extent that it limits one’s intellectual conversation partners, those who
the scholar “knows with.”1 The acknowledgment of social location issues forth from the
recognition that a scholar unaware of the effects of one’s social location and the power
dynamics embedded in one’s intellectual history/genealogy will replicate the same power
dynamics in their own intellectual production. This introduction highlights some of my own

1

“Know with” is a phrase I encountered in Brian D. McLaren, The Last Word and the Word after
That: A Tale of Faith, Doubt, and a New Kind of Christianity, 1st ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005),
129f. I use the phrase somewhat differently than McLaren. What I have in mind is the social
interdependency of knowledge discussed by feminist thinkers such as Lynn Hankinson Nelson, Sandra
Harding, and Patricia Hill Collins. For more on the epistemic interdependence of knowers see Sandra G.
Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women's Lives (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1991); Lynn Hankinson Nelson, Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1990). For a discussion on feminist standpoint theory, which articulates the
importance of perspectival differences stemming from social location see Sandra G. Harding, ed., The
Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies (New York: Routledge, 2004);
Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment,
2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009 [1990]).
1

experiences as a way of acknowledging the conversation partners that I know with and making
explicit the power dynamics embedded in my own social location.

Growing up in Miami, Cuba
My identity as a person and a scholar has been shaped by the years I spent in Miami in
working class neighborhoods of immigrant families from various parts of Latin America
(Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, among others) as part of a Cuban
family. My brother, sister, and I were raised by our abuelo/as. None of our abuelo/as spoke
English because they had no need to speak it, except for a few words and phrases which always
surprised me when I heard them. As anyone who has been to Miami knows, Cubans have
managed to retain Cuban life, language, and customs in diaspora, though of course constant
exposure to gringos has made its impact. Miami Cubans like to chatter about Cuba, about what
went wrong, about when “Fidel” would be toppled, and about the possibility of returning to the
island one day, even though as the years (and decades) went by that possibility seemed ever
more remote. Partly as a result of living in a large Cuban community and partly because of the
periodic arrival of more relatives from the island—tío abuelo/as, primo/as, and the like—stories,
memories, and dreams about Cuba deeply influenced my development, even though my
abuelo/as had fled from la isla years before I was born. Thus, it was jarring when abuelo Luis
insisted that I was estadounidense cubano, not cubano estadounidense.2 Later I realized that
abuelo Luis was right: I was a child between worlds, or between islands, since “Cuba es una isla y
Miami también.”3 While I had never stepped foot on the island of Cuba, my identity was shaped

2

Growing up I considered myself to be Cuban, sans qualifier.

3

Carlos Victoria, "De Mariel a Los Balseros," Encuentro invierno, no. 15 (1999-2000).
2

through an U.S. experience grafted onto a communal remembrance that grew within me an
exilic Cuban imaginary.4

An Education in Economics
My exilic Cuban imaginary expressed itself in various ways throughout my education. I
became enamored with economics as espoused by Milton Friedman in Capitalism and
Freedom.5 The close link Friedman makes between democracy and capitalism, political freedom
and economic freedom, fanned my intellectual interests. I had heard of Marx, of course, but I
had been taught that he was the founder of communism and thus his writings were not worth
studying. My own social location seemed to serve as evidence for this dismissal. For a son of
exilic Cubans who fled in search of economic opportunities and political freedom, Friedman’s
arguments were quite powerful and persuasive.
I continued to study economics, in particular in the context of global politics, law, and
international cultures, at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. In our
discussions it was taken for granted that the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries had largely solved the problems of slow growth, low efficiency,
substantial economic fluctuations, and an unfair distribution of income and were therefore to
be taken as models of how to help emerging economies do better. It would be too simplistic to
say that I was being trained in the Washington consensus, the basic logic of which is the
improvement in economic efficiency (and thus social welfare) through the mechanism of free-

4

For Lacan, the imaginary is a mode of representation that makes the self and world intelligible.
See Jacques Lacan and Bruce Fink, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English (New York: W.W. Norton &
Co., 2006 [1970]). The imaginary will be discussed in more detail in chapter one.
5

Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982 [1962]).
3

market.6 The economic crises in Latin America and in East Asia during the mid and late 1990s
that shook the confidence in the Washington consensus was also felt by my professors. But
there was no abandonment of the consensus. Rather, the question at hand was: how should the
consensus be adjusted?
At the same time I was also exploring the cultures, politics, and history of Latin America
and among U.S. Latina/os. Todorov helped me make the connection between the activity of
language and the activity of conquest. The vastly outnumbered expedition of Spaniards were
able conquer the empires of the Americas, Todorov argues, not through superior technology or
military skills but through language. The Spanish would linguistically and symbolically exploit
what they knew of the Aztecs’, Incas’, and Mayans’ cyclical codes and beliefs to subjugate them.
Studying Walter Mignolo further underscored for me the relationship between language history
and the practice of colonization. Alternate forms of knowledge and structures of power were
created through the practice of reading and ideology of cultural hierarchies.

6

John Williamson was the first to coin the phrase “Washington Consensus.” Williamson included
10 principles that made up the consensus:
Principle 1: Fiscal discipline
Principle 2: Concentration of public expenditure on public goods including education,
health, and infrastructure
Principle3: Tax reform toward broadening the tax base with moderate marginal tax rates
Principle 4: Interest rates to be market determined and positive
Principle 5: Competitive exchange rates
Principle 6: Trade liberalization
Principle 7: Openness to foreign direct investment
Principle 8: Privatization of state enterprises
Principle 9: Deregulation or abolishment of regulations that impede entry or restrict
competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental, and consumer protection
grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions
Principle 10: Legal security for property rights
John Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," in Latin American Adjustment :
How Much Has Happened?, ed. John Williamson (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
th
1990), 7-33. Later, the exception to the 9 principle for regulations “justified on safety, environmental,
and consumer protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions,” leading Williamson
to disavowal the phrase as representative of his work. John Quiggin, Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas
Still Walk among Us (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 52-53.
4

After graduating from Penn, I worked briefly at the World Bank before taking a position
as a consultant at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The IDB was founded in order to
encourage economic and social development and reduce poverty and inequality in Latin
America. During my tenure there, I noticed that many of the IDB’s past projects were similar to
the sorts of projects that were currently under review. Despite the IDB’s diligent and longstanding efforts, high unemployment persisted in the region and the reforms that the Bank had
initiated did not seem to have improved the lives of the poor much at all. I began to question
whether the diagnosis of neoclassical theory and the medicine it offered were adequate to
respond to the needs of people in the Majority World.
While I was living in DC, I continued to cultivate my interest in Christian theology and
spirituality. It was clear that I had a passion for and fascination with Christian theology and with
development work.7 In my own mind, these two interests were united by the theme of change. I
was interested in thinking deeply about and helping to enact social and personal change.

A Fuller Gospel: Christian Social Ethics of Corporate Life
It was at Fuller Theological Seminary that I began to integrate my faith and theological
convictions with my concern for social change. Under the tutelage of Glen Stassen, I recognized
that there are few issues more thoroughly addressed in the Bible than political economic life.
Jesus came not just to preach the good news but to preach the good news to the poor (Lk 4:1821). I became convinced that the center of Jesus’ teachings is a prophetic judgment on riches
accumulated through the exploitation of the poor and a challenge to the dominant economic
and political practices of the world. While evangelicals have often reduced the moral values of
7

Later, I found that the academic study of theology—a critical, rigorous, and systematic
enterprise—is quite different from the more speculative and spiritual forms of theology I had read up to
that point.
5

Christianity to concerns for abortion and gay marriage, literally hundreds of verses in the Bible
discuss God’s concern for poverty, the environment, and the mistreatment of the least in
society.
In the summer following my first year of seminary, I had the good fortune to take a class
with Ada María Isasi-Díaz at Drew University. It was in that class, entitled La Justicia y El Amor Se
Abrazan (Love and Justice Embrace), that I was first exposed to liberation theology. We read and
discussed five theologians: Jean B. Metz, Gustavo Gutiérrez, Leonardo Boff, Juan Luis Segundo,
and Jon Sobrino. I was immediately attracted to liberation theology’s ethos and premises.
Theology and politics imply one another. God is on the side of the poor. In articulating a
theology, one must be in solidarity with those who suffer and are oppressed. As a theology of
conscientization it involves unmasking false explanations given by a privileged class to explain
why things are the way they are. It is theology that reminded me about the connections
between power and a telling of history, between language and conquest. Praxis precedes
theology: theology is dependent on beings involved in the struggle for liberation. If a theology
refuses to condemn the oppressive structures of the world, it remains a theology of the status
quo, which always works to maintain the privilege of the privileged.

Working with Workers at CLUE
Shortly after graduating from seminary, I put my new convictions about liberation
theology to work. As an associate pastor at an urban Latina/o church in Los Angeles, Iglesia
Unidad de la Comunidad, I represented our congregation at the Religious Leaders Committee
meetings for Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice (CLUE), an interfaith association
committed to responding to the crisis of the working poor. I had the opportunity to meet with
low-wage workers, including grocery workers, janitors, and hotel workers, and accompany them
6

in prayer and spiritual reflection at worker meetings and in street demonstrations in front of
their workplaces. The workers were largely women of color and immigrants, who faced
mistreatment of various forms, including uncompensated injuries on the job, unpaid overtime,
harsh working conditions, and for undocumented workers, employer threats to contact
immigration authorities when they complained about working conditions. They represented
only a fraction of the working poor of Los Angeles, an entire impoverished community
surrounded by communities in which wealthy Christians lived in extravagant homes and
worshiped in lavish church buildings. The incongruity made clear to me, emotionally and
spiritually, that any theology worthy of the name must involve praxis.

Theology and Economics Reexamined: Postcolonialism and Economic Heterodoxy
I was confronted with a different sort of challenge when I entered the JDP. Through my
experiences with CLUE, I saw Christianity as a force for justice. A major charge I encountered
early and often in my doctoral studies was that Christianity has often been the motivation of
injustice. More specifically, the charge was that Christianity is complicit with the impact of
modernity/colonialism on the lives of the majority of the world. I thought carefully about this
charge and with the help of Kwok Pui-lan, Joerg Rieger, and Mayra Rivera Rivera considered how
one might parse out the elements of Christianity that are complicit with empire from those that
are not: I reflected on how to develop a postcolonial Christian theology and ethics.
In line with this charge is the critique that liberation theology, because it relies on the
concept of human dignity and the ability of human beings to shape their own destinies, Marxist
analysis in the critique of capitalist societies, and metanarratives about the mobilization of the
masses towards a utopian kingdom of God, is complicit with modern/colonial complex. These
critiques have forced me to examine my own liberationist sympathies. While liberation
7

theologians have responded in various ways to this critique, my own view is that liberation
theology has evolved in the face of these criticisms.8 The Latin American theology that was born
in the late 1960s is not the last word on liberation theology. Many second and third generation
liberation theologians have undergone the paradigmatic shift from modernity to postmodernity,
from coloniality to postcoloniality.9 My project has liberationist leanings, but it should not be
understood through the lens of late 1960s Latin American liberation theology. It is a project in
Christian social ethics that responds to and uses the tools of postmodern and postcolonial
theorizing to extend liberation theology’s basic insights.
My own social location, including the exilic Cuban imaginary, had prevented me from
engaging in any serious way with Marx. I was resistant on the grounds that it was Marx’s ideas
that gave rise to the oppressive regime that threatened by family and forced us from our edenic
island. My interest in social change helped me overcome my reticence and I enrolled in Alan
Gilbert’s class on Marx and Social Change. It was in that class that I was given space and time to
read and digest large portions of Capital, Vol 1. This was my first real exposure to something
other than neoclassical economic thinking. Subsequently I learned that Marxism and NeoMarxism are just one of many heterodox schools of economic thought, all of which critique
neoclassical thought and reject its rationalist, individualist, and reductionists approach to
economic life.

8

For a study on the various ways these liberation theologians have responded see Joerg Rieger,
Opting for the Margins: Postmodernity and Liberation in Christian Theology (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
9

Here I have in mind figures like Marcella Althaus-Reid who embraces the liberationist concern
for the poor, but critiques liberation theologians for imitating the homogenizing tendency of much of
modernist thinking. For example, she argues that liberationists construct the subject of the poor as a
male, heterosexual peasant but have remained silent on patriarchal and sexual liberation that their
theology implies. Althaus-Reid is one of many liberationists who challenge and extend liberation
theology’s basic insights by adopting postmodern and postcolonial tools. See Marcella Althaus-Reid,
Teología Indecente (Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2005).
8

I began to wonder how heterodox economic thought would change the construction of
Christian moral visions of political economic life. I had read mainstream Christian ethicists on
the issue of the political economy, but now I read with a different focus: with an interest in the
underlying social and economic assumptions in their ethical reflections. In what ways are
Christian moral visions challenged by what I had learned about language and conquest, about
social location and a particular historical narrative? In what ways does mainstream Christian
social ethics uphold the neoclassical understanding of economics and what are the relevant
insights that heterodox, postmodern, and postcolonial theory can bring to bear on the
construction of a moral vision of the political economy? It was these sorts of questions that led
me to this project.

9

CHAPTER 1: CHRISTIAN POLITICAL ECONOMIC ETHICS FROM A LATINA/O AND
POSTCOLONIAL PERSPECTIVE

Defining the Topic: The Problem, Research Questions, and Thesis
The U.S. and world economy grew steadily in the Post-War era.10 Some have taken this
effectiveness in bringing about productivity growth as a vindication of the prevalent capitalist
political economic system. Yet, increases in GDP have been accompanied by a downward
pressure on social mobility, persistent poverty, and increasing inequality. Growth-centric
capitalism has moved people from middle class to the working class and has transferred wealth
from the working class to the wealthy. While poverty rates have stagnated since the late 1970s,
the 13.2 percent poverty rate in 2008 was the highest rate since 1997. From 1979 to 2009,
productivity in the U.S. increased 80 percent, but real wages—that is, nominal wages adjusted
for inflation—rose less than 10 percent.11 The result is that increasingly skilled and educated
workers are producing wealth more effectively for their firms than ever before and being paid
comparatively less. This effect of downward social mobility, poverty, and inequality is magnified
when one examines the data broken down into categories defined by difference: gender,

10

From 1946-73, U.S. GDP rose on average 3.8% per year. That growth rate has since slowed to
only 2.7% per year. From 1965-99, the average rate of growth was steady across income levels: 4.1
percent in low-income countries, 4.2 for middle-income countries, and 3.2 percent in high-income
countries. Tatyana P. Soubbotina, Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable Development,
2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004).
11

Susan Fleck, John Glaser, and Shawn Sprague, "The Compensation-Productivity Gap: A Visual
Essay," Monthly Labor Review 134, no. 1 (2011): 57-69.
10

race/ethnicity, age, and national origin.12 Many women continue to make cents on the dollar to
men in comparable positions. One-third of African American adult males will at some point in
their lifetimes be incarcerated. White families are twice as likely to own a home as Latina/o
families. The members of dominant group(s) maintain their privilege by extracting wealth from
marginalized individuals and communities. The idea that when the elite prosper the rest will
follow has yet to be evidenced.
The response of mainstream Christian social ethics to the problems of increasing
inequalities of wealth, income, and opportunity and persistent poverty begins with an insistence
that the capitalist political economy has substantially improved the condition of all people, both
in the U.S. and around the world.13 The task of Christian social ethics from the mainstream
perspective is, therefore, to uncover what is redeemable about capitalist political economics
while denouncing that which is irredeemable. Christian moral visions are constructed
accordingly: they envision a reformed capitalism tempered of its grossest excesses.
The problem with mainstream Christian moral visions of the political economy is that
they fail to deal with the host of ways in which the structures of capitalism are complicit with
the modern/colonial complex. While mainstream Christian social ethicists lament the situation
of the poor and stubborn inequalities, their efforts to bring religious and moral commitments to
bear on political economic practices stop short of condemning the ways in which the capitalist
12

Or really any category of difference. Beverly Tatum identifies seven commonly cited categories
of difference: race/ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status (or class), religion, sexual orientation, age, and
physical and mental ability. The privileged or dominant group within each of these categories tends to
subsume or ignore the characteristics of difference. See Beverly D. Tatum, "The Complexity of Identity:
Who Am I?," in Readings for Diversity and Social Justice, ed. Maurianne Adams, et al. (New York ; London:
Routledge, 2000).
13

For example, “All the jokes about economists aside, increasingly over the past decades
applications of mainstream market economics on both the macro and micro levels have substantially
improved economic conditions within the United States and around the world, and for persons from all
levels of society.” John E. Stapleford, Bulls, Bears & Golden Calves: Applying Christian Ethics in Economics
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 33.
11

political economy has strategically and dangerously reconfigured colonialism and its racist,
patriarchal, and oppressive power relations.14 The destructive and death-dealing effects of these
social structures on members of subordinate groups show such a pro-status quo response to be
utterly inadequate.
Two questions naturally emerge from the above discussion. First, why does mainstream
Christian political economic ethics fail to address capitalism’s neocolonial configuration?
Second, is it possible to construct decolonized Christian moral visions of political economy,
visions that attend to the plight of racial/ethnic minorities, women, and the most vulnerable
members of society and that function in anti-hegemonic and anti-colonial ways? These are the
central, driving questions of this project.
In this dissertation, the answers to these questions are shaped by liberationist and
postcolonial theory and methodologies. With the liberationists, it takes on the perspective of
the socially, politically, and economically oppressed in analyzing Christian moral visions of the
political economy articulated by mainstream social ethicists.15 To paraphrase James Cone, to the

14

Fanon was one of the first to articulate the logic of capital in the context of what he called the
problem of colonialism. See Frantz Fanon and Richard Philcox, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Richard
Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004 [1965]).
15

Some liberationist theorists have argued that continuing to focus on work of the mainstream
thinkers directs attention on the center and distracts from the project of articulating theologies and ethics
from marginalized perspectives. The author agrees, as far as this goes. But there is something wrongheaded about this critique: it assumes that liberationist theorizing exists in isolation from the broader
tradition, as if it arrived on the scene fully formed. Concepts much celebrated among liberationists, such
as human dignity or even liberation, have a long history in the western tradition. It seems at best
disingenuous to proceed as if the first usage of these terms occurred in the second half of the 20th
century.
Both liberationist and mainstream perspectives are branches of the same trunk of the Christian
theological tree. Moreover, given that liberationist views continue to be sidetracked and seen as only
about and for the communities from which they are written, it is both appropriate and relevant to critique
mainstream perspectives. While liberation theologians have excelled at scrutinizing in exquisite detail
how oppression operates within sinful social structures, their analysis of the political economy usually
ends there. The liberationist ethicist’s summative dismissal of society as it now stands falls short of critical
engagement with the mainstream theorists which may be vital to achieving social change.
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extent that these Christian moral visions fail to address the communities of the oppressed, they
cease to be Christian or moral.16 Thus, methodologically the analysis proceeds by pressing the
liberationist question: does mainstream Christian ethics envision a political economy
substantively different than the status quo? It is axiomatic that if a moral vision supports the
status quo or some gently modified version of it, it has failed to advocate for the oppressed and
marginalized of society. With postcolonial theorists, this project engages in a reading strategy
and method of critical analysis focused on the dynamics of power, resistance, and identity.17 The
question of epistemic privilege which lies at the heart of the liberationist critique receives
further and fuller articulation in the discourses of postcoloniality. The postcolonial theoretical
backing is most clearly expressed in suggesting a way forward for Christian political economic
ethics, since any moral vision that remains complicit with modern/colonial structures could
never constitute a decolonized moral vision.
Enrique Dussel’s approach to ethics, which combines postcolonial thought and
liberation theology, has been particularly influential to the project. In Dussel's view, the current
political economy is a result of a succession of systems of exploitation and expropriation of
value that originates with the creation of modernity and coloniality, when Europe organized the
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Cone’s actual words: “Theology ceases to be a theology of the gospel when it fails to arise out
of the community of the oppressed. For it is impossible to speak of the God of Israelite history, who is the
God revealed in Jesus Christ, without recognizing that God is the God of and for those who labor and are
over laden,” James H. Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation, 20th anniversary ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books, 1990 [1970]), 1.
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The term postcolonial refers to a complex and interdisciplinary series of discourses that
employ varied and sometimes contradictory concepts to theorize the (post)colonial period, condition,
and/or thinking. One way to understand postcolonial theory is as an attempt to reveal relationship of
colonizer and colonized as an instantiation of the dynamic of power-resistance-identity in Hegel’s masterslave dialectic. See Leela Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998), 16-17.
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initial world system and placed itself at the center over and against the periphery.18 Approaches
to political economic ethics that focus solely on poverty, as defined by measures of income,
occlude the imperial nature of the capitalist system of production and accumulation of wealth.19
In short, in order to speak about the problems of wealth and poverty one must also speak of
global capitalism, colonialism, and the historical patterns of wealth accumulation which enriches
the minority while impoverishing the majority.20
The central argument of the project is twofold. First, mainstream Christian ethicists have
constructed their moral visions of the political economy according to modern/colonial logics.
Second, decolonizing mainstream Christian moral visions requires theorizing from the
18

See Enrique D. Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse Of "The Other" And the Myth of
Modernity, trans. Michael D. Barber (New York: Continuum, 1995).
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Dussel’s anti-imperial political economy coincides with the critiques developed by Immanuel
Wallerstein.
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Dussel’s development as a philosopher and ethicist largely coincide. During the late 1960s and
1970s, recognizing the pedagogical inappropriateness of the methods he had learned in Europe and
intrigued by the revolutionary and populist movement in Argentina and Latin America, he undertook the
task of developing a philosophical methodology that was responsive to Latin American symbols and
hermeneutics. See Enrique D. Dussel, Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, [1. ed., 2 vols.
(Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Argentina Editores, 1973); Enrique D. Dussel, Filosofía Ética
Latinoamericana, vol. 3, Colección Filosofía y Liberación Latinoamericana (México: Editorial Edicol, 1977);
Enrique D. Dussel, Filosofía Ética Latinoamericana, vol. 4, Colección Filosofía y Liberación Latinoamericana
(Bogotá: USTA, 1979); Enrique D. Dussel, Filosofía Ética Latinoamericana, vol. 5, Colección Filosofía y
Liberación Latinoamericana (Bogotá: USTA, 1980). In the second stage of his philosophical/ethical
development, Dussel immersed himself in reading Marx and in doing so discovered a Marx that is relevant
both to the project of liberation and to the critical reception of Marx in the twentieth century. See
Enrique D. Dussel, La Producción Teórica de Marx. Un Comentario a Los Grundrisse, 1a ed., Biblioteca del
Pensamiento Socialista. Serie Estudios Críticos (México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1985); Enrique D. Dussel,
Hacia un Marx Desconcido. Un Comentario de Los Manuscritos del 1861-1863 (México: Siglo Veintiuno
Editores, 1988); Enrique D. Dussel, El Último Marx (1863-1882) y la Liberación Latinoamericana. Un
Comentario a la Tercera y a la Cuarta Redacción de "El Capital", Biblioteca del Pensamiento Socialista.
Serie Ensayos Críticos (Iztapalapa, México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1990). The third stage begins with
Dussel’s decade long debate with Karl-Otto Apel, which confronts the challenges of how to construct a
global ethics of liberation in the face of the linguistic turn. See Enrique D. Dussel, Ética de la Liberación en
la Edad de la Globalización y de la Exclusión (Madrid: Trotta, 1998); Enrique D. Dussel and Eduardo
Mendieta, The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996). For a detailed and systematic explanation of Dussel’s
thought Eduardo Mendieta, "Introduction," in Beyond Philosophy : Ethics, History, Marxism, and
Liberation Theology, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).
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perspective of Latina/o thinking and disrupting Christian social ethics’ operative understanding
of economics. The first part of the argument explains the problem while the second offers a dual
solution.

Theoretical and Methodological Concerns
The Social Embeddedness of Ethical Systems and the Moral Imagination
A crucial theoretical basis for the project is the social embeddedness of ethical systems
and the moral imagination. Various societies have evolved embedded ethical systems—rules,
principles, narratives, basic convictions—intended to guide moral behavior. It is worth noting
that ethics is derived from the same Greek root as the English word ethos,21 which refers to
what is habitual, a way of life, or what Bourdieu refers to as “habitus.”22 Ethos belongs to a
people, a culture, a group; it is the characteristic or prevalent existential tone, the immediate
world of human works under the horizon of meaningful action.23 From this embedded ethic and
ethos arises philosophical ethics, which tries to methodically and explicitly analyze what is
already being lived out at the level of the ethos and to elucidate the embedded ethical
systems—the beliefs and patterns of acceptable behavior—of a given human community.24
Greece gave birth to philosophical ethics, but despite claims that their reflections are universally
21

Ethos, with an eta.
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In The Logic of Practice, Bourdieu defines habitus as “The conditionings associated with a
particular class of conditions of existence . . . system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and
organize practices and representations.” See Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1990), 53.
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valid, it was necessarily a Greek philosophical ethics; it could not have been otherwise. The
Greeks, critical of their own world, could not apply their critique beyond the horizons of the
Hellenistic world. That is, the horizon of their ethical imagination was already historically,
culturally, and socially bound and determined.25
Ethics analyzes and interprets the embedded moral imagination of a historically
bounded and determined people, community, or society, even when an ethicist does not
acknowledge her or his subject position within the habitus. Despite insistences of some,
Aristotle’s discussion of eudaimonia (“happiness” or “flourishing”) and arête (“virtue”) in his two
ethical treatises, disseminated under the titles Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics, do
not deal with an ethic valid for all human beings at all times, but only for the Greeks of his
time.26 Although he lacked the critical self-consciousness to recognize it, Kant’s Critique of
Practical Reason reflects the ethos of the Prussian people at the end of the 18th century and
beginning of the 19th century.27 Despite Kant’s Enlightenment presumption of universality, his
ethics are socially situated and only comprehensible on those terms. This does not mean that
the reflections of Aristotle or Kant are to be abandoned wholesale, only that their ethics must
be examined in the context of their ethos, of their habitus.
The focus of this dissertation is on Christian social ethics, not with Greek or
Enlightenment philosophers directly. They are meant only to illustrate that even the figures that
loom largest in the moral imagination are bounded by their own time and space. If that is true
for Aristotle or Kant, then it is certainly true for the contemporary figures examined in this
25

Ibid., 8-9.
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Perhaps even for a much narrower group than that: the privileged upper classes of his
particular region of Greece. See Ibid., 9.
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dissertation. Since ethics is correlated to habitus, it is clear that social ethics evokes questions of
epistemology, ontology, and existentialism; questions about what and how human beings know,
what reality is, and the identity and place of human being in that reality. Like all forms of ethics,
then, Christian social ethics imaginatively constructs moral visions conditioned and limited by
the ethos and habitus of the theorists.

Core Theoretical Concepts
Decolonizing
The focal point of the dissertation lies at the intersection of three core theoretical
concepts: decolonization, moral visions, and the political economy. Each of these offers a way to
understand the project. The first way of understanding the project is as a performance in
decolonizing mainstream Christian social ethics. 28 Decolonizing is necessary because any
attempt to construct an unmodified form of Christian ethics, a universality valid ethics, is
already an ethnocentric and colonizing act in at least in two ways. First, tensions and
connections with empire and colonization have been part of Christianity from its earliest
beginnings and have been part of the context of Christianity, in a variety of ways, since then.
Nonetheless, Christian thinkers have rarely reflected on these tensions.29 In the modern period,
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The decolonizing framework attempts to do more than deconstruct texts, tell the horror
stories of the past, and recover marginalized epistemologies. It is part of a much larger effort to stop the
mechanism of death operative in marginalized communities. For more on decolonization, see Emma
Pérez, The Decolonial Imaginary: Writing Chicanas into History, Theories of Representation and
Difference. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); Chela Sandoval, Methodology of the Oppressed,
Theory out of Bounds (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Linda Tuhiwai Smith,
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There are only handful of works currently available that have taken on the task of interpreting
Christianity within the context of empire and even fewer which have attempted to disentangle
Christianity and empire. Sharon Betcher, Kwok, Rieger, and Rivera Rivera are among the few postcolonial
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Christian (or sometimes “civilizing”) mission as part of the rationale for empire building, has
until recently seldom been critiqued. To take one example, within the massive amount of
research dedicated to the 19th century theologian Schleiermacher there are hardly any
investigations into the colonial context of his work.30 Although empire/colonialism has been the
context for Christianity, and Christianity has often been co-opted by empire and colonizing
power, these connections have been considered only infrequently. Christian social ethics that
ignores the involvement of colonizing and imperial forces becomes an ethic synonymous with
the projects of colonization and empire.
Second, the ethnocentricsm is expressed through a colonial mindset which warps and
distorts the personal identities and intellectual endeavors. Edward Said and Walter Mignolo
have identified this phenomenon whereby efforts to describe the other, of the (Near or Middle)
East or (American) West, transmute into a reflection and serves the purposes of the one
describing.31 Through the transmutation of Said’s Orientalism and Mignolo’s Occidentalism, the
other is created to expand the power and boost the self image of the colonizer. One important
implication of the Orientalism/ Occidentalism interpretation is that there is no such thing as

theologians. See Sharon Betcher, "Monstrosities, Miracles, and Mission: Religion and the Politics of
Disablement," in Postcolonial Theologies: Divinity and Empire, ed. Catherine Keller, Michael Nausner, and
Mayra Rivera (St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 2004); Pui-lan Kwok, Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist
Theology, 1st ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005); Joerg Rieger, Christ and Empire:
From Paul to Postcolonial Times (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2007); Mayra Rivera, The Touch of
Transcendence: A Postcolonial Theology of God, 1st ed. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007).
The number of scholars who deploy postcolonial methodologies are on the rise, though on the whole
postcolonial discourse still remains on the periphery of Christian ethical discourse. For an attempt engage
in this project more generally see Don H. Compier, Pui-lan Kwok, and Joerg Rieger, eds., Empire and the
Christian Tradition: New Readings of Classical Theologians (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2007).
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unqualified Christian ethics. There can be only African-American Christian Ethics or Latina/os
Christian Ethics or Euro-American Christian Ethics. Writing under the rubric of (unmodified)
Christian Ethics marks either a refusal to recognize the ethos and habitus already present in
one’s work or a ethnocentric, hegemonic, and social-cultural colonial move that claims
superiority over other forms of Christian ethics (even if it is unconsciously made). Constructing a
Christian social ethic that is more than a colonizing act requires a critical examination of the
ethnocentricism and colonial mindset and searching for those insights that can move the
conversation beyond the horizon of empire.
The little work that has been done in the field usually falls under the rubric of
postcolonialism, which gives the mistaken impression that the colonial period, has come to an
end. Positing a strong pre/post binary assumes amorphous and porous elements can be
somehow separated. While some formal colonial relationships have ended, others have
remained. Guam and Puerto Rico, both acquired under the Treaty of Paris after the SpanishAmerican War, for example, continue to function as U.S. colonies, despite the end of official
colonialism. The French Départements d'Outre Mer (DOM) of French Guiana, Guadeloupe,
Martinique, and Réunion, although official integrated regions, are considered by many to be the
contemporary colonies of France. One might consider this quibbling—after all, the U.S. refers to
these as organized territories, not colonies; the French consider these “departments.” Yet the
power differencials characteristic of colonizer/colony still exist: Puerto Ricans are subject to U.S.
laws even though they are excluded from participation in electing officials who create them.
Guam finds itself under similar circumstances. And although the residents of DOM colonies
officially enjoy the same status of European French, they are often relegated to the status of
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second-class citizens. Thus, the term postcolonial thus fails both in terms of historical accuracy
and in signifying the end of power differentials that have not come about.32
Since post-colonialism signals the end of colonialism in only a limited way, the term
deployed in this project is decolonizing, which recognizes that there is no easy escape from
modern/colonial powerful differentials, structures, and mindset. And yet these must be faced
head on. Instead of the perhaps unrealizable, utopic dream of a postcolonial world, this
dissertation proposes a realistic utopia, one that acknowledges the modern/colonial context of
our world.33 Like the mestiza Guadalupana, who embodies both continuity and discontinuity
and symbolizes both oppression and liberation, decolonizing attempts to get at the best of the
euroamerican/modern tradition, rather than rejecting it wholesale.
Moral Visions
Social ethics, as noted above, must always be both descriptive and prescriptive. It
attempts empirical description of the social context as well providing practical proposals for
32
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Some of the author’s colleagues have insisted the appeal here to “realistic” utopias has more
than a hint of Nieburian odor to it. Niebuhr’s construction of “Christian realism” was an attempt to deflate
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social change. The role of social ethics is to use the critical tools of social science, philosophy,
and the natural sciences in the direction of pragmatic reinterpretation necessary for the
prescribing norms for regulation of social life. This pragmatic reinterpretation forms a moral
vision of Christian social ethics. The range of practical proposals constitutes a spectrum of the
Christian moral imagination; it is the spectrum of the possible. Chapter two takes on the task of
mapping the spectrum of the Christian moral imagination on the political economy. What
follows is a theoretical grounding and methodological justification for exploring moral visions
and moral imagination.
Moral visions, as the pragmatic reinterpretation of critical social analysis, are the
culmination or apex of ethical formulations. They are also the starting point of ethical
reflections. Moral visions shape social ethics and ethical methodologies which in turn influence
moral visions. In this sense, moral visions work in analogous ways to physical vision; human
beings do not pay attention to everything they see. Magic tricks work because when the human
eye detects motion, the brain tracks the movement and actively suppresses the visual stimulus
around it.34 In a similar way, ethicists who expound moral visions attend to what is in motion,
the segment of society they consider most important, and actively suppress the concerns of
other segments. The ethicist’s moral vision always already delimits the range of what is seen
before they begin theorizing.
The construction and deconstruction of moral visions is one of the main activity of social
ethics, and indeed all practical and critical social theory. Theorizing alternative worlds or
articulating moral visions requires, among other things, activating the imagination. Imagination
is the power to enact a mental image of what society might be, whether one envisions a world
34

See Stephen Macknik, S. Martinez-Conde, and Sandra Blakeslee, Sleights of Mind: What the
Neuroscience of Magic Reveals About Our Everyday Deceptions, 1st ed. (New York: Henry Holt, 2010).
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in which most abide by the rules or principles of an ethical system (a focus on behavior), or
embody the virtues/character of the same (a focus on a communal and individual ethos), or in
which institutional and social evils have been transformed into just ones (a focus on structural
realities). That is, ethical reflection, regardless of the mode of operation—deontological,
teleological, responsible, virtue, narrative, character, etc.—even if it describes merely a task or
mechanism or quest for self-knowledge,35 depends on the faculty of the imagination and the
articulation of moral visions. Following Satre, imagination refers to the mechanism by which
mental images of the world manifest themselves as objects to the consciousness, rather than
merely a bridge between sense and cognitive faculties.36 Thus, Christian moral visions reveal as
much knowledge about the subjective mental states of the ethicists as they do ontological
knowledge. Stated differently, moral visions provide a basic framework that externalizes the
internal conception of reality of ethical theorists.

Political Economy
Social theorists, including ethicists, have often deployed the terms political economy,
global political economy, globalization, etc., but have seldom used these terms as more than
35
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fashionable buzzwords. The reader is to understand that these terms refer to something like
“the current state of things” but otherwise is left to guess what these terms might mean. This
imprecision or lack of analytical rigor concerning “political economy” and/or related terms is
perhaps unsurprising since it reflects the imprecise use of the term in popular discourse. Recent
social theory has not done much better in formulating a more precise concept of political
economy despite insistences by some to the contrary. All of which begs the question: what is
the political economy?
On a basic level, political economy refers to the relationship between politics and
economics, between public and private spheres, between nation-states and markets. But in a
sense this definition is too limited: political economy refers to a synthesis of any form of political
authority and economic activity, both from above (regional, international, the global) and below
(the local, state, and provinces). Moreover, defining political economy as the relationship
between politics and economics assumes the ability to separate politics from economics.
Pioneers of International Political Economy (IPE), such as Susan Strange, have stressed that the
political economy involves the inseparability or mutual influence of the economic (resource
mobilization and wealth-creation) and the political (authority, power, and control). For Strange,
IPE is concerned with the “social, political, and economic arrangement affecting the global
systems of production, exchange and distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein.”37 In
short, political economy is concerned with the nature and exercise of power, be it economic or
political or both, within the material social context in which human beings live.
Having defined political economy as the exercise of power within a material context,
implies that the particular sort and practice of power known as western democratic-capitalism is
by no means inevitable. A market-oriented political-economic system as the single possible
37
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solution to human want is a product of the modern/colonial imagination. The mechanism
undergirding the system of democratic-capitalism, the unchecked pursuit of self-interest so
vigorously defended as an omnipresent and timeless part of human nature, is an historically
contingent socio-cultural product.38
Those with more economistic leanings might object, arguing that the capitalism cannot
be considered a cultural product since, as Karl Marx noted, culture is a superstructure with only
a derivative relationship to economics. According to Marx, the capitalist economy sets the tone
for culture, which changed in order to accommodate it. The concern here is not simply to turn
the explanation around, as Max Weber did, to argue that culture is the formative influence on
the development of a capitalist market economy. The debates in western social science, split
along the lines of economistic and culturalist ways of thinking about the origins of the modern
market economy, are less relevant than the acknowledgement that regardless of which came
first, the economy or culture, the capitalist economy represents a decidedly modernist/
colonizing way of organizing the material world.
It is important to note that a modernist/colonizing way of looking at the world is not
equivalent to a Euro-American or European way of looking at the world. The adoption and
legitimization of market oriented capitalist system among Europeans took centuries. Mercantile
feudalism categorized the European political economy for over 1,000 years during the Middle
Ages. Certainly there were markets: traveling fairs and places where agricultural producers sold
their goods. The idea of a market as more than a place of exchange, however, as the driving
force for sustaining an entire society, was unthinkable. There was good reason why medieval
Europe could not conceive of a market system. It had not abstracted the elements of production
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necessary to conceive of a market system: land, labor, and capital. In the feudal way of life,
lands formed the core of social life. They were the basis of status and prestige, of military,
juridical, and administrative organization. A medieval nobleman would no more sell part of his
land than the governor of Connecticut would sell adjacent counties to the governor of Rhodes
Island.39 Serfs were not free agents contracting out their services for pay. Serfs, like apprentices
and journeymen, labored but their labor never entered into a market to be bought and sold.
There was no more of a labor market than is provided by hospital interns.40 While capital existed
in the sense of private wealth, there was no impetus to put it to use as leverage for more
efficient production methods. The slowest and most labor intensive process was preferred to
the fastest and most efficient.41
The dread of change and innovation gave way very slowly over the course of centuries.
Several movements gave rise to the change: the rise of nation-states, conquest and colonialism
(of the Holy Land, within Europe, of the Americas, and then Africa and Asia), changing religious
ideas (acquisitiveness construed as a virtue by Protestant Reformers), changes in infrastructure
and increasing international trade (spurred on by events like the drive to build Gothic
Cathedrals), the rise of humanism, the rediscovery of ancient learning via Arabs, and scientific
curiosity (and creation of sub-industrial inventions).42 It was not until the late 18th century that
the economic ideology of liberalism emerged. Liberalism advocates for broader political
participation, free economic markets, maximum amount of individual liberty possible, and that
39
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individuals should pursue their own economic self-interest unapologetically because in doing so
they will raise the standards of living for everyone. This ideological position was important in the
break with medieval European notions and the creation of modern ones.
Increasing global integration based on commercialization and commodification—of
land, labor, and capital—is not inevitable, even for Europeans. The political economic principle
that each person acting in their own self-interest will yield the greatest social well-being is not a
discovery of an eternal timeless truth, but an imaginative invention of a people within a
particular historical and socio-cultural framework. It is an invention that attempts to legitimize
the current social configuration as the best of all possible worlds.
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Nature and Scope of the Project
The second half of the twentieth century marked a shift in concerns for normative ethics
towards meta-ethics.43 Questions such as “what is the good?” or “what are one’s duties to
others” tended to fade into the background of ethical discussions, supplanted by meta-ethical
questions such as “what does the good mean?”; “how are goodness and rightness related?”;
“what purpose does moral language serve?”; and “how is it possible to know what is ethical at
all?” Meta-ethical questions such as these are not new—Socrates asked them more than two
thousand years ago—but they occupied a greater part of the attention of professional ethicists
in the twentieth century than in any time in the past.44
This research project is a work of meta-ethics. The distinction is an important one.
Normative ethics has as its subject matter the human conduct. Meta-ethics, in contrast, has the
discipline of normative ethics as its subject matter: it is the systematic study of normative ethics.
While normative ethics is once removed from moral practice, meta-ethics is twice removed.45 As
a twice-removed inquiry, it stands apart from normative ethics proper, asking questions about
ethical theories and the problems of meaning, method, and knowledge. The project undertakes
an analytical and meta-ethical examination of Christian moral visions of the political economy.46
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Contemporary Writers, 8th ed. (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace, 1999), 311.
45

Oliver A. Johnson is just one who makes this classic distinction between normative and metaethics. See Ibid., 9-11.
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The project only examines the moral visions articulated by professional Christian social
ethicists. Christian advocacy groups, grass-roots resistance movements, and the like are not in view. These
no doubt would provide rich sources for analysis, but they do not represent fully articulated moral vision
of the political economy.
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It is not an attempt to elaborate a Christian moral vision of the political economy; instead it is an
attempt to provide methodological guidance for decolonizing Christian moral visions of the
political economy.

Outline of the Dissertation
The discussion of the dissertation proceeds along the lines suggested by the thesis.
Chapter one sets the parameters of the study and laying some of the theoretical groundwork for
what follows. The second half of the chapter examines decolonizing, moral visions, and political
economy—three concepts central to the discussion. The chapter concludes with some thoughts
about the nature and scope of the project and an outline of the dissertation. Chapter two maps
the discourse of mainstream Christian social ethics of the political economy. It focuses on the
work of three leading ethicists writing in this area—Daniel Finn, Max Stackhouse, and Philip
Wogaman—who represent the mainstream perspective.47 Chapters three and four constitute
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These authors are influential representatives of the mainstream perspective of Christian
political economic ethics. Over the last few decades, there have been a number of publications in this
area, though in the mind of the author there are reasons to exclude them from the analysis at hand. One
such work is the often cited Herman E. Daly, John B. Cobb, and Clifford W. Cobb, For the Common Good:
Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future, 2nd ed. (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1994 [1989]). Cobb and Daly’s work is more of a critique of mainstream economic concepts
than it is a thoroughgoing Christian ethical analysis of the political economy. Two related works, which
aim to introduce economic concepts to the “theologically minded” non-specialist are Samuel Gregg,
Economic Thinking for the Theologically Minded (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001); and
Walter L. Owensby, Economics for Prophets: A Primer on Concepts, Realities, and Values in Our Economic
System (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988).
Another work is Hans Küng’s sweeping A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics (Hans
Küng, A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)). While
Küng’s work surveys a wide range of ethical issues in politics and economics—driven by the conviction
that the world’s religions are capable of supplying the basis for his “global ethic”—it is not a theological
examination of the political economy. Küng’s is a pluralist moral vision: he draws almost not at all on the
Christian tradition in his reflections on politics and economics.
An excellent critique of the liberal tradition’s attempts to reconcile theological ethics and
economics can be found in P. Travis Kroeker, Christian Ethics and Political Economy in North America: A
Critical Analysis, Mcgill-Queen's Studies in the History of Religion (Montreal ; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1995). Kroeker examines the work of Rauschenbush, R. Niebuhr, and the pastoral letters
by the Canadian and U.S. conferences of Roman Catholic Bishops and ultimately concludes that they fail
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to rise above their faulty theological assumptions. While it is a compelling critique and useful in thinking
about attempts to articulate a political economic ethics of previous generations, Kroeker only provides a
sketch of his own proposal based on a return to Augustinian realism, as opposed to the sustained
treatment of the views in the works of the authors chosen. Moreover, Kroeker’s call to return to the
theological foundations of an earlier area is voiced earlier and more powerfully by Stackhouse.
Other works focus on Biblical perspectives of wealth such as Bruce C. Birch and Larry L.
Rasmussen, The Predicament of the Prosperous, 1st ed., Biblical Perspectives on Current Issues
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1978); Craig Blomberg, Neither Poverty nor Riches: A Biblical Theology
of Material Possessions (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999); and John R. Schneider, Godly Materialism:
Rethinking Money & Possessions (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994).
Still others attempt to give a theological account of the economy or to use the metaphor of
economics to reformulate theology, such as D. Stephen Long, "The Theology of Economics," in Calculated
Futures: Theology, Ethics, and Economics, ed. D. Stephen Long, Nancy Ruth Fox, and Tripp York (Waco, TX:
Baylor University Press, 2007), 105-16; and M. Douglas Meeks, God the Economist: The Doctrine of God
and Political Economy (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989).
Some works are not serious scholarly contributions, but are meant for individual Christians and
churches interested in responding practically to political economic realities, such as Rebecca M. Blank, Do
Justice: Linking Christian Faith and Modern Economic Life (Cleveland, OH: United Church Press, 1992);
David P. Gushee, Toward a Just and Caring Society: Christian Responses to Poverty in America (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Boooks, 1999); Susan R. Holman, God Knows There's Need: Christian Responses to
Poverty (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Rebecca Todd Peters and Elizabeth L. HinsonHasty, To Do Justice: A Guide for Progressive Christians, 1st ed. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press,
2008); Ronald J. Sider, Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger: Moving from Affluence to Generosity, 20th
anniversary revision. ed. (Dallas: Word Pub., 1997 [1977]); and Ronald J. Sider, Just Generosity: A New
Vision for Overcoming Poverty in America, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2007 [1999]).
Other works examine Christian spirituality as a way of opening up alternative kinds of political
economic spaces, such as William T. Cavanaugh, Being Consumed: Economics and Christian Desire (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2008); Rodney Clapp, "Why the Devil Takes Visa: A Christian
Response to the Triumph of Consumerism," Christianity Today 40, no. 1 (Oct 7, 1996); and Daniel G.
Groody, Globalization, Spirituality, and Justice: Navigating a Path to Peace (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,
2007).
Then there are a series of earth-centric books on ethics including Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary
Radford Ruether, Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans, Religions of the
World and Ecology (Cambridge, MA: Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Harvard University
Center for the Study of World Religions, 2000); David G. Hallman, Ecotheology: Voices from South and
North (Geneva, Switzerland; Maryknoll, NY: WCC Publications; Orbis Books, 1994); Willis Jenkins,
Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (Oxford; New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008); Sallie McFague, Life Abundant: Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in Peril
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001); Michael S. Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, New
Studies in Christian Ethics (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Larry L.
Rasmussen, Earth Community Earth Ethics, Ecology and Justice (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996); and
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology: With a New Introduction,
10th anniversary ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993 [1983]). These texts are invaluable in uncovering the
theological relationship between God, nature, and humanity; calling for a rearticulation of Christian
theology in light of the ecological challenge; recognizing the link between oppressive systems and
ecological threats under the rubric of eco-justice; and emphasizing the covenantal commitment and
sacramental obligation of Christians to engage in ecological justice. While most of these texts condemn
market-focused political economic system for their ecological unsustainability, none have a construction
of a Christian political economic ethics in view.
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the solution portion of the discussion, taking each of the two-fold suggestions cited above in
turn. Chapter three deconstructs the epistemic limitations of Christian social ethics that
universalizes the subject position of its author and explores the ethical and epistemic potential
of Latina/o thinking. Chapter four exposes the neoclassical economic framework which
undergirds Christian moral visions and offers an analysis using the tools of heterodox
economics. Chapter five revisits the argument of the dissertation, states its contributions to
Christian social ethics and Latina/o religious-cultural studies, and suggests prospective lines of
research and theorizing to further the project of decolonizing moral visions.

Since talk about globalization has become commonplace, a number of works have been
published that critically examine globalization, such as Pamela Brubaker, Globalization at What Price?:
Economic Change and Daily Life, Rev. and updated. ed. (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2007 [2001]); Cynthia D.
Moe-Lobeda, Healing a Broken World: Globalization and God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2002);
and Rebecca Todd Peters, In Search of the Good Life: The Ethics of Globalization (New York: Continuum,
2004). These works address the issue of globalization which is a broader concern than the just political
economy.
Other works along these lines that might have been but were not included because they were
the singular work of the author in this area or because they contain ideas and arguments that are already
represented by the authors chosen: David M. Beckmann, Where Faith and Economics Meet: A Christian
Critique (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Pub. House, 1981); Robert Benne, The Ethic of Democratic
Capitalism: A Moral Reassessment (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981); Warren R. Copeland, Economic
Justice: The Social Ethics of U.S. Economic Policy (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1988); Robert Lee, Faith
and the Prospects of Economic Collapse (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981); Albert Terrill Rasmussen,
Christian Responsibility in Economic Life (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965); Robert L. Stivers, The
Sustainable Society: Ethics and Economic Growth (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1976); and Richard K.
Taylor and Joint Educational Development, Economics and the Gospel: A Primer on Shalom as Economic
Justice (Philadelphia: Published for Joint Educational Development [by] United Church Press, 1973).
Lastly, there are two books, published by the current co-chairs of Economic Ethics group of the
SCE, James P. Bailey, Rethinking Poverty: Income, Assets, and the Catholic Social Justice Tradition (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010); Kathryn D'Arcy Blanchard, The Protestant Ethic or the
Spirit of Capitalism: Christians, Freedom, and Free Markets (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books). The themes
covered in these two books are thoroughly represented in works addressed in chapter two. Bailey’s book
applies Catholic social thought to the issues of economic poverty, and his solution, to empower the poor
by building assets, adds little to the discussion among mainstream Christian ethicists. Blanchard, along
with Finn, is part of the “markets rightly-conceived” camp. That is, they both argue that markets can
become “moral” (Finn) or “other-interested” (Blanchard) if conceptualized correctly. Moreover, Finn,
Stackhouse, and Wogaman have a much larger corpus related to the issues of ethics and political
economy, each having written on the topic for decades.
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CHAPTER 2: MAINSTREAM CHRISTIAN ETHICS OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

For as long as the universe contains conscious beings whose willed actions cause
themselves and each other many kinds and degrees of suffering and joy, moral
questions will remain inescapably important.
—Christopher Clausen48

Envisioning a Moral Political Economy
Religious and non-religious thinkers alike are interested in envisioning a moral political
economy. Many of these theorists have concluded that capitalism—the prevalent form of
political economy currently operative in the world—is violent, discriminatory, dominating, and
exploitative. Most wars have underlying economic causes, usually about access to resources. For
example, it is now widely accepted that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was motivated primarily by a
quest for oil.49 The widespread U.S. consumer demand for any and all types of drugs has led
directly to the increase in violence, drug dealing, and arms trade in Latin American and other
developing countries.50 Income and wealth flow to a select few at the expense of the vast
majority. Social categories of race/ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation are used to maintain
privilege and oppress individuals not because of anything they have done or not done, but on
48

Christopher Clausen, The Moral Imagination: Essays on Literature and Ethics, 1st ed. (Iowa City:
University of Iowa Press, 1986), 5.
49

Even the fiscal conservative Alan Greenspan acknowledges as much in his book Alan
Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (New York: Penguin Press, 2007).
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A topic under discussion at a recent meeting between Honduras’s Minister of Public Security
Oscar Alvarez and his U.S. counterparts in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). The ATF
operation called Operation Fast and Furious was meant to track the guns and then take into custody those
involved in drug cartels. The operation went badly and allowed as many as two thousand guns to flow
illegally into Mexico, Honduras, and other Latin American countries. As reported on Univison’s Al Punto,
broadcast on July 24, 2011.
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the basis of difference. Lack of access to clean water in many places has led to the spread of
preventable diseases, chronic illnesses, and sometimes death.51 Climate change attributable to
industrial activities of humans is leading to desertification, decimation of food sources, and
starvation. While it may be somewhat difficult to accept, there is little doubt that the present
capitalist political economy deals death every day.
One would expect that the moral vision articulated by Christian social ethicists, who
have the prophetic Biblical tradition to draw from, would take the lead in critiquing a system
that encourages human beings to trample on each other, the Earth, and all life in the name of
economic gain.52 On the contrary, Christian social ethical discourse, while ostensibly concerned
about injustice, inequity, and the poor, defends the basic framework of the world-capitalist
system. This chapter argues that mainstream Christian ethics of the political economy endorses
the status quo and affirms the virtues of the prevalent free-market system. The argument is not
that those who write in the field of Christian ethics are maliciously intent on designing ways for
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There are relatively inexpensive and quickly implementable water purification systems, such as
the H20 Tech 2 system installed in the community of Aceituno, Guatemala through partnership of Central
Presbyterian Church and the author’s local church, Presbyterian Church of the Covenant. For incredibly
low cost (the entire system cost $10,000, has a life span of 10 years, and purifies more than 120 gal of
water per day) the system reclaims contaminated water (the only available water in the community) into
safe, potable water.
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Biblical scholarship reveals a Jesus who said and did a great deal relevant to the political
economy. One can make a good case that promoting a moral economy was a pivotal project for Jesus. See
Blomberg, Neither Poverty nor Riches. The prophetic social role of Jesus’ ministry has been identified as a
key aspect of Jesus’ brief public ministry. Marcus Borg identifies five key roles of Jesus’ ministry. He was a
person a mystic, healer, wisdom teacher, social prophet, and founder of a movement. See “Jesus Before
and After Easter: Jewish Mystic and Christian Messiah,” in Marcus J. Borg and N. T. Wright, The Meaning
of Jesus: Two Visions, 1st ed. ([San Francisco]: HarperSanFrancisco, 1999), 53-76. A social prophet, Jesus
followed in a line of earlier prophets who protested a system of domination, the economic and political
arrangement that oppressed and exploited, and announced that it was God’s will for a very different
system. Jesus promoted an alternative moral vision of an inclusive and egalitarian society, a vision that
challenged the social boundaries of his day. That is, Jesus challenged the systems of domination of his
day. One could make the argument that Jesus was killed for his economic and political policy suggestions,
which challenged the wealthy and powerful of his day. This line of reasoning is pursued in the small
pamphlet Tom Head, Envisioning a Moral Economy, ed. Chel Avery, Pendle Hill Pamphlet 405
(Wallingford, PA: Pendle Hill, February 2010).
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privileged groups to maintain their power. Nor is it that they fail to condemn some violations of
human dignity and ecological integrity. What is being argued is that mainstream Christian
ethicists understand these injustices as occasional exceptions to a system that generally yield
good economic and political outcomes.
This chapter examines mainstream Christian social ethics’ moral visions of the political
economy. In order to examine these moral visions in some detail, the discussion is limited to the
work of three prominent Christian social ethicists—Daniel Finn, Max Stackhouse, and Philip
Wogaman. All three have written extensively on the issues of political economic ethics and have
served as Presidents of the Society of Christian ethics (2009, 1986-87, 1976-77, respectively).
Finn has Catholic roots while the other two draw on the Protestant theological heritage:
Stackhouse is ordained in the United Church of Christ while Wogaman is an ordained United
Methodist minister. Together they represent mainstream Christian social ethics of the political
economy. Their work reveals the various configurations of the political economy Christian
ethicists imagine are possible and what they believe to be “unimaginable,” or outside the
boundaries of the possible.
Each section begins with a brief biographical sketch of the thinker under discussion, with
a focus on his intellectual history, before proceeding to an analysis of his work. The biographical
data offers a way of locating each thinker within his social location. It is not an attempt to
reinscribe the trope of the narrative identity of the great white man, who self-sufficiently speaks
to all times and places. On the contrary, it serves as an acknowledgement that identities and
social locations are relevant features of epistemic assessments and are important in the
construction of moral visions. Acknowledging the social embeddedness of knowledge is a crucial
step in decolonizing moral visions.
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Finn’s Trade and Free Markets, Correctly Understood
Daniel Finn began his academic career in Mathematics, earning a B.S. in 1968 from St.
John Fisher College, a liberal arts Catholic college located near Rochester, NY.53 After college,
Finn did not move far: he stayed in and around Rochester for the next five years. Influenced by
his Catholic upbringing and training, he worked first for Project REACH, an organization
dedicated to youth advocacy in Perkinsville located just south of Rochester, and then as a High
School teacher of Calculus and Algebra. Finn moved to Chicago in 1973 where he earned an
M.A. in Economics (1975) and a Ph.D. in Religious Social Ethics (1977), both at the University of
Chicago. The University of Chicago’s economics department of the 1970s was well-known for its
uncompromising faith in neoclassical macroeconomics and its advocacy of economic liberalism
and free markets.54 Thus, Finn was trained in the sort of economy theory advocated by Milton
Friedman, George Stigler, and Arnold Harberger, all of whom taught in the economics
department at Chicago during that time. As a newly minted Ph.D., Finn received a joint
appointment in Theology and Economics at College of Saint Benedict/St. John’s University in
Minnesota, an appointment he has held to this day.55
Finn’s research interests on the intersection of ethics and economics dates back to his
dissertation which explores the normative basis of economic decision making in policy.56 Since
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Much of the information in this paragraph is drawn from Finn’s faculty page at College of Saint
Benedict/Saint John's University, "Daniel Rush Finn," http://www.csbsju.edu/Theology/Faculty/DanielFinn.htm (accessed July 24, 2011).
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See Ross B. Emmett, The Elgar Companion to the Chicago School of Economics (Cheltenham,
Glos, U.K.; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar), 133.
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Daniel Finn, "The Economic View of Decision Utility Theory and the Economist's Claim to
Neutrality in Policy" (microform, 1977).
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then his publications, from his first, “Norm and Method in Normative Economics,” to his most
recent, “The Unjust Contract: A Moral Evaluation,” have all had an almost single-minded focus
on the Christian social ethics and political-economic life.57 Moreover, Finn has experience in
structuring conversations across disciplinary boundaries, annually attending professional
meetings in both economics and Christian ethics for decades, and serving as the president of
Association for Social Economics (1986) and well as the SCE (2009), as noted above. As one of
the most widely published and well-known Christian political economic ethicists, Finn is a
particularly appropriate theorist to examine in the current project.
In Toward a Christian Economic Ethics, Finn’s first monograph, co-authored with Prentiss
L. Pemberton, Finn notes the consistent theological demand of God throughout history to care
for the “economically downtrodden.” The economically downtrodden includes what they
euphemistically call economically “unsuccessful” individuals, those living at or below 125
percent of the poverty level, meeting some minimum standard of living, yet facing “significant
deprivation” and economic hardship.58 The problem with the U.S. economy is that it produces a
large and increasing ratio of such economically unsuccessful individuals. For example, in 1982 in
the U.S. the economically unsuccessful numbered 46.5 million or one in six individuals. In the
face of this worrisome trend, Pemberton and Finn questioned whether a harsher form of
capitalism, that has little to do with economic justice, was developing.59 For Pemberton and
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Finn, the problems of poverty and unemployment have a structural rather than just an
individual basis. Christian economic ethics demands an obligation towards all who are
economically unsuccessful, which means creating “counter-structures that effectively challenge
unjust social structures.”60
These counter-structures must be built on a Christian moral vision of the political
economy, which must include six crucial elements:
1. The just entitlement of the poor61
2. Constraints on the right of ownership (as far as it concerns obligations to towards
the poor)
3. A reorientation of personal lives
4. A transformation of social structures
5. A commitment to individual and social transformation through “countervailing
power”
6. A reliance on democratic processes.62
The first two general principles affirm a prophetic devotion to the poor, the infirm, and the
outcast as well as the counter-cultural idea that not everything in God’s creation ought to be
owned. The last four principles stress individual, communal, and structural transformation.
Taken together, the six principles represent a good starting point for conversation in Christian
communities concerned with economic injustice. It is in the application of these general
elements to particular problems that it becomes clear how Pemberton and Finn’s work supports
the basic structure of the capitalist political economy. They concretized these principles into five
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The just entitlement of the poor means that the poor “have a valid claim on those goods
possessed by the rich over and above the necessities of life,” Ibid., 169.
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Ibid., 167-77. On this last element of their moral vision, democratic decision making, they are
careful to point out that it is a fallacious idea that preferences of the majority will solve all ethical
questions or even that it will make decisions that promote justice. Having pointed out this possible failing,
they express confidence that the “prophetic stance” of the church has the power to act as a structural
safeguard against the “excesses of democracy.” This caveat itself challenges their assurances that a robust
democratic process is the means to implement a moral vision of the political economy.
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“operative norms”: 1) strengthen social welfare programs for the poor; 2) regulate energy costs
so they are lower for poor and subsidize renewable energy costs to support a reduction in the
use of nonrenewable energy; 3) resist market failures by enforcing true competition since
competition is “the guarantor against injustice in capitalism”63; 4) limit the influence of large
economic interests (corporations) on government; 5) transform the inner operations of the
firm.64 All of the operative norms they suggest are, in some fashion, already in place. From
prophetic and counter-cultural principles they have derived a position that is neither. They
affirm some important reforms to capitalism and capitalist institutions, but their work falls
safely within the structures of U.S. capitalism.
Moreover, by being narrowly focused on poverty, defined as being “locked out of career
employment and locked into menial, dead-end jobs or into sheer joblessness,” Pemberton and
Finn ignore the broader matrix of oppression operative within the political economy.65 They
suffer from a limited range of moral vision. Within the framework they have adopted, Christian
political economic ethics deals with social justice issues as it relates to poverty and employment.
For them, the intersection of politics, economics, and ethics is concerned only with income,
wealth, and employment. They do not see beyond these narrow parameters towards the ways
in which capitalism is implicated in various forms of oppression.66 Ironically, Pemberton and Finn
warn their readers that too narrow a focus on any one form of injustice “tends to splinter the
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Iris Marion Young, a leading feminist and political philosopher, in her brilliant essay parses out
the “five faces” of oppression: economic exploitation, socio-economic marginalization, lack of power or
autonomy over one’s work, cultural imperialism, and systematic violence. See Iris Marion Young, "Five
Faces of Oppression," in Rethinking Power, ed. Thomas E. Wartenberg (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1992), 183-92.
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overall effort.” They note that in focusing on racial/ethnic injustice, black and Hispanic groups
might miss the way that their actions oppress women, or middle-class whites focusing on the
poor might fail to see their own racism/ethnic prejudice and sexism. Yet, they themselves fall
into the trap that they warn their readers about. Simply put, their assault on the current political
economic structures does not go far enough. Rather than challenging oppressive structures
Pemberton and Finn propose an ethic that is a far cry from the prophetic and counter-cultural
norms in biblical, patristic, and medieval sources they excavate.
Toward a Christian Economic Ethic concentrates on the U.S. political economy. Just
Trading, published nine years later, focuses on the morality of international trade.67 The basic
framework for Finn’s thinking survives the intervening years. Economic ethics is still primarily
about economic welfare as defined by income, buying power, and wealth. As in Toward, Finn
engages in a review of the relevant biblical and theological themes, now in relationship to
international trade, but the review in Just Trading seems much more cursory and less focused
(less than 15 pages of the 269 page book). Surprisingly, Finn concludes that the biblical and
theological data provides limited guidance for an ethic of international trade. The tone is
dismissive, as if the relevant biblical and theological themes are anything but relevant.
Finn argues that even if one is clear on the theological norms that should guide
adjudication between trade policies, a great deal of moral flexibility exists in the choice of any
particular policy. The realities of international trade are such that they create a psychic and
geographical distance between environmental and social costs of production and economic

67

Daniel Finn, Just Trading: On the Ethics and Economics of International Trade (Nashville, TN:
Abingdon Press in cooperation with the Churches' Center for Theology and Public Policy, Washington,
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benefit enjoyed by consumers.68 Even a “modest” lifestyle by the standards of developed
Western nations—driving a car, using a dishwasher, taking a plane to travel either for business
or vacation—threatens the integrity of creation and does little to address the grinding poverty
of so many inhabitants of the globe.69 After reviewing the arguments for and against trade, Finn
highlights the extension of the “welfare-enhancing” exchange of the domestic market to the
globe.70 His position is that international trade can be just if it is correctly understood.
International trade must be bound by carefully constructed laws and regulations to prevent the
most serious abuses and injustices.71
Finn’s pro-trade position and his Christian convictions seem to be at odds. Yet, the
contradictions and inconsistencies between what Finn describes as the relevant biblical and
theological insights and the arguments against increasing trade remain unexamined. The love of
neighbor, the preferential option for the poor, the commitment to the integrity of creation
(environmental stewardship), a concern for foreigners as well as fellow citizens, are all
inconsistent with the downward pressure on wages, protections for workers, and environmental
safeguards that critics argue are characteristic of international trade. He partially resolves this
incongruity by noting that moral convictions should not be allowed to trump “scientific
understanding of causal relationships.”72 Citing “the world capitalist system,” Finn claims, is not
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in itself an explanation for why rising inequalities, environmental problems, etc, happen.73 Finn,
however, ignores the data that support the causal relationship with the current system of
international trade and ill effects on people and the environment.
In 1993, the notorious Catholic defender of markets Michael Novak published The
Catholic Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, in which he argues for the moral necessity of market
economy as the proper economic system for creative beings made in God’s image.74 Since then,
others have closely paralleled Novak’s arguments. Markets, under certain conditions, are moral
because they allow individuals to act freely and with dignity and respect.75 This sort of argument
is just one degree away from stating that capitalism is the divinely sanctioned form of political
economy. It rejects the view that capitalism necessarily leads to the exploitation of labor and
discounts the idea that it concentrates resources in the hands of the wealthy and privileged. On
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the contrary, it celebrates capitalism as a system that allows human beings to express their
innate creativity, thereby “improving and adding to God’s bounty on Earth.”76 Forgetting the
adage “there is no divinely sanctioned human economic system,” Novak and his ilk must
minimize or discount the evidence that refuses to fit their thesis. The loud cheers for capitalism
drown out the caution (even hostility) towards capitalism expressed in by Paul VI in Populorum
Progressio.77 At the very least Novak’s analysis is incomplete, as far as Catholic social teaching is
concerned. Worse, the injustices that capitalism leaves in its wake are minimized or ignored.
A more moderate position insists on the value of markets while still maintaining a
critical spirit towards the injustices of laissez-faire capitalism. Finn’s Moral Ecology of Markets
expresses this more moderate position, though it has much in common with Novak’s arguments.
In Moral Ecology of Markets Finn argues that markets, understood as a mechanism for
distributing resources, are value neutral.78 Only when markets are assessed within their context,
to their “moral ecology,” can moral evaluations of the market be made. He insists that markets,
correctly understood as voluntary interactions of individuals and businesses functioning under
the pursuit of self-interest, can be considered moral under the right conditions, within an
appropriate legal framework and a system that guarantees to provide essential goods and
services.
The first part of Moral Ecology focuses on the market as a moral issue, reviewing the
unsuccessful attempts of Friedman, Buchanan, and Hayek to defend markets without reference
to moral argument, the defense and critique of markets and self-interest, and the four
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fundamental problems of economic life. Finn’s primary claim is that there is an ethically sound
“economic defense of self-interest” in markets, but that “this argument is often misunderstood,
especially by those who most frequently make it.”79 In Finn’s view, everyone agrees—even
proponents of liberty and free markets like Nozick and Friedman—that government should
enforce some limits on people’s actions. In Finn’s language, the market should have fences, or
laws that restrict what is allowed within the market.80 Finn’s central discussion revolves around
the nature and number of these fences. The book concludes with a warning that the economic
defense of self-interest cannot be extended to governmental process because lobbying efforts
change the rules of the game.
Finn’s vision of the political economy is a world in which advocates and critics of
markets, those from the right and the left, can sit down and have dialogue about the strengths
and weakness of markets in their own context.81 In this dialogue, both sides would take the
other’s point of view seriously, critically examine their own assumptions, and engage in a
genuine conversation about how to address the “four problems of economic life” which are
allocation, distribution, scale, and quality of relations.82 According to Finn, the goal of each of
these factors is, respectively, increasing efficiency, reducing inequality, sustainability, and
community.83 In his discussion about allocation, Finn reinscribes the neoclassical definition of
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economics as “the study of the allocation of scarce” resources and stresses the effectiveness of
self-interested activity.84
In adopting this schema, Finn reveals that his understanding of economics and his moral
vision of the political economy falls within the narrow spectrum of orthodox economics. Finn’s
search for a common framework to discuss the merits and faults of markets is an attempt to
discredit the arguments of libertarians and critics on the left. According to Finn, libertarians do
not really believe in unrestricted market mechanisms and critics on the left who assume that
markets and the pursuit of self-interest are axiomatically amoral are wrong. He is saying, in
essence, “if everyone would simply be reasonable, and have a real discussion, they would see
that markets are an essential part of solving the problems of economic life.” In arguing that
markets and the pursuit of self-interest, under certain conditions, is ethically defensible, Finn
has provided fodder for proponents of the status quo.
On his starting assumption, Finn is correct: formally speaking, the market refers to the
economic activity in which buyers and sellers, through the forces of supply and demand, agree
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on a price.85 Finn argues that markets cannot be understood apart from their context, but he
does not take his own argument far enough. Markets imply market economies, and in an age of
increasing economic integration, the context of markets is free market economics, the reduction
or elimination of international trade barriers under conditions that favor the wealthy, Western
nations at the expense of nations in the global South.86 Where Finn’s argument fails is in
pretending that context is waiting to be discovered; the current global political economy is the
context and from the perspective of the poor, markets are anything but moral. Finn insists that
markets and the exertion of self-interest can “receive a conditional moral approval” if markets
have defined legal boundaries and certain essentials are provided.87 Yet in making this claim he
has ignored actual historical insistences in which his proposed solution has been applied and yet
falls short of any meaningful definition of morality.
Yet, Finn attends to this distinction of perspectives in considering the question “are
markets just?” He points out that those who advocate for markets presume the context of the
prosperous nations of the West and those who are critical of markets present the context of the
majority of the world, where most live in poverty.88 Having noted how much context matters in
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developing conditions under which market outcomes can be considered just, Finn proceeds to
elaborate two examples, one involving buying cans of green beans and secondly a throw rug.
Both of these examples describe a decidedly bourgeois activity: having purchasing power and
choices among various goods. From these two illustrations, Finn draws the conclusion that it is a
serious mistake to think it is always morally wrong to act out of one’s self-interest and that
moral evaluations of narrowly self-interested actions in the market “depend on the context and
the result that eventuate.”89
It is troubling that Finn feels the need to defend markets as a moral, albeit within, as he
puts it, a “properly structured context.”90 He does so, one suspects, because he is concerned
about getting the thinking about markets right. While Finn stops to get his thinking right, the
majority of the world’s people continue to live in misery and squalor. While Finn is right to insist
that markets must be understood in their context before they can be evaluated as just (or
unjust), his work does very little by way of disrupting or challenging the status quo. As we have
seen, Finn’s political economic ethics is limited to thinking about the economy as neoclassical
economists do. Since economic life can be conceptualized concisely as allocation,91 and markets
do very well in efficiently allocating, then market capitalism must be considered the best
configuration for solving the problems of economic life. Finn sets the boundaries of what is
morally conceivable and economically desirable within the basic configuration of the
contemporary world and advances this as a Christian moral vision of the political economy.92
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Stackhouse’s Metaphysical-Moral System
Stackhouse studied philosophy of religion at DePauw University in Greencastle, IN (B.A.
1957). In the 1950s he spent a summer working on a railroad while reading Marx and Sartre in
the evenings. He found their radical and existentialist ideas so appealing that the next fall he
began to write a column for the campus paper, “The Ax by Max.”93 Stackhouse spent a year at a
Dutch institute on a scholarship arranged by one of his professors, where his conversations with
other students who had experienced Marxist regimes in action began to curb his enthusiasm for
radical political economics.
Stackhouse returned to the U.S. to begin his seminary education at Harvard Divinity
School. At Harvard, he studied under James Luther Adams, a ethicist of democratic socialist
leanings well known for translating and interpreting the work of German theologians Paul Tillich
and Ernst Troeltsch. Fifteen years after receiving his M.A. and B.D. (1961), he edited a series of
Adams’s articles collected in an anthology billed as the “first comprehensive collection of his
ideas and work.”94 During his time as a seminarian, Stackhouse first encountered Reinhold
Niebuhr who was at Harvard as a visiting professor. Stackhouse describes himself as being
“puzzled” at hearing Niebuhr lecture for the first time.95 He became fascinated with Niebuhr and
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detail in chapter three.
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chose to write his dissertation on the intersection of eschatology and ethics in the work of
Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr (Harvard University, 1965).96
Over the years, Stackhouse moved has moved far to the right of the Marxist and
existentialist socialism he advocated for as an undergraduate.97 During the 1970s while teaching
at Andover Newton Theological School, he critiqued the military-industrial complex, calling
instead for a counter complex of just peace.98 Then during the 1980s he drifted further to the
right of the democratic socialist influence of his teacher, Adams. He critiqued any form of
Christian theology formulated from a particular cultural or social context (one presumes that
includes Black, Feminist, and Latina/o theologies) for lacking a trans-cultural logic and failing to
critically assess local cultural realities.99 He also expressed serious concern with “radical”
Christians who identify with the oppressed and who see liberation as the primary locus of God’s
activity.100
In 1991, Stackhouse co-authored an essay with Dennis P. McCann an essay trumpeting
his decisive move rightward. “A Postcommunist Manifesto” announced that with the death of
Soviet communism, the prophetic witness of “the Protestant Social Gospel, early Christian
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realism, much neo-orthodoxy, many forms of Catholic modernism, the modern ecumenical drive
for racial and social inclusiveness, and contemporary liberation theories” were proven wrong
about socialism.101 Stackhouse (along with McCann) criticizes religious leaders for clinging to the
belief that capitalism is “greedy, individualistic, *and+ exploitative” and that socialism is
“generous, community affirming, *and+ equitable.”102 The authors proclaimed a new era for
social ethics in which socialism and socialist ideas have no ground on which to stand: “everyone
who holds to a ‘preferential option for the poor’ must now embrace capitalism.”103 Theologians
and ethicists who advocate for socialist institutions and programs (even if they never argue for a
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full-blown socialism) are misguided. Christian pastors and teachers on the left of the
conventional spectrum—including those of socialist, liberationist, and ecologist variety—are
confused about the nature and character of economic life.104 Socialism and socialist programs
are “regressive, superficial, *and+ demonically destructive of morality.”105 Any theologian with
socialist leanings or sympathies with the socialist leanings of the great figures of the Protestant
theological heritage, including W. Rauschenbush, Karl Barth, R. Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, Martin
Luther King, Jr., must abandon those ideas or become irrelevant in the public square.106
Stackhouse affirms the liberationist’s “passion” for social justice, but dismisses the rest of
liberation theology’s insights as “narrow dogmatism.”107 Liberation theology views social
questions through the lens of power analysis which distorts an “accurate understanding” of the
causes of oppression by drawing on Marxist analysis.108 Ecological theologians (along with,
presumably, eco-feminists, eco-womanists and the like) are also mistaken, since their theory
tends to be anti-technological and it is clear that God may use technology to heal, build
community, and preserve creation.109 Those who cannot rethink the issues must be left behind
as relics of an earlier era.
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Elsewhere, Stackhouse puts things differently. According to Stackhouse, contemporary
voices in Christian ethics imagine three possibilities at the intersection of the global political
economy and issues of faith: the statist, liberationist, and neo-sectarian. The statist debate
replicates the arguments between democratic capitalists and social democrats about the right
mix and blend of government involvement.110 Conservative and business-oriented forces of the
developed West argue for less government interference with the market, but more protection
from international competition. Progressive and liberal forces meanwhile advocate for more
government involvement in welfare benefits, racial and sexual equality in access to economic
opportunity, guarantees of job security, and a living wage. The debates have become “political
ritual and quite tired.”111 Stackhouse reduces the liberationist position to a concern for human
rights, ecology, and the poor with a commitment to Marxists analysis. He describes the neosectarian view as being suspicious of “any attempt to form a social ethic on any other basis than
biblical, narrative-driven or dogmatic convictions.”112 Neo-sectarians agree with the postmodern
claim that public possibilities of meaning have disappeared with the triumph of the market
economy.
Stackhouse claims that he agrees with liberation theology’s diagnosis of wrong—social
sins resulting from complex societies—and its idea that “the only God worth worshiping is
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biased in favor of the oppressed.”113 Yet he wants to offer an alternative prescription to the
pretense that salvation can be found in a form of revolutionary/radical social change.114 Instead
of radical social change, Stackhouse proposes drawing on the “dynamism” of contemporary
democratic capitalism.115 In his view, Christianity (especially Protestantism) has done much to
sustain and support this dynamism. In the twentieth century, it helped to subdue Fascism,
imperialistic colonialism, national socialism, and communism.116 The ghastly events at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, during the Holocaust, and in the Gulag were all resisted by constitutional
democracy, human rights, and economic corporations independent of state control, all forces
defended (even generated by) Protestantism.117 Because of its Protestant roots, this sort of
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democratic capitalism has an “inner validity,” a “moral coherence” and “spiritual fiber.”118 Citing
Matthews, he affirms that all political systems are to be evaluated by their abilities to sustain all
persons in a community and that the community of faith is not to become identical to coercive
structures of government.119 In economic matters, Stackhouse agrees with Matthew that
Christians above others should have a deep sympathy with the poor and unfortunate, but it is a
mistake to think of Jesus as being against wealth. Christian approaches should be more antigreed than anti-capitalist.120
Stackhouse doubts the ability of any of these other options to adequately access the
deeper Christian ethical heritage or respond to the present political economic needs. Instead of
these options, Stackhouse proposes the development of a “public theology.”121 Public theology
presumes that theology, while related to personal faith, particular communities, and concrete
social conditions, can never be “psychologically defined, contextually determined.”122 According
to Stackhouse:
‘Public theology’ points toward a wider and deeper strand of theological reflection
rooted in the interaction of biblical insight, philosophical analysis, historical discernment
and social formation. It sees the moral interpretation of the common life as a
fundamental task of theology and seeks to link that interpretation with the cultivation of
a normative vision to form, guide and reform society.123
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Ibid. There is a sense in which public theology, thus understood, is simply a description of
Christian social ethics, which attempts to make theological insights intelligible to a wider (i.e., public)
audience. Stackhouse proudly identifies the roots of public theology in the writings of the biblical
prophets, the teaching of Jesus and Paul, Augustine’s City of God, Thomas’ writing of justice, the
Reformers’ teaching on the orders of creation, vocation, and covenant, Ernst Troeltsch’s quest for a
52

Over and against neosectarians, public theology insists that we can elaborate a discourse that is
intelligible to both those within religious traditions and those outside of it. It is an effort to offer
guidance for society, its sectors, institutions, and organizations. It makes use of public sources,
insights, and terminology. Thus, public theology is a theology informed by public discourse
about social, political, and economic problems.124
Public theology insists on the relevancy of theology and ethics to a pluralistic society.
This claim poses no problem for Stackhouse who contends that modern society is constructed
by values grounded in a religious metaphysical-moral foundation. For Stackhouse, developments
in the early church gave rise to the idea of universal moral law and the creation of a universal
community independent of tribe or nation. The ethos of the church gave rise to creeds which
became the basis for human solidarity, identity, and universal human rights.125 He doubts that
God and Mammon have ever been kept separate.126 He suggests that “modern” politicaleconomic life “must be understood, at least in part, by reference to its religious heritage.”127
Since theological values have such direct bearing on worldly affairs expressed in political forces
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and economic interests, it becomes obvious that a public theology can once again provide
ethical guidance for the structure of society and public life.
For Stackhouse, what is decisive for economics is the kind of religion that forms the
ethos of the civilization.128 In this sense, Stackhouse’s project heavily depends on and agrees
with Weber, who argued that the “inner-worldly asceticism of Puritanism first produced a
capitalist ethic.”129 In structuring society, the decisive pattern is not culture, human will, rational
choice, class interests, or ruling ideology. These are all secondary to religious and spiritual
dimensions, defined as “the basic structure of meaning and the principles of right and wrong,
good and evil, truth and falsehood.”130 Stackhouse finds Weber especially useful in combating
the utilitarian secularists he believes pose such a threat to political and economic life. According
to Stackhouse, Weber “has demonstrated that modern social realities simply cannot be
understood without detailed knowledge of the metaphysical-moral visions that, along with
other factors, brought into existence the modern method, on which our political and economic
systems depend.”131 What Weber cannot do is articulate that metaphysical-moral system.
In 1997 Stackhouse wrote that though in the past he believed that corporations acting in
a capitalistic context produced inequities of distribution, after fifteen years of spending every
leave and sabbatical in socialist countries with different modes of production, he concluded that
he “was substantially in error.”132 The problems of misdistribution and consumerism are worse
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in socialistic economic systems than they are in the West where corporate structures of
production dominate.133 While he grants that there is no definitive “Christian” political economic
system, he argues that the political economic systems of developed countries are theological
and ethically defensible. For Stackhouse, a mixed political economy, centered on the
corporation but moderated through government regulations and taxes, is the most “likely social
form of economic life in the foreseeable future.”134 Moreover, because corporate capitalism
“support*s+ the possibilities of pluralistic democratic governance under laws and protect[s] basic
human rights, minorities, and dissent,” it is also “the best expression of basic theological
principles in modern social life.”135 Those who scorn capitalism and condemn the corporation as
“the embodiment of profit-oriented greed, a soul-less artifact that pollutes the environment,
uproots people from their farms, closes plants, dislocates workers, [and] promotes growing
discrepancies between the rich and poor” have failed to diagnose the problems of modern
political economies.136
Stackhouse argues that of the seven possible social centers for economic organization—
families, worker guilds, religious organizations, the market (an indirect possibility), the state,
and the corporation, only the last two are serious contenders. In socialist experiments in Eastern
Europe and elsewhere around the world, “problems of maldistribution and rampant
consumerism are at least as dramatic, if not more striking, than they are in the West.”137
Government-centered economic production has succeeded, and then only partly, where state133
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centered economic planning functioned very much like independent corporations.138 In other
words, the corporation is currently the chief social form of economic life and is likely to remain
so for the foreseeable future. Stackhouse concludes that business corporation-centered
production and distribution is the only viable model of the political economy.139
In Stackhouse’s moral vision of the political economy, the basic structures and
institutions through which humans organize social life remain unchallenged. He agrees that
there are serious problems with the political economy and that the emphasis of Christian social
ethics should be to demand more equitable distribution of wealth, defend human rights, ensure
full employment, and defend the poor. His solution to these problems is the revitalization of
current political economic structures through public theology. Since there are no serious
alternatives to the corporation as the center for production and distribution, the task of
Christian ethicists and theologians is to transform the corporation spiritually and morally. Thus,
Stackhouse affirms the status quo as it pertains both to the broader political economic
structures and to the central role of corporations in production and distribution.

Wogaman Democratization as Social Ethic
Wogaman grew up in Southern California. He stayed in his home state for college,
earning a B.A. at the University of the Pacific in Sacramento (1954). Immediately after college,
with a sense of calling to the pastorate, Wogaman moved to Boston where three years later he
earned an M.Div and after three more years of work a Ph.D. in Social Ethics (Boston University,
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1957, 1960). Rather than return to his home Methodist conference and take a church as he had
intended, Wogaman was “lured into teaching.”140 Initially, he taught at his alma mater, the
University of the Pacific (1961-66) before taking a post at Wesley Theology Seminary in
Washington, D.C. as a professor of Christian social ethics where he taught for 26 years (196692). His only pastoral experience during that time was for a two year appointment during his last
year of seminary and first year of doctoral work in “the (then) shoe mill town of Marlborough,
Massachusetts.”141 After his retirement from that post in 1992, Wogaman began an
“unexpected journey”142 as Senior Minister at Foundry United Methodist Church, also in D.C., at
the age of sixty. In that post he served as spiritual advisor to Bill Clinton, who regularly attended
the church during his terms as U.S. president.143
In his writing, Wogaman has generally been attentive to the issues and problems of his
day. His dissertation, published in 1960, dealt with some of the theoretical and practical
challenges of racial integration in the Methodist Church.144 Wogaman’s early writing also
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addresses religious freedom and the problem of human overpopulation.145 His ethics is guided
by the conviction that there is a logical connection between religion and ethics, that Christian
theology has something to add to moral discourse, and that to be relevant, Christian ethics must
speak to the structures of the human existence in the present world.146 Wogaman, like Finn and
Stackhouse, has written extensively on the intersection of economic and politics with ethics. In
the 1960s, he addressed the issues of guaranteed income.147 Sensitive to the plight of the poor
in “civilized” countries and excited by the national debate about new social proposals to simply
give to the poor a minimum income, Wogaman took up the question: “is it moral for people to
be given income which they have not earned and may not deserve?”148 The idea commanded
the attention of neoliberal economists Milton Friedman as well as liberal thinkers Robert
Theobald and Leon Keyersling. Wogaman articulates the arguments for and against and
concludes that the basic material conditions for human life is a social right of every person.149
God’s purpose for economic life is to “create and maintain the material conditions which best
serve man’s true humanity.”150 Objections to guaranteed income on the grounds of injustice
without work, “its damaging effect on human creativity and social fulfillment, its overlooking the
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incompetence and immorality of the poor, and its neglect of the need to overcome man’s
selfishness and inertia” are rejected on the basis of denying a person’s right to physical and
social existence.151
Affirming this somewhat radical position of guaranteeing a minimum income floor for
all, Wogaman is quick to warn his readers that this does not in any way equal “socialism” or any
form of “collectivism.”152 Socialism, which Wogaman glosses as government ownership of the
means of production, is not necessary for guaranteed annual income to work. All the means of
production could be in private hands and still the concept would not be affected. He continues
to push the limits of the idea of economic equality as the Christian norm, citing some exceptions
where inequalities are necessary in order to maintain God’s covenant community. All the while
emphatic that “guaranteed income does not mean ‘socialism.’”153 Ensuring equality of income,
Wogaman insists, will engender a genuine sense of community and will strengthen democracy, a
chief mechanism in bringing about God’s intention for creation.
In his later writings Wogaman continues to be optimistic about the ability of democracy
to defend against injustices. In The Great Economic Debate he expands his concerns from the
narrow exploration of the ethical issues associated with a guaranteed minimum income for the
poor to a concern with the political economy as a whole.154 The “great economic debate” of the
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title refers to the ideological debates particularly fervent during the Cold War era about the
organization of economic life. Wogaman compares five competing ideologies: Marxism, laissezfaire capitalism, social market capitalism, democratic socialism, and economic conservationism.
These he compares on the basis of “moral considerations” and pragmatic “real world”
considerations. Ultimately, Wogaman concludes that the two ideologies on the extremes,
Marxist communism and laissez-faire capitalism “seem to have fatal flaws which would prevent
a Christian from espousing either without serious reservations.”155 The other three choices he
holds out as possible positions of Christians to hold since each of these forms “can be deeply
committed to human rights and political democracy,” “can envisage the use of economic
production for the welfare of human beings in the good society,” and “can encompass
safeguards against sinfulness.”156
Wogaman writes about liberation, and even speak approvingly of Gutiérrez, Cone,
Rosemary Radford Ruether, and Segundo, but then has amnesia about this when it comes to
creating criteria for adjudicating between political economic systems. He affirms the major
themes of “Third World theologians” and challenges whoever believes that Christian ethics is
mostly a “sanction of an unjust status quo” need only read their works.157 He believes that
liberation theory “has much to teach us,” but he has one caveat. 158 While the theme of
liberation is “laden with possibilities for an economic ethic” it does not constitute the entirety of
Christian thinking on economic matters. A too narrow focus on liberation from oppression in
history distracts from the overall task of Christian ethics: the “careful analysis of ultimate
155
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norms” in terms of relationships to God and the material world. One needs to return to the
basic “metaphysical and ontological commitments” to determine “whether ‘liberation’ or any
other kind of action really matters.”159 Wogaman presents a glowing assessment of liberation
theory and history only to immediately dismiss its insights.
Wogaman lists what these ultimate Christian norms relevant for economic life are on a
number of occasions. According to Wogaman, Christian ethics applied to economic life:
1. Understands creation as the sphere of provision for material well-being and human
fulfillment.
2. Upholds the basic unity of the human family undergirded by mutual love in
community.
3. Values each individual and is committed to individual freedom, creative
development, and expression.
4. Affirms the basic equality of human beings.
5. Takes the universality of human sinfulness seriously.160
A careful analysis of how these norms relate to the economy, according to Wogaman, would
yield a moral vision of the political economy. Yet, these values would not raise eyebrows within
current pluralistic societies.
In Economics and Ethics, Wogaman offers an articulation of economics based on his
interpretation of Christian moral values based on the theoretical grounding that the
“connections between economic reality and social purpose . . . cannot be understood apart from
an ethical frame of reference.”161 He expands his list of norms necessary for constructing a
Christian ethical framework to six:
1. “The material world is good because God created it to reflect good purposes”
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2. Grace precedes works. Justice should be patterned in accordance with the priority
of grace, in such a way to enhance human well-being, self-acceptance, and
communal feeling without reference to what people deserve.
3. Both physical well-being and good social relationships are necessary for the moral
structuring of economic life.
4. Human beings are invited to respond to God’s grace and to the creative activity of
vocation.
5. The perspective of stewardship allows for the enjoyment and use of property for
loving and not selfish purposes. Treating right to property as absolute is not
permitted.
6. The recognition that self-centeredness—i.e., original sin—is a painful and persistent
part of human nature. Thus blaming poverty on the character deficiencies of the
poor is out of bounds.162
Though they are stated here in theological language, many of these values are already widely
accepted outside of Christian communities. For example, both the goodness of the physical
world and the human tendency towards selfishness are very widely held views.163 Thus, it
remains unclear how these two sets of values challenge the boundaries of established political
economic order.
For Wogaman, the relationship between economic reality and ethics is reducible to a
choice between social priorities, based on (in)visible values that are always present.164 Choosing
among priorities always involves a trade-off: saying yes to something necessitates saying no to
others on all levels of decision making, from personal and family to national and international.165
The question arises: who is to make the choices regarding social priorities? In Wogaman’s view,
there are three possible answers to the question of who should decide: the free market, elites
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(private, public, or party), or a responsible civil service.166 He rejects free markets as the
exclusive means for deciding between choices because they inefficient in addressing social and
communal concerns, such as highways and national defense. The second method, priority
setting by some type of elites, he seemingly rejects as inefficient aristocratic paternalism, both
on the right (extraordinarily wealthy private citizens) and left (Marxist party elites). Wogaman
favors the third method, that of a civil service responsive to a basic ordering of social priorities
determined through democratic means. In other words, it is democratization that matters most
in adjudicating between political economic choices: “either a democratic capitalism or a
democratic socialism or some mixture of the two” is acceptable as the basis for a moral political
economy.167
Wogaman’s Christian moral vision of the political economy has the same basic structure
of the political economy of the liberal democratic nation-states of the world. The practical
outworking of his moral vision are clear from his application of the norms discussed above the
social priorities of adequate production, equity and security, employment and educational
opportunity, conservation, and a new world order.168 In Wogaman’s system the poor and
families in need of welfare and those who do not have adequate resources must depend on
largess of the majority in order to participate fully in the social enterprise. His ethic provides no
mechanism for caring for the least of these except the hope (remote as it is) that those who
govern, chosen either through election or appointment, hold the right sorts of values in order to
translate their concerns into actual social policy. His insistence that participatory, democratic
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economic arrangements are most in keeping with Christian values, given the widening gap
between rich and poor, widespread unemployment, enormous global military expenditures, and
the threat of exhaustion of basic resources and environmental pollution (all of which Wogaman
acknowledges as economic realities!169) constitutes a short-circuiting of the moral imagination
and an endorsement of the status quo.
Wogaman’s interpretation of the spectrum of the Christian moral imagination in terms
of politics reveals the same short-circuiting of the moral imagination. Wogaman divides the
major viewpoints—or “generating centers” as he calls them—of Christian ethics of the political
economy into five camps: 1) Pacifist and Anarchists; 2) Liberationist; 3) Neoconservative; 4)
Evangelical (right and left); 5) Mainstream liberal. He emphasizes that these viewpoints
represent intellectual tendencies and thoughtfully recognizes that each is in the state of
“dynamic development.”170 Wogaman is striving not for an airtight classification—none is
possible—but proposes instead to explore issues. Thus, he acknowledges, there is overlap
between categories and many of the figures discussed in one section might be discussed in
another. Critically examining each viewpoint in turn provides evidence of how Wogaman has
already set the conditions and boundaries of what is “imaginable” in term of the political
economy.
The Christian Pacifist and Anarchist perspectives question the legitimacy of the state by
asserting that violence and coercion, the typical tools of state action, contradict fundamental
principles of Christian ethics. From this perspective, the heart of the gospel is nonresistance to
evildoers (Tolstoy) or renunciation of the way of violence (Yoder). Power exercised in the
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political order is then necessarily and by definition illegitimate; Christians cannot morally
approve or reconcile the fundamental contradiction between Christian conviction and state
action.171 For the pacifists-anarchist, Christians best serve the state through their personal and
social participation in a gospel-formed reality to which the state must respond.
According to Wogaman, they accept subjugation but not obedience to the state.172 To the extent
that the state employs coercion and/or violence, it is something less than a Christian
understanding of the state and can only be conditionally accepted.173
Wogaman is cautious about any kind of pacifist-anarchist orientation. Though he
presents it as a question, it is clear enough that he believes this orientation “may not best
represent Christian teaching.”174 His major concern is that this perspective theologically
weakens the legitimacy of the political order that he imagines as the proper Christian view of
the political economy. Ultimately, Wogaman concludes, this perspective is “an inadequate one.”
Wogaman’s caution is a form of falsifying—as delusional or unrealistic—the pacifist/anarchist
perspective since it does not affirm the current political order.
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At the outset, shaped by a moral imagination determined by his social and cultural
matrix, Wogaman is unable or unwilling to imagine an alternative form of political ordering. The
legitimacy of the state in its current configuration is a fundamental, non-negotiable part of his
moral language. While these pacifists-anarchists do an admirable job of reminding us that
violence is evil and “counterproductive,” and that Christians ought never to be cavalier about
acting “coercively or violently,” Wogaman insists that their perspective is by and large
dismissible on the grounds it fails to affirm the political order. Convinced that social
responsibilities are best exercised in and through the current political regime, Wogaman shortcircuits the imagination, falsifying a creative alternative even when it is an alternative
articulated in and through the symbols and categories of his basic (Christian) convictions.
According to Wogaman, the liberationist perspectives share many concerns about the
legitimacy of the existing power structures of the leading pacifists thinkers. Liberation theologies
are consciously revolutionary in respect to what it sees as oppressive structures and are critical
of reformism.175 Reformism implies that some social-political-economic system is fundamentally
sound and needs only improvements at some points.176 Liberationists are skeptical about
reformism as it is seen as shoring up the current power structures and deflecting attention from
the root causes of oppression. The call to revolution implies that the entire system is
fundamentally, irrevocably flawed. It calls for an overthrow of existing order by the powerless
who empower themselves. The Magnificat of Mary provides the liberationist’s slogan: “He has
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brought down the powerful from their thrones, and lifted up the lowly; he has filled the hungry
with good things, and sent the rich away empty.”177
Wogaman elaborates three “troubling points” about liberation theology in all its forms:
1) an inadequate account of redemption given the social or institutional location of sin; 2) the
absolutizing of the limited diagnostic tools of Marxism; 3) a seeming unwillingness to listen to its
adversaries—or to learn from the “oppressor.” On the first point, Wogaman’s concern is the
degree to which the liberationist account of sin rides on the outcome of concrete political
objectives. The institutionalization of sin bothers Wogaman insofar as it suggests that
redemption can be found in institutional change. Wogaman insists that “personal selfcenteredness of individual human beings limits both the permanence and the quality of any
institutional change.”178 Is Wogaman suggesting there can be no just institutions as long as
human sin—conceptualized as personal self-centeredness—persists? If so, this is not only a case
against the revolutionary call of liberationists, but of the reformist impulse Wogaman is pointing
towards.
On the second point, Wogaman acknowledges that Marxist analytical tools have far
greater value than most Western Europeans and North Americans are willing to admit. His
concern is whether liberation theology is “open enough to presentations of empirical truth”
unfiltered through ideological lenses, such as Marxism.179 Wogaman’s appeal to “empirical
truth” is a way of dismissing the type of analysis of capitalism by Marxists diagnostic tools.180
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Moreover, his appeal reveals a more troubling tendency underlying his analysis: a simple
distinction between “truth” and ideology, between fact and values. Wogaman’s analysis, like the
debate between moral objectivists and moral subjectivists is misguided: in as much as matters
of fact and matters of value are not easily distinguished.181 They are best thought of as
statements along the same continuum, with statements (whether fact or value) that are widely
accepted by a given community of language users on one side (statements for which warrants
are usually not demanded), and statements which are in contention on the other. For example,
that babies should be not be chopped up for use in bullion is a value statement, but one which
there is widespread agreement in U.S. society. Wogaman is troubled by liberation theology’s
filtering the world through an ideological lens, one that accepts the Marxists tools as a valid
basis for analyzing and critiquing capitalism. It is not “empirical truth” that Wogaman offers, but
a different moral imagination, one that does not accept the validity of Marxists tools, but
implicitly embraces capitalism. Hence, Wogaman short-circuits the imagination in refusing to
make use of the insights of liberationist theologians.
Wogaman’s third concern correctly emphasizes a loss of humanity on both sides that
follows any hard and fast division of oppressor/oppressed, rich/poor, us/them. Overcoming
oppression is as important for the oppressor as the oppressed. Agreed, although this insight is
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not original to him: postcolonial theorists have for decades argued along these lines.182 While
people located in places of privilege have something valuable to share, one wonder if this is just
another way to dismiss the creative insights of those employing a different moral imagination, in
particular those on the margins of society. It may be a form of falsification on the grounds that
people of privilege are busy elaborating their own very valuable contributions. It is easy to see
how the insistence that even the oppressor may have something to share can devolve into a
reification of the oppressor’s moral imagination.
Conservative movements usually represent a concern to preserve institutions and
values in the face of what is perceived as imminent danger. Conservative political regimes such
as those of Ronald Reagan in the U.S. and Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain formed in the face
of Soviet power and communist expansionism. With the end of the Cold War, the threats and
dangers have shifted. Nevertheless, the mood of neoconservatives, a new generation of
theological conservatives, remains “anti,” with communism “replaced by feminism, abortion,
homosexuality, pornography, and the perceived liberalism of Protestant denominations and
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councils of churches.”183 Neoconservatives should not at the outset be characterized as onedimensional. The latest generation of neoconservative thinkers of this orientation tends to be
former liberals and even former radicals.184 They continue to espouse aspects of their more
former political views and are therefore more complex than the characterization “anti”
suggests.
Amid this complexity, Wogaman identifies several themes. Neoconservatives 1) affirm
democracy, 2) emphasize a limited state, 3) exhibit a deep commitment to capitalism, 4) support
a strong U.S. military and political presence around the world, and 5) maintain that individual
Christians (mostly) and churches (to a lesser extent) should be engaged in political life.
The neoconservative perspective serves as perhaps the best evidence of the limits of the
their moral imagination: they engage in a form of falsification through an accusation that
alternatives are delusional. Unlike pacificists and liberationists who exhibit skepticism
concerning democracy, neoconservatives strongly affirm the superiority of democracy among
possible political systems. For the neoconservative, democracy is indelibly linked to capitalism. A
market economy may be “a necessary condition for democracy.”185 And capitalism promotes
liberal-democratic political systems. In the minds of many neoconservatives, such as Paul
Johnson, democracy and capitalism are the twin parents of freedom, and the “notions of
political and economic freedom both spring from the workings of the Christian conscience as a
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historical force.”186 For neoconservatives, democratic capitalism is not only a superior way to
provide adequate material well-being for the people of the world, but is, in a substantive way,
the form of political-economic organization ordained by God.
When the collapse of the Soviet Empire around 1990 revealed profound flaws in the
economic and political Soviet-style communism the neoconservatives went much further in
condemning communism. For them, communism was not just deeply flawed; it was the enemy,
the “prime example of social, political, economic evil of our time.”187 The absoluteness in the
neoconservative opposition to world communism reveals an “almost Manichean tendency”
that, as Wogaman correctly points out, is “as much a form of idolatry as the absolutizing of any
person or movement we wish to affirm.”188 The danger is not only the spiritual danger of selfrighteousness, but a short-circuiting of the imagination, a closing off of creative possibilities.
Wogaman argues that evangelicals offer a great deal of fire, but very little light. The
brevity of his treatment suggests he finds very little insight among evangelicals in terms of the
intersection of Christian thought in politics and economics. He divides evangelicals into the right
and left. Evangelicals of the right, while a diverse lot, share a number of views: the identification
of Christian values with U.S. tradition, advocacy for the restoration of prayer and Bible reading
in public schools, alarm over liberals and secular humanists, and a host of issues to which they
are opposed including abortion, homosexuality, pornography, drugs, and gambling. While these
positions are pursued with passion, it remains unclear how any of these positions are derived
from a theological analysis, raising doubts that it constitutes a serious Christian conception of
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the political economy. The evangelical right relies on intellectual capital of earlier conservative
theologians and secular thinkers whose support for limited capital they incorporate into their
thinking.189 Wogaman believes that the “lack of well-thought-through positions or of openness
to dialogues with alternative views means that this movement is not—at least not yet—a strong
generating center of Christian political thought.”190
Evangelicals on the left are more of “an intellectual force than their counterpart of the
right.”191 They emphasize along with the pacifist and liberationist perspectives God’s special
concern for the most vulnerable members of the human community. Both evangelicals of the
right and left cite the Bible as the source of their political views. But while evangelicals of the
right draw mostly from the prescriptive laws of the Hebrew Bible, the left characteristically
draws on Jesus and the Prophets. Evangelicals of the left adhere to a generally conservative
theological orientation while pressing for a liberal political agenda. Their political liberalism is
expressed in their vigorous attention to “economic issues, civil rights, prison reform, and
international peace” but have remained decidedly conservative in regards to their views on
abortion and homosexuality.
The label “mainstream liberalism” for the fifth generation center of Christian political
thought is somewhat misleading. Though mainstream suggests majority opinion and/or
relationship to mainstream Protestantism, the high visibility and political success of the
evangelical right, along with the inclusion of Roman Catholic thinkers within this perspective
indicates otherwise. By mainstream liberal, Wogaman is referring to Christian thinkers who are
committed to established churches and participate in crafting denominational and conciliar
189

Such as Francis Shaeffer, Cornelisu Van Til, and Carl F. H. Henry.

190

Wogaman, Christian Perspectives on Politics, 129.

191

Ibid., 133.
72

documents. They share one fundamental theological conviction—a Niebuhrian conception of
original sin.192 Reinhold Niebuhr’s conception of “original” sin as perennial and universal,
ultimately based on human insecurity, was accompanied by the idea that human beings are
capable of justice and benevolence. Two consequences for political economic ethics result from
the view that evil and good are inherent in human beings. First, that all political solutions are
limited and provisional. Second, since all have sinned, no one individual or group has grounds
for self-righteousness; politics cannot be reduced to the forces of righteousness against the
forces of evil.193
Other characteristics mainstream liberals share: an ecumenical spirit, a reformist
attitude towards change, a positive attitude toward government, and acceptance of the
legitimacy of democratic states including police action. Writing in contexts where they do not
consider revolution a viable option, mainstream liberals advocate for broad outlines of a “mixed
economy.” They are involved in political struggles for: 1) adequate public welfare; 2) full
employment and job training programs; 3) a more progressive tax structure; 4) adequate health
care delivery; 5) environmental protection and energy conservation; 6) additional protections of
public safety, such as safety features on automobiles and great regulation of nuclear reactors; 7)
civil rights struggles; 8) support for disarmament, increased role for the UN, more generous
foreign aid programs, and greater regulation of transnational corporations.194
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Wogaman portrays the mainstream liberal perspective as a mediating position,
rhetorically strengthening the position he favors.195 The mainstream liberal orientation lies at
the center of “ether end of the ideological spectrum.”196 “The orientation is . . . treated as
revolutionary by ideological conservatives. And radical structuralists, such as socialists, often
characterize reformism as an implicit support for existing systems of injustice because the
reform only serves to make the system more palatable.”197 The language of “ideological
extremism” is another technique for dismissing more leftist or radical views. Wogaman
acknowledges the critique that his perspective supports unjust structures, but offers no
response except to state that “mainstream liberals remain unpersuaded by the arguments at
either end of the ideological spectrum.”
Wogaman believes a mainstream liberal position is the most “reasonable” one offered
by Christian thinkers, avoiding excessive trust in any one particular political configuration,
standing above the fray of the raging debates. Moderation and reformism are the bywords of
the mainstream position. They will not challenge the violence and coercion inherent in state
action (like the pacifists), nor will they stand in opposition to oppressive structures and
institutions (like the liberationists). These are, no doubt, manifestations of humanity’s universal
sin expressing itself. But the same human beings are capable of wondrous acts of righteousness.
Wogaman has it right: the fundamental theological conviction of mainstream liberals is in the
coexistence of the universality of sin with the possibility of righteousness in every person.
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The preceding analysis of Wogaman’s account of the full spectrum of the Christian
moral imagination concerning politics reveals Wogaman’s affirmation of the status quo. To
reiterate succinctly, for Wogaman, the pacifists-anarchist view categorically excludes violence
within the range of acceptable Christian action and denigrates “‘effectiveness’ as a primary goal
for Christians.”198 The only logical conclusion of their perspective is to somehow exist apart from
the sate—an impossibility—or to dissolve the state. The liberationist perspective combines an
emphasis on conscientization, insistence on praxis, and open advocacy for revolution with
skepticism about existing political institutions and ambivalence about democracy. By identifying
sin with current social structures, they fail to address the problem of evil and injustice after the
revolution takes place. Neoconservatives insist on the superiority of the democracy, the
indispensability of capitalism, the need for a limited state, the importance of social mediators,
and the legitimacy of U.S. military and economic power abroad. They were better suited to
opposing totalitarianism than elaborating a positive vision. Evangelicals, alternatively relying on
the intellectual capital of an earlier era (the evangelical right) or combining a political liberalism
with a social conservatism (the evangelical left), lack a concrete, comprehensive moral vision of
the political economy. Despite their enthusiasm for serving justice, evangelicals on the left lack
an understanding of the consequences of a power vacuum upon the dismantling of social
institutions. Finally, mainstream liberals, convinced of both the universality of sin and human
benevolence, strive to affirm what is redeemable in the current political economic climate and
reform what is not. It advocates for Christians to achieve a balance that both stands outside of
the mainstream society as a prophetic community and works within it to help recover a civil
identity that grounds society. Ultimately, Wogaman envision that Christians will, “in concert
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with people of goodwill of all faiths and nations” will forge “a new era of global community with
peace and justice.”199
Wogaman builds the case that the only viable moral vision of the political economy is a
type of reformism that emphasizes democratization within the contours of current structures.
Wogaman’s “prophetic” Christian moral vision is basically the status quo, with some modest
policy adjustments to curb the most grotesque forms of injustice. Attempts to creatively imagine
alternatives that question the legitimacy of current structures (such as the inherent violence of
state action or that existing social systems create injustice) are falsified as either fantasy or selfdeception (i.e., unrealistic and delusional). For Wogaman these alternatives are necessarily
mistaken and thus, through a short-circuiting of the moral imagination, relevant insights are
lost.

Concluding Assessment
The task of Christian ethics is to evaluate political economic life in light of the
requirements of the Christian faith. Some Christians uncritically endorse the political economic
world, while others have nothing but condemnation for it. In the view of mainstream Christian
social ethicists, the appropriate posture is somewhere in between.200 There are injustices in the
world that are in need of prophetic critique, but a blanket condemnation of modern political
economic systems is unwarranted.201
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Mainstream Christian ethicists’ moral vision of the political economy is a market-based
society circumscribed by appropriate laws and regulations, in Finn’s language, “markets with
fences.” These Christian ethicists are concerned with what is morally defensible in the context of
that account of political-economic life. Instead of challenging the system of capitalism,
mainstream social ethics grapples with how market outcomes, corporate behavior, and
government actions can be conceived of as more just.202 The entire discourse centers on
eliminating moral abuse of both governments and markets through providing a Christian moral
underpinning to society. The basic claim that capitalist economies improve the economic well
being of nearly everyone is accepted as fact.203
The three ethicists under study here are concerned not only with relating theology to
political economy, but in constructing a Christian moral vision of the political economy. Yet it
remains an open question whether they have done so. All three acknowledge that Christian
teaching emphasizes the importance of the material necessities of life.204 Without adequate care
for the conditions of the materially needy, human beings cannot be what God intended human
beings to be spiritually. Along with Rauschenbusch, they affirm that good spirituality requires
confronting material inequality and injustice. With Karl Barth (though Stackhouse would dislike
being associated with him), they affirm “creation as the external basis of the covenant” and of
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“the covenant as the internal basis of creation.”205 They hold that the material realm (creation)
represents the preconditions for the fulfillment of the spiritual ends of human life.206 These
thinkers insist on the relevancy of Christian theology and ethics on the practices of other
religions (Stackhouse especially) and for the wider world. They are also clear that God has a
special concern for the poor (Finn particularly) and values the importance of liberation from
oppression (Wogaman here is especially sympathetic). Neither are they oblivious to the horrors
and gross tragedies that have coincided with the rise of democratic capitalism since the
sixteenth century.
Yet, they have constructed a selective theology that is resonant with capitalist political
economics rather than one that is critical of it. In their view, the brutality of laissez-faire
capitalism has given way to social welfare capitalism, which institutionalizes a greater concern
for the poor.207 Not everyone has benefited, true, and there have been injustices, yes. But the
possibility still exists that economic productivity can yield a just system in which all can benefit,
if only markets and international trade are conceived of correctly, if only theology once again
takes on a publically accessible character, if only democratic processes are allowed to function
properly. These Christian social ethicists do not attribute these injustices to the capitalist
political economic climate at all. They consider these events aberrations, excesses, or outliers to
a system that has, on the whole, brought about freedom, wealth, and well-being. They therefore
see no fundamental incompatibility with these values and norms and global democratic
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capitalism. From their perspective, a system which is better or more compatible with Christian
social ethics has yet to be conceived.
It is wishful thinking that somehow one can disrupt systems of oppression by
perpetuating more of the same. But such wishful thinking is what Christian ethicists are engaged
in most of the time. The result is a Christian moral vision that does not matter, one that fails in
terms of addressing the urgent needs of the majority of the world’s peoples. It views pluralist
liberal capitalist democracy as the best way to organize political economic life and the entire
moral imagination is subordinated to this overarching modernist conclusion. Despite its
purported concern for the least of these, mainstream Christian ethics poses no threat to the
current capitalist political economic system. In fact, it affirms reformed capitalism as the system
which is most in line with a Christian moral vision. As a result, mainstream Christian ethics fails
to deal in any substantive way with the social realities of inequality, discrimination, and
oppression generated by the capitalist system. Perpetrators of capitalist injustice might get
disgusted by being gummed and slobbered on by this toothless Christian social ethics that
supposedly protects society from oppression and inequalities.208 But they are under no real
danger.
The next chapter takes up the challenge of how we can expand the Christian moral
imagination. It points to Latina/o thinking as an ethical space from which to theorize Christian
political economic ethics, disrupt the feedback loop, and reestablish the connections of the
short-circuited moral imagination.
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CHAPTER 3: IMPLICATIONS OF LATINA/O THINKING FOR CHRISTIAN ETHICS OF THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY

Introduction
The previous chapter argued that mainstream Christian ethicists affirm the status quo
with some modifications, despite the insistence that their work constitutes a prophetic and
counter-cultural call for social change. Given the growing disparity between the promises of
capitalism—namely material prosperity and political freedom for all—and what it can deliver,
devotion to capitalist models of political-economic development constitutes a failure of the
moral imagination.209
There are two ways to account for this failure of the moral imagination. The first
concerns the epistemic limitations of theorizing from a universalizing point of view that covers
up or conceals the geopolitical location and structures of power of the speaking subject.210 In

209

This disparity is in the growing gap between rich and poor, the erosion of public services, and
degradation of community life in countries, like the U.K. and the U.S., where capitalism is most
uninhibited. Capitalism has historically brought about these disparities and degradation s in complex and
contradictory ways as Ellen Wood makes clear. See Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: A
Longer View, New ed. (London; New York: Verso, 2002 [1999]). One of Wood’s purposes is to challenge
the naturalization of capitalism, which “denies its specificity and the long and painful historical processes
that brought it into being” (Wood 8). Wood’s account challenges the widespread and dangerous
assumption that capitalism has brought about enormous benefits to humanity and is compatible with
democracy. Examining capitalism’s sordid past is an important step in imagining possible alternative
futures. The author returns to this challenge about the naturalization of capitalism in chapter four.
210

The Argentinean philosopher and social theorist Enrique Dussel argues for a
reconceptualization of knowledge along geopolitical lines in Enrique D. Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation,
trans. Aquilina Martinez (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, [1977] 1985). This first chapter is entitled
“Geopolitics and Philosophy.” It is not the same thing, Dussel notes, to be born in Chiapas or in New York.
Access to knowledge and education depends heavily on what part of the world one is born in and what
80

other words, the problem is with the particular point of view that presents itself as being
without a point of view, the “point zero” of western philosophies. 211 The second lies with an
underlying neoclassical understanding of economics combined with a rhetorical strategy that
frames Marxist socialism and unfettered neoliberal economics as the entire spectrum of choices
for the political economy. Given this structural framework, some form of moderated mixed
economy (a democratic socialism or democratic capitalism) becomes the inevitable and
“obvious” moral choice for the political economy. The second issue is addressed in chapter four
through a heterodox analysis of mainstream Christian ethics’ weak economic framework.
This chapter focuses on the former challenge. It moves beyond the failure of the moral
imagination by exploring the ways in which the social location of mainstream Christian ethicists
limits their moral imagination and by proposing an alternative social-cultural framework.212 It is
not enough, however, to replace one social-cultural framework with another; one must instead
construct a dynamic framework that allows for multiple subject positions and the intersection of
cultures. What is needed is a paradigm that resists the “god’s eye view that hides its local and
particular perspective under a universal perspective,” dualistic (either-or) conceptual paradigms,
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monoculturalism, and ethnocentrism.213 What is needed is an epistemic framework that
consciously and critically relates the local and particular to the global, closes the dualistic gap,
embraces pluralism, and achieves a holistic perspective in cognition. Latino/a thinking offers
such a framework.214
Latina/o thinking is a pointer to Latina/o religious and cultural discourses, a way of
referring to its insights and analyses. Latina/o thinking affirms the idea of postcolonialism, but
from a standpoint of embodied existence on the border, of life between colonial forces and
postcolonial imaginary. It does not precede from the orderly assumption that one can claim a
higher moral ground by achieving a postcolonial state of being. Instead it aims for a decolonizing
of reflections, praxis, and narratives of the other as the basis for constructing moral visions. It
refers to the epistemological and ethical potential of thinking on the borderlands. Authors refer
to this thinking and meaning-making on the borderlands in various ways: “new mestiza
consciousness” (Anzaldúa), “double consciousness” (Du Bois), “creolization” (Glissant), “religious
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poetics” (León), “border thinking” (Mignolo), “double translation” (Subcomandante Marcos).215
These terms refer to a simultaneity of multiple (at least two) perspectives; they critically reflect
on the hegemonic paradigm that assumes a neutral, universalistic, and objective point of view.
They affirm that people always speak from a particular social location, acknowledging that no
one can escape the sexist, racial, gender, and geographical hierarchies of the modern/colonial
world system.
Latino/a thinking is intrinsically concerned with intermixing combinations of cultures,
languages, and thought. It incorporates rather than excludes multiple perspectives. It invites
discontinuity and change. It refers to subjugated forms of knowledge produced by Latina/o and
Latin American critics and religious scholars who—because of their status as a hybrid, mestiza/o,
mulata/o, people standing between two (or more) worlds, in a “third space,”216 have gravitated
in their scholarly work to theorize cultural and religious mixing. Some of these intellectuals, like
Gustavo Gutiérrez, Enrique Dussel, and Walter Mignolo, live between former colonized and
colonizing countries. Others did not move, but the world moved around them, such as American
Indians in Latin America. Still others belong to a category somewhere between these two:
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Chicano/as are part of migration but the world has also moved around them. Virgilio Elizondo,
Gloria Anzaldúa, and Chela Sandoval are a few examples.217
Other groups have engaged in this dual strategy of critical theorizing and epistemic
decolonization: the sub-altern studies group from the Indian sub-continent and African thinkers
focusing on inculturation, to name but two cadres. The parallel manifestation of such a strategy
in the Americas is what is referred to here as Latina/o thinking. The argument here is not that
Latina/o thinking is unique or that is it categorically “better” than thinking of people from monocultural backgrounds (whatever that might mean). Instead, the argument is that Latino/a
thinking offers a socio-ethical space from which to construct a moral vision of the political
economy that counters capitalism’s complex web of oppression.
Like a symphony, this chapter proceeds in five movements, with the addition of a
conclusion.218 The opening movement explains how the moral imagination is socially contingent,
analyses how the dynamic of privilege works to render invisible the concerns of those on the

217

As this diverse list of theorists makes clear, this dissertation rejects the orderly and clear
division between U.S. Latina/os and Latin Americans as well as the underlying notion that there is a clear
distinction between colonizing and indigenous knowledge production. While there are differences
between the two, given the family resemblances among their theoretical insights, a strong differentiation
remains unwarranted. Thus, this dissertation adopts the term Latina/o thinking as a way of referring to
the knowledge production taking place among scholars both in Latin American and in U.S. Latina/o
communities and everywhere inbetween. Latina/o thinking draws on the border gnoseology and exilic
theorizing of Chicana/os, Latina/os, Hispanics wherever they may happen to be geographically.
The concept of Latina/o thinking is thoroughly indebted to the efforts of an earlier generation of
scholars who investigated the possibility, nature, and structure of a distinctly U.S. Latina/o epistemology.
Among religious scholars and theologians, this includes scholars such as María P. Aquino, Orlando E.
Costas, Allan Figueroa Deck, Orlando O. Espín, Ismael García, Justo L. González, Roberto S. Goizueta, Ada
María Isasi-Diaz, Ana M. Pineda, Harold J. Recinos, Jean-Pierre Ruiz, and Jaime R. Vidal, to name but a few.
Their reflections on epistemology, along with the efforts of Latin American philosophers such as Leopoldo
Zeo, Henrique de Lima Vaz, Enrique Dussel, and José Carlos Mariátegui, constitute the groundwork of
Latina/o thinking. A more systematic and sustained discussion of their epistemological insights lies outside
the scope of this study.
218

Those versed in music history might object that the normal form of the symphony since the
18 century decline of the “Italian”-style of symphony is a four movement symphony. However,
Tchaikovsky’s Third Symphony, for example, has five movements, so the five movement symphony is not
without precedent.
84
th

margins of society, and illustrates how social location and privilege work together through
mainstream Christian ethicists’ allegiance to Niebuhr’s realism to limit the moral imagination.
The second movement sets up the parameters of Latina/o thinking. It insists, despite claims to
the contrary, that there is such a thing as Latina/o thought; it parses out the categories of
Latina/o religious-cultural discourse; it warns of essentialist dangers in the quest to describe
Latina/o thinking; and it makes the case that Latina/o thinking addresses the postmodern
critique of the vanishing center. The third movement addresses Latina/o thinking’s potential for
restructuring moral visions of the political economy by moving beyond identity politics,
connecting identity and epistemic modalities through a noninnocent reading of history, a
rearticulation of the self according to a border imaginary, and examining Latina/o thinking’s
postexilic moments. The discussion moves apace in the next two movements which further
explore Latina/o thinking by examining two key concepts: praxis and lived experience. In short,
Latina/o thinking proposes a decolonizing praxis which calls for a transformation of the
methodology and social/intellectual basis of Christian social ethics. Connected to Latina/o
thinking’s praxis of decolonization is the concept of lived experience, which challenges rigid
academic categories and has the potential to broaden the moral imagination.219 The final
movement critically analyzes two concepts that have family resemblances to Latina/o thinking
articulated among scholars associated with world system analysis: the notions of Border
Thinking and Transmodernity.220 Both contribute and strengthen Latina/o thinking’s project of
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decolonizing moral vision of the political economy. The chapter concludes with a summative
rearticulation of the implications of Latina/o thinking for decolonizing and rearticulating
Christian moral visions of the political economy.

First Movement: Social Location and the Moral Imagination
Linking Social Location and Moral Imagination
Social location and moral imagination, or moral vision, are linked in three important
ways. The first pertains to the recognition that the spectrum of the moral imagination is
historically and socially contingent. Inherited symbolic systems, lived experiences, and historical
narratives constitute the horizon of possibilities concerning what is feasible and ethically
desirable.221 For example, medieval scholastics writing about economics in the fourteenth
century did not consider increases in wealth to increase quality of life, let alone be an end to
itself. For the scholastics, wealth was beneficial only if it was used in a way that was consistent
with the demands of justice and charity. A social system built on avarice, or at least
acquisitiveness, was unimaginable. Yet within a couple of centuries of the scholastic debates on
wealth that began humbly in manuals for confessors, commercial attitudes pushed moral
questions aside.222 Instead of disputing the morality of profit, profit-seeking behavior was taken
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Around 1215 CE, the year it become compulsory for all adults to go to confession at least
annually, Thomas of Chobham (c. 1163-1235) wrote the Summa Confessorum, a medieval manual for
confessors, which were books on how priests should advise people who came to them for confession.
Among his list of chief sins Thomas includes both usury and avarice. Thomas provides a strong defense of
commerce missing from earlier writings; he finds nothing wrong with merchants charging more for a good
than its purchase price, and approves of merchants including labor and transportation expenses incurred
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for granted. Thinkers began to work out the implications of people taking actions that were in
their own interests. Economic thought was increasingly abstracted from situations of economic
compulsion and the ethical dilemmas that gave rise to it.223 A social world in which individuals
did not pursue their own interests, in which they would not use any means to maximize that
interest, became unimaginable.
Second, ethical reflection is as much a function of imagination and social sentiments—
both socio-historical accidents—as it is of rational comparison.224 Stated differently,
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th
standard accounts of economic history locate the origins of economic ideas much later in the 18 century
with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, the work of David Ricardo, and James and John S. Mills. Only
recently have some scholars recognized their proper origins in the scholastic period. This is due partly to
th
the 18-19 century Enlightenment historiographical lens which understood the medieval period as one of
“darkness.” For a discussion of the reception of scholastic political economic thought in economic
historiography see Rodrigo Muñoz de Juan, "Scholastic Morality and the Birth of Economics: The Thought
of Martín de Azpilcueta," Journal of Markets & Morality 4, no. 1 (Spring 2011). For more on the economic
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(London, Melbourne, Toronto, New York: Macmillan; St. Martin's Press, 1969).
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contemporary ethical debates pit not just different rational arguments against one another, but
different moral and social imaginaries.225 Making ethical decisions in complex world—puzzling
through possible responses using various motifs (or ways) of forming ethical norms—and
adjudicating between responses requires drawing on one’s social location and the activation of
the imagination. A simplistic appeal to ends, principles, or virtues cannot alone solve complex
ethical problems. Regardless of the approach to making moral decision-making that is favored
(either teleological, deontological, or character/virtue ethics), the active use of the social
imaginary is required.
Much of contemporary Christian ethical discourse that addresses imagination takes its
understanding from Kant’s focus on its productive aspect and the Romantic Movement’s
association of imagination with creativity, genius, and freedom.226 Imagination is conceived as
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that make knowledge possible. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen
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the human capacity or power to transform experiences into new mental constructs. Bernard
Hoose writes in his introduction to Christian Ethics that “we stand in relation to reality not
merely physically . . . but also through our imagination.”227 Creativity is an essential element in
elaborating theological ethics. As Darby Kathleen Ray put is, “if there is one thing we cannot do
without on this journey into Christian responsibilities, it is the imagination, robust and
patient.”228 Some authors, like Cardinal J. H. Newman—concerned with the relationship
between science and theology in the late nineteenth century—pit reason against imagination.229
The author takes a different approach than this familiar trajectory. Moral imagination in this
project refers to a complex social capacity which does not set imagination in opposition to
reason, but is an inseparable part of it. Since moral judgments always involve prior imaginings,
imagination and reason must be understood as co-constitutive elements; imagination cannot in
any simple way be separated from reason, practical or otherwise.230

http://www.bartleby.com/27/23.html (accessed June 28, 2010). Also cited in P. H. Sedgwick, The Market
Economy and Christian Ethics, New Studies in Christian Ethics (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge
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Third, theories of morality are irreducibly imaginative and depend largely on socially
constructed images, schemas, metaphors, and narratives.231 Fundamental concepts of morality
depend on deep (usually unconscious), socially mediated metaphorical understandings.
Objectivist and rationalist approaches to moral judgments ignore how human beings actually
make sense of the world.232 This understanding of imagination makes it clear that the spectrum
of what is considered ethically possible is articulated out of received conceptual categories.
Previous articulations of the moral imagination delimit boundaries for how moral action in the
political economy is conceived/perceived. The moral imagination sets the boundaries within
which ethicists conceive or imagine. Mainstream Christian ethicists, believing that they are
elaborating a radical social vision, are simply producing and reproducing particular human
conceptions of how the world works based on human social institutions, structures, and
philosophical assumptions. This process represents a feedback loop of the Christian moral
imagination. The feedback loop not only determines the moral imagination of ethics; it also
creates the structure of the social reality itself.
To make this point more concretely, consider as an illustration the following definition
of ethics. Ethics is the analysis of how agents make judgments about good and evil, right and
wrong. Defining ethics this way posits that there is a good or evil, right or wrong “out there,” a
reality ready to be discovered. The binary of good and evil invokes a cosmic dualism, one
replicated and repeated in the development of ethical models. The mind of the ethicists is
therefore prepped, biased by their own conceptualization of the type of work they are engaged
in, to misrepresent the complexity, ambiguity, and pluralism of contemporary society. Consider
another illustration: the relationship between ethics and philosophy. Ethicists look to philosophy
231
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(among other disciplines) for insights in elaborating their own reflections. Yet philosophical
views depend on the cultural and historical climate in which they arise. Ethicists who rely on
philosophy are thus stuck in a feed-back loop, endlessly rehearsing the same tired ideas about
how to reason through complex moral issues like the political economy.233 Their imagination is
disengaged; the world of the possible is transmuted into the world of the likely, and finally into
the world of what is expected and anticipated. There is nothing new under the sun and ideas
which do not correspond to “reality” as constructed in the incestuous western intellectual
tradition are relegated to operations of fanciful, or worse, deluded minds.234

Privilege, Oppression, and the Moral Imagination
The social construction of reality, which is then internalized and becomes part of an
individual’s consciousness, begins to explain how privilege allows Christian ethics to define
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reality as fitting the experience of privileged theorists.235 One of the most visible consequences
of this privilege is an uneven distribution of income, wealth, and jobs along with everything
associated with it, from good housing to access to education and health care. As such, its
concerns are about the right mix of government and markets, or the inherent morality of
markets, or theorizing stewardship, or analyzing the common good. These projects are replete
with insights into how to make Christian ethical reflections in a complex “secular” society
relevant, and how to conceive the relationships between politics, economics, and theology.
They simply fail to deal with the elephant in the room: a society in which for many people it is
difficult to live decent and productive lives. Rather than challenging the yawning divide in levels
of income, wealth, dignity, and quality of life, these ethical systems affirm the basic structures of
society and ignore the social structures that attach privilege to being white, male (mostly),
heterosexual, and nondisabled.236
One of the most insidious characteristics of privilege is that is usually invisible to those
who have it. Privilege is an unearned benefit granted to members of a particular group that is
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denied to other because they belong to a different group.237 Privileges that some groups enjoy
at the expense of others create the corroding effect of oppression on millions of people every
day. And yet it is easy to be unaware of being granted these privileges. As members of a
privilege social class, mainstream professional Christian ethicists have a vested interest in
defending the status quo and ignoring the way in which the current political economic
configuration deals death. It is much easier to focus on issues of that have the least to do with
the matrix of privilege and oppression.238 The ease of unawareness to privilege is an aspect of
privilege itself. Social problems of oppressed people are routinely ignored, even as close
attention is paid to privilege and privileged culture.
While mainstream Christian ethicists may acknowledge the important of views from
oppressed people groups, in their theorizing they stay safely within the established canon
(which of course represents the perspective of privilege). The interests of those who are female
or of color or in some other way on the outside of privilege are not represented by mainstream
Christian ethics. Since these interests are routinely overlooked, they become invisible. This
becomes a major way in which patterns of privilege and oppression repeat themselves again
and again.
Latina/o thinking troubles this state of mainstream Christian social ethics. As much as
people might wish that the U.S. had moved in the 21st century into a post-racist/ethnic
prejudiced society, the reality of most U.S. Latina/os says otherwise. Segregation in housing and
education are stubborn and pervasive. The average wealth of white families is almost 15 times
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that of Latina/os and Black families.239 The average annual household income for whites is 44.6
percent greater than Latina/os and 70.3 percent greater than African Americans. Income
advantages among whites exist on all levels of educational achievement.240 Middle class
Latina/os and blacks who believe what whites told them, that if they went to school and worked
hard, race/ethnicity would not be an issue, are discovering that nothing can protect them from
structures of white racism.241 Latina/os thinking destabilizes the binary epistemes that form the
foundations of ethical analysis of the political economy. It also invites those of privilege groups
to take ownership over their own involvement in systems of privilege in order to discover what
can be done to heal the dysfunctionality in the system.
Oppression, hostility, and violence on the basis of difference are part and parcel of a
peculiar political economic system which has become the basis for every other social institution:
capitalism. The rise of capitalism is linked historically with the invention of whiteness and racism
on the basis of skin pigmentation, that is, for less time than Europeans have been aware of
other “races.”242 For most of recorded history, differences that are now considered so crucial
were considered socially irrelevant. However, when Europeans began to conquer and exploit for
their own economic gain, the idea of race was developed to justify their behavior on the
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grounds of racial superiority.243 Skin color, which had no importance in social life, became
something significant in order to justify and enforce privilege within the capitalist system.
The dynamics of capitalism produce an enormous amount of wealth but high and
increasing levels of inequality, within societies and globally. Capitalism manifests as a race to the
bottom: creating jobs for the least skilled, least powerful, and most vulnerable. It is a system
that creates and perpetuates oppressive conditions. For those living at the bottom the cost in
terms of living conditions is enormous. Even among those who are employed, the capitalist class
system offers little security and takes an emotional toll.244 It’s surprising, given these
characteristics of capitalism, that mainstream Christian ethicists parrot arguments about
capitalism being the only viable way to organize the political economy. It’s a bizarre outcome
that results partly from their privileged social location and having benefited from capitalism.

Niebuhrian Realism as Limitation
Mainstream Christian ethicists’ social location and privilege work together, through their
reliance on Niebuhrian realism, to limit their moral imagination.245 They argue for the superiority
of Christian realism by affirming the paradox of the basic goodness of God’s creation, including
human nature, with the ubiquitous presence of sin. Niebuhr’s Christian realism, they argue, is
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profoundly relevant for politics and democracy.246 They approvingly cite Niebuhr’s conviction
that “the human capacity for good makes democracy possible, and the human capacity for evil
makes democracy necessary.”247 Adherence to realism also supports for their opposition to
liberation utopianism. For Stackhouse, liberationists are “on the fringes of serious political and
economic thought” which for him is a definitive argument against it.248
Stackhouse and Wogaman’s dismissal of liberationist’s moral visions as “naïve” and
“unrealistic” is an odd sort of critique. To the extent that the goal is to imagine another social
reality, it is poor practice to insist on “realism” at the outset. The initial task of the imaginative
construction of a moral political economy is not policy recommendations, which are a second
order activity, but to broaden the conception of what is possible. John Milbank provides a
profound critique. He insists that Niebuhrian realism itself is an impoverished concept:
The Christian grasp of reality right from the start is utterly at variance with
anything the world supposes to be ‘realistic’. This is why it is so absurd
deliberately to import the world’s realism into the sphere of Christian ethics as
if, when it came to the practical crunch, we could set our entire religious vision
to one side. In Christian terms it is the world that will never understand the
world aright.249
Most mainstream Christian ethicists accept Niebuhr’s Christian realism. The result is a sort
politics of the possible, short-circuiting any notion of what is ultimately good and liberating. A
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reliance on realism sets limits on their moral imagination and serves to legitimate reformed
democratic capitalism.250

Second Movement: Parameters of Latina/o Thinking
¿Existe un Pensamiento Latino/a?
Latina/o thinking can serve as an alternative social-cultural framework from which to
elaborate Christian political economic ethics. But a possible difficulty exists in undertaking this
type of argument. Some, like the Peruvian Augusto Salazar Bondy continue to ask ¿Existe una
filosfía de nuestra América? (does a (Latin) American philosophy exist?), that is, a type of
philosophy that is not contemplated by the classic accounts of what is called philosophy.251 In
Filosofia de la liberacion latinoamericana, Leopoldo Zeo identifies Juan Bautista Alberdi as one
of the pioneers of Latin American philosophy.252 Alberdi’s work “Ideas para un Curso de Filosofía
Contemporánea” takes the existence of a distinctly Latin American thought for granted.253
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The problem, as José Carlos Mariátegui points out, is that many Latin American thinkers
have been educated in Euro-American schools.254 Thus, raising the question: is Hispanic
American thought merely a rhapsody of elements composed of motifs and fragments of EuroAmerican thought? It is certainly possible to argue that Latina/o thinking is culturally dependent
on North Atlantic societies. One could undertake a comparative approach to see if such a claim
is supported by surveying prominent Hispanic thinkers. The results of such study would most
likely prove only that Hispanic thought fails to be distinct from the Western tradition, since it
has not produced the major figures and “isms” that indicate an original tradition.255 But this view
is based on an incorrect assumption: that distinctly Latina/o thought must deny or reject its
Euro-American elements to become Latina/o. Yet Euro-American thought forms are a
constitutive aspect of what Latina/o thinking means. At its best, Latina/o thinking embraces the
best of modernity, unlike Third World and/or Indigenous fundamentalism that shun these
elements in their totalizing rejection of Euro-American thought.256
Latina/o thinking does exists, but in a form that intersects with, runs parallel to, and
sometime contradicts Euro-American thought.257 The content of Latina/o thinking largely
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depends on one’s questions and interests. In history, which asks about the significance of the
past to understand the present and construct the future, it is about the sense of history and the
philosophy of history. In social sciences, it involves a new interpretation of social structures and
institutions, such as dependency theory. And in cultural-religious discourse, in particular
liberation theology and philosophy, it is about the establishment of the Reign of God, a rein of
justice and liberation, in which human beings are no longer exploited.258

Praxis and Lived Experience
The massive body of socio-cultural-religious texts produced by Latina/o scholars since
the 1960s can be grouped into categories: liberation theology, philosophy, and pedagogy and
narratives of resistance and liberation.259 That is, these texts focus on either the idea that
thoughtful action or active thought is transformative or liberatory (often called praxis) or the
importance of the personal narrative and other expressions of lived experience. These texts are
the discursive component of transformative social movements, including the continued
organization of indigenous groups (Rigoberta Menchú, Chiapas), the movement towards a more
inclusive and multicultural society (César Chávez), the emergence of Christian base ecclesial
communities (Gutiérrez, Boff), and development of alternative notions of pedagogy geared
towards collective consciousness-raising (Freire). These Latina/o discursive manifestations of
religion and social change, in addition to offering fresh examples to the tired, often used cases
of King and Ghandi, serve as a new way to explore the complex and not always transparent
258
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relationships between discursive, social, and cultural-religious change. They suggest the two loci
of Latina/o thinking explored later in this chapter: praxis and lived experience.

A Non-Essentialized Approach: A Lesson from Latina/o Identity Debates
A deployment of Latina/o thinking as a method for formulating a cultural-religious
framework is fraught with essentialist dangers that find parallels in the scholarly quest to
describe Latina/o identity. Some scholars have attempted to portray Latina/o identity
(understandably so) by describing the essential traits of Latinidad, the central characteristics or
constitutive elements of life embodied in a Latina/o context. Invocations of Latinidad rarely
question its exclusionary premises, especially in regards to gender and sexuality.260 The results
of these studies have been a portrait of “homo hispanicus,” and other flat, one-dimensional
characterizations of an enormously diverse set of peoples.261 Another, more sophisticated
technique has been to define latinoness as the mixing between two cultures, its mestizo/a
characteristic.262 Still others argue that this fails to go far enough and treat latinidad in
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relationship to hybridity, pointing to complex negotiation of meanings rather than essential
characteristics as a way to conceptualize Latina/os identify.263
It is this last perspective that best describes Latina/o identity. Thus, debates on Latina/o
identity emphasizes that Latina/o thinking must eschew essentialized descriptions in favor of
non-essentialized approaches.264 The Hispanic is creatively localized in-between worlds and
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within worlds constituting the intercultural “border,” not as essences or reductive elements, but
as being involved in the dialectical creation and integration of new components in the process of
historical development.265 The dignity of this historical development should be affirmed as a way
to destabilize the Anglo strategy of jealously projecting “su alegada superioridad cultural,
política, religosa” (his or her alleged cultural, political, and religious superiority).266

The Postmodern Case for Latina/o Thinking
Postmodernism, as Lyotard defines it, is “incredulity towards metanarratives.”There is
no single story, no metanarrative that holds the center together or allows a place from which to
stand.267 Since, according to postmodernist thought, nothing that is known can be checked

Latina/o religious scholars involved in the debate on identity have paid little attention to the
fieldwork-based examinations of Latino pan-ethnicity. These studies reveal the difficulties in delineating
identity and make clear that the question of identity remains complex, as people choose to identify
themselves with various ethnic or national labels or with the larger Latina/o community according to
circumstances, locations, and historical moments. Dávila argues that the classification of all people of
Spanish origins as self-defined, stable community as revealing more about U.S. marketing strategies than
of the people themselves (Arlene M. Dávila, Latinos, Inc.: The Marketing and Making of a People
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001)). Ricourt and Danta point to the hope of organizing
Latina/o communities not on the basis of some shared essentialized characteristic, but on the basis of
working-class immigrant interests (Milagros Ricourt and Ruby Danta, Hispanas de Queens: Latino
Panethnicity in a New York City Neighborhood, Anthropology of Contemporary Issues (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2003)). Santiago-Irizarry charges that the essentialist concept of Latina/o cultural among
psychiatric medical practices are incongruent with experiences of the urban, U.S. born Latino patients
(Vilma Santiago-Irizarry, Medicalizing Ethnicity: The Construction of Latino Identity in a Psychiatric Setting,
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against reality as such, what is the basis of commending a particular story, or way of making
meaning, over another? Postmodern theorists have responded in various ways. Willad Van
Orman Quine provides one basis for adjudication:
Truth is whatever we can get our colleagues (our community) to agree
to. If we can get them to use our language then—like the “strong poets” Moses,
Jesus, Plato, Freud—our story is as true as any story will ever get.
Of course, if our story doesn’t “work,” if we fail to have a language that
allows us safely to “cross a street when a bus is coming,” few of us will be
around long in a modern city. Some language will pass out of existence because
the language framers did not survive long enough to have children to whom
they taught the language. But since many human languages—from Hindi to
Mandarin to Swahili—keep us alive in the cities, they have all the truth value
needed to keep us from being hit by a bus.268
In short, the only kind of truth is the kind of truth related to practical affairs. It is on this basis
that one can adjudicate between social-cultural perspectives: their usefulness in keeping people
alive. There is no “truth of correspondence,” but there is efficaciousness of language insofar as it
acknowledges death dealt out by current political economic systems and ethical reflections
around it.
Another way to adjudicate between competing socio-linguistic-cultural perspectives is
to deploy Alasdair MacIntrye’s scheme for evaluating large-scale traditions. According to
MacIntyre, a tradition can be rationally accepted if it is internally consistent and has the
resources to address the intellectual crises it faces.269 As an example, consider the crises faced
by the Christian tradition. Christianity survived the crucifixion of Jesus, the delay of the second
coming beyond the lifetime of the apostles, the introduction of Aristotelian thought by Arabian
conquests, and (much later in the 19th century) the rise of the historical-critical method. As
268
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Christianity faces each of these crises, it reevaluates its account of the historical situation,
reconstructing itself in light of these challenges. The Christian tradition thus can be rationally
accepted, on the basis of its ability to face intellectual crises and internal consistency. Latina/o
thinking demonstrates the same type of internally consistency and survival of intellectual crises.
In an intellectual age (in the sense of intellectual history) that is becoming more and
more postmodern, awash in a pluralism of perspectives, there is no sense of how to get from
here to there. The horizon has been washed away. The fixed center has vanished. Cultural
anarchy seems inevitable. What is needed is an intellectual-cultural framework that has
resources for dealing with the washing away of the horizon and the vanishing of the center. A
framework that accounts for various perspectives not in an either/or fashion, but a both/and.
Latina/o thinking offers just such a framework.

Third Movement: Thinking Beyond Identity Politics
The third movement explores the ambiguous relationship between identity and
knowledge production by drawing from postcolonial and Latina/o religious and cultural
discourses. Latina/o histories and identities are indelibly linked to epistemic modalities which
begin to address epistemic injustices. By connecting identity with the notions of noninnocent
reading of history, exploring the European “I,” New Mestiza consciousness, la facultad,
hybridity, and mestizaje-mulatez, Latina/o thinking offers new epistemic modalities, rather than
just an articulation of an identity or a transmission of knowledge from a particular perspective.
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Noninnocent Reading of History
Latina/o thinking draws on the concept of a noninnocent history as a way of moving
beyond questions of identity to Hispanic ways of perceiving and knowing.270 Justo González
contends that understanding U.S. Latina/o experience necessitates a “noninnocent” reading of
history.271 Innocent history is constructed from a singular perspective that justifies its political
goals religiously.272 U.S. history, as taught in schools and even universities, is guilty of such
innocence.273 González insists that as long as this country constructs its past as an innocent, “it
does not have to deal with the injustices that lie at the heart of its power and its social order.”274
In an innocent telling of history, Hispanics are either constructed as the “beneficiaries” of
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Kant attempts to reconcile Hume’s empiricism and Cartesian rationalism. For Kant, the
philosophical problem of epistemology centers on one question: how are synthetic a priori judgments
possible? His Copernican revolution in philosophy lies in his emphasis on the role of the mind in ordering
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missionary activity or they disappear altogether. A noninnocent history unveils the hidden
tradition of oppression and violence and the rationalizing of that behavior.275 Latina/o thinking,
as expressed in González’s noninnocent telling of history, articulates far more than an identity. It
recognizes that societal norms that establish and authorize knowledge often ascribe more
credibility to the powerful than the powerless. It makes clear that the present order is result of
theft, and not merely “hard labor, daring enterprise, and rugged individualism.”276

The European “I” and Latina/o Thinking
Claims about another way of thinking, an alternative reflective process are often met
with skepticism. The astonishment—sometimes cloaked as righteous anger—that their ways of
thinking are not the only ways is paralleled in the agonizing discovery, when they made their
way across the Atlantic, that they are not the only people.277 But the Euro-Americans’ agony
merits diagnosis. It must be uncovered how Euro-Americans came to totalize their experiences
in order to uncover if Latina/o ways of thinking are different from theirs.
Predecessors to today’s Euro-Americans did not center themselves in the same way. For
example, Francis of Assisi recognized God within the other. But, as Dussel explains, the subject
of the self, the European “I” is the beginning of a process. The first experience of the “I” is that
275
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of “I conquer.”278 The foundation of its potency is in the “I conquer” of Cortez or Pizarro. “The
European “I” begins with “I have sovereignty over all the lands” of the Hispanic king.”279 The
second stage begins with Descartes “I think.” Descartes doubts everything, even his own senses
and body. The result is the reduction of the self to a disembodied soul. The foundation of
everything else is this “I think.” With this foundation in place, the other is subliminated,
diminished, belittled, if not outright denied. The Indian, the African, and the Asian are reduced
not as something exterior but ideas internal to the system of the “I.” Finally, the “I” becomes an
“I will to power” in Nietzsche. He envisions a psychologically healthier being beyond the
common human conditions who creates, as an artist does, all from within. Things exists when I
believe them to exist. The “I” is the complete man (übermenschlich).280
The “I” that emerges is unconditional and indeterminate. Nothing comes before it, no
previous condition. Since it comes first, all determination is within the “I.” This “I” is an
autonomous chooser who transcends cultural norms. Isolated from the interpersonal
relationships, social responsibilities, and larger social forces, the European self lacks emotional
bonds and commitment to social conventions that undermine ethical duty. Beyond this “I” there
is nothing, the nothing about which nothing can be said.281
Latina/o thinking offers a different way of articulating the self and points towards the
possibility of another logic. It is a configuration of the border imaginary, in contrast to an
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Atlantic imaginary, which has become the imaginary of the modern/colonial world.282 Latina/o
thinking names a dynamic, multi-valent cultural milieu and the conditions of misery, poverty,
discrimination, and deprivation that is the norm for so many living on the borderlands. It
represents epistemic modalities that cannot be disassociated from the conditions and sites of its
production. It calls into question the omissions and interpretations of the victors of history.
Thus, Latina/o thinking holds potential for restructuring moral visions of the political economy
by supplementing the victor’s partial perspective with those of the vanquished and calling into
question the suffering which is the basic condition of those on the “underside of modernity.”283

Latina/o Thinking’s Postexilic Moments
Latina/o thinking also expresses the relationship between identity, history, and
epistemic modalities through the concept of the postexilic.284 For a myriad of reasons and in
various ways, Latina/os have been exiled from their homelands, often as a result of U.S. foreign
282
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policy.285 Some of Latina/os are literal exiles. For political, economic, or ideological reasons—
more likely some combination of these—Latina/os fled their countries. They later understood
that the U.S. supported the right-wing dictatorships Latina/os were fleeing and that the U.S.
economic policies created the poverty at home. Whatever the reason, their lands of birth are
now lost to them; they live in this adopted land. And though they no longer have any other land,
they nevertheless remain exiles. Other Latino/as are not exiles in the sense that they left their
lands of birth to come here. They were born here, and in many cases so were their parents and
grandparents. Although they may be citizens by birth, they are not treated as full citizens; they
remain “exiles living in a land that remains foreign.”286
Latina/o religious scholars have theorized exile as a method of exploring the
connections between U.S. Latina/o experiences, identity, and epistemic modalities and ancient
Judean communities. For instance, Miguel De La Torre contends that juxtaposing the portrayal
of the Israelites’ Babylon captivity found in Psalm 137 sheds light on the social location of Cuban
exiles.287 The forced removal that happens during the galut—the Hebrew word translated exile,
banishment, or diaspora—becomes more than a reinvention of identity. It becomes a “religious
condition” and raises questions of theodicy in the mind of the displaced: How can God allow
such a fate to come to pass on God’s people?288 The Judeans living in the foreign land of Babylon
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drew on their faith to cope with their existential situation by finding new meaning in the
humiliation and shame of their displacement, not just by reinventing their community’s identity.
Exilic Cubans have also abstracted important events of the past to engage in meaning making in
the present, a type of meaning-making that functions as a critique of prevailing ideologies.289 De
La Torre makes explicit how the pain of exile and the struggle to cope generates a new
religiosity. For Cubans and Judeans residing in a foreign land, (re)negotiating a (post)exilic
identity determines their sociopolitical reality and justifies their worldview. Their alienation
from their homeland forces a religious quest that reconfigures identity and a new
consciousness.290
Latina/o thinking connects postexilic moments with knowledge and aesthetics that are
not established by transcendent subjects, but historical ones in diverse cultural centers. Within
Latina/o thought, Chicana feminist Gloria Anzaldúa’s New Mestiza consciousness—a
transformed state of feminist, political, and social awareness—represents a powerful alternative
aesthetic and political hermeneutic.291 Anzaldúa’s work is characterized by a struggle to develop
a language that offers new conceptual repertoire for understanding human existence. For
Anzaldúa, the alternative form of knowing that comes about through la facultad (faculty).
Anzaldúa defines la facultad as “the capacity to see in surface phenomena the meaning of
deeper realities, to see the deep structure below the surface.”292 La facultad is “latent in all of
us” but is more developed in postexilic subjects (or for Anzaldúa, those on the border) who are
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constantly “against the wall” and experience “all sorts of oppression.”293 This sense is more apt
to develop in “those who do not feel psychologically or physically safe in the world . . . the
females, the homosexuals of all races, the darkskinned, the outcast, the persecuted, the
marginalized, the foreign.”294 La facultad arises as a necessity, as a survival technique to assess
threats and manage fear. Anzaldúa contends that Latina/os are “forced to develop this faculty
so that we’ll know when the next person is going to slap us or lock us away.”295 It is a type of
non-verbal perception, an acute awareness that communicates in “images and symbols which
are the faces of feelings.”296 Anzaldúa’s configuration of Latina/o thinking insists that perception
and understanding derived from pain, suffering, and loss, from an unwarranted and sudden
offense and the fear of it happening again is a legitimate source of knowledge.
The intersection of the postcolonial notion of hybridity to mestizje and mulatez,
constitutes another postexilic moment in Latina/o thinking, one that speaks about the diversity
of the human experience.297 For Hommi Bhabha, an Indian literary critique and key figure in
postcolonial discourse, hybridity emerges as a product of colonialism. Hybridity is a state of inbetweenness, a “third-space” of communication, negotiation, and translation resulting from the
colonial cultures inability to replicate itself in a homogenized manner.298 Bhabha’s notion of
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hybridity is nothing new for Latina/o scholars who anticipated his theoretical moves.299
Nevertheless, Bhabha is a good starting point for understanding the diversity and multiplicity of
postcolonial/postexilic/border subjectivity and its relationship to epistemic modalities. Bhabha
highlights the ambiguous nature of the colonial process and the always unstable notion of
culture. However, Bhabha’s notion of hybridity has its limitations. As Alred J. López argues,
Bhabha’s writings represents a rejection of the progressive narratives of liberation in favor of
the language of postmodernism.300 In trying to offer a theory that is applicable to colonialism in
general, Bhabha has abstracted away historical particularities. The result is that Bhabha’s notion
of hybridity fails to remain rooted in the daily struggles of peoples’ lives. Turing to the Latina/o
mestizo/a and mulato/a context allows a concretization of Bhabha’s ideas in a way that both
affirms and expands Bhabha’s notion of hybridity.301
As a part of Latina/o thinking within the identity/knowledge complex, mestizaje-mulatez
offers a way to reconceptualize difference and identity.302 Latino/a thinking transforms
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mestizaje-mulatez from merely a way of representing and referencing Hispanics into an ethical
choice and a hermeneutical tool for reinterpreting difference.303 Latina/o thinking’s embracing
of mestizaje-mulatez as an ethical choice constitutes a denunciation of the racism/ethnic
prejudice and the poverty it generates among Hispanics.304 Difference is reconceptualized as
heterogeneity, not as absolute otherness or mutual exclusion. The mestiza/o and mulato/a
embodies multiple traditions and cultures simultaneously, challenging the dominant
conceptions of difference. The dominant and the deviant, the self and the other, are contained
in the same body, not as discrete parts, as if one could cut off the European or Amerindian or
African part of themselves, but as aspects of the same being, creatively intermingling. From the
mestizo/a and mulato/a perspective of Latina/o thinking, it is clear that different cultures have
value and that the attempt to eliminate cultural differences constitutes a great evil, something
that should be resisted.
Latina/o thinking’s postexilic moments given rise to la facultad, hybridity, mestizo/amulato/a, revealing a strategy of resistance to the insistence of homogenized epistemic
modalities and rigid, inflexible social orders. Latina/o thinking represents a condition of
possibility—a creative opportunity—to construct moral visions which challenge the established

De La Torre has suggested the metaphor of ajiaco, a hearty and life-giving food that nourishes and
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frameworks of thinking and knowing.305 For Christian ethicists aiming to articulate an anticapitalist moral vision of the political economy that moves beyond identity politics, Latina/o
thinking can open up new hitherto unimagined conceptual possibilities.

Fourth Movement: Decolonizing Praxis and Lived Experience
Brief Genealogy of Praxis
This section addresses Latina/o thinking’s praxis of decolonization as a way of
decolonizing moral visions of Christian ethics. But before undertaking this task, it is appropriate
to (briefly) trace the genealogy of the notion of praxis in some key figures in the western
philosophical tradition, beginning with Aristotle, then flash-forwarding to the Hegel and Marx.306
Aristotle understood the free person as having three ways of relating to life, or
alternatively, three human activities through which understanding arises: theoria, praxis, and
poiesis.307 The three ways represent speculative (theoria), practical (praxis), and productive
(poiesis) modes of interaction of the reflective subject with the objective world: they are
305
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therefore three different ways of knowing. The difference lies mainly in their telos or their
intended purpose. Theoretical knowledge is an end in itself, while practical knowledge engages
in the ordering of human actions, and productive knowledges leads to the creation of
artifacts.308
Aristotle used the term praxis in a number of different ways, but with a basic
commonality. For Aristotle, praxis means a reflective action through which knowing arises
through social engagement. In praxis, knowing arises not from inward speculation, but form the
experience of social situation and intentional engagement with it.309 Given the purposes of
Christian ethics discussed above, it is reasonable to argue for the praxis way of knowing as an
epistemological basis for ethics.310 The praxis way of knowing must dialectically unite theory and
practice in a rearticulation of the Christian community’s narrative and vision.311
Rather than seeing these concepts in opposition, as is held by common interpretation,
Aristotle understood poiesis and praxis as cooperating together to make possible the life of
theoria.312 Yet, Aristotle is partly to blame for the dichotomizing of theory and praxis that later
developed. While he understood the three forms of knowing to be interrelated, theoria led to
the highest form of wisdom, sophia, and functioned as its own end. After Aristotle’s death,
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poiesis as a way of knowing fell out of favor.313 Largely as a result of the influence of the Neoplatonists, the primacy that Aristotle gave to theoretical knowledge was further emphasized and
praxis as a way of apprehending the world was greatly downgraded. Over time, speculative,
theoretical knowledge became the primary way of knowing without qualification. While
Aristotle held that both theoria and praxis were two aspects of the free human life, praxis was
now spurned. The result was a mindset that becomes typical of Western philosophy: to know
the world one should begin with speculative type of knowing and then apply, if any application
existed, to practice.314
Slowly, human knowledge as a reflection on experience was reestablished. G. W. F.
Hegel (1770-1831) began to use the term praxis in these terms. He deepened the rational
moment of praxis far beyond Aristotle’s notion. Hegel’s understanding of praxis is tied into the
organizing theme of his philosophy, what he called the Geist. The Geist is the all-encompassing
“Spirit” that is the sum total of all creation possibility. For Hegel, all praxis is the praxis of the
Geist.315 History in Hegelian terms is an ongoing and dialectically evolving praxis, shaping the
future towards the development of human freedom through praxis. Knowing is not realizing
through speculative theorizing about the world, but by reflection on and participation in the
praxis of the Geist.
One can draw two lessons from Hegel’s understanding of praxis as a way of knowing.
First, he rejects the underlying assumptions of theory to practice model. Hegel challenges the
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primacy of theoria, proposing instead the primacy of praxis. Second, he rejects the dichotomy
between theory and praxis: they bond together in a fundamental unity. For Hegel, praxis
becomes the actualizing of Geist, and theoria becomes human reflection on the Geist’s
actualization.316 This unity of praxis and theory appears in Latina/o thinking’s approach to praxis
in the attempt to decolonize moral visions. However, Hegel’s conception of praxis contains a
fundamental flaw. For Hegel, human knowing is merely consciousness of the Geist’s praxis.
Thus, there is no self-initiated reflective and active engagement. That is, Hegel’s praxis is overly
contemplative, receptive, and passive. One can only speculate that Hegel was caught up in the
Greek theoretical mode of knowing.317 While Hegel brought a praxis way of knowing back to the
attention of western philosophy, his conception is not adequate for the purposes of Christian
social ethics.
Marx understood that Hegel’s grand system contained this fundamental problem:
though it promised a type of salvation through the actualization of the Geist, the world
remained unchanged. Marx came to see Hegel’s idea of the Geist as no more than an ideology—
a false consciousness—that legitimizes the world as it appears to be as the world ought to be.318
Still fascinated by Hegel’s system, Marx replaced humankind in the place of Geist, so that the
evolutionary process became a human activated one. For Marx, then, knowledge is not a
reflection of the consciousness of Geist, but a reflection of “historical materialism,” the modes
of production and the material means of existence.
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According to Marx, the alienation that occurs is the result of the objectification of the
inner life of the laborer. The reappropriation of one’s labor leads to a “material synthesis” in
which true self-consciousness is achieved. However, in a capitalist system, where the products
of labor are controlled by the owners of the means of production, this process is stymied. Thus,
a revolutionary praxis, Marx claimed, is necessary to change social and economic structures so
workers can share in the products of their labor. For Marx, human praxis becomes the agency in
history of freedom and emancipation. Labor, which mediates between subject and objects is
both a means of engaging in the world and a means of knowing it. One knows about the world
as she engages in critical reflection that transforms the world.319
Two insights are distillable from Marx’s praxis way of knowing. First, Marx affirms
human knowing demands human creativity and initiative as active participants in human praxis.
In this he has already moves beyond Hegel. A second insight is that authentic knowing should
transform reality towards human freedom and emancipation. But Marx’s notion of praxis is also
deficient for the purposes here. Marx reduces human beings to products of their own labor. An
exclusively materialist way of knowing can never be adequate for Christian ethics. The human
emancipation Marx hoped for is entirely the product of human efforts. This is a type of
Pelagianism that denies the transcendental realities incongruent with the Christian tradition.
Moreover, in positing labor as the mediating moments between subject and object, Marx
reduces the reflective moment in praxis to the level of “instrumental action.”320 Marx limits the
breadth and scope of the reflective moment in praxis.
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Praxis of Decolonization
Latina/o thinking offers a broadened understanding of the active and reflective
moments of praxis that transcends the limitations of Marx’s position. A view of praxis as
decolonization, as part of Latina/o thinking, can serve as a basis for rearticulating Christian
moral visions of the political economy.
In Latina/o thinking, the term praxis can be traced genealogically to two sources. The
first is the Latin American Episcopal Councils (CELAM), from Medellín (1968) to Puebla (1979),
which pushed the findings of Vatican II to more progressive ends.321 The second is through
reflections developed in response to the conditions of oppression and exclusion experienced by
the majority of those in Latin America. Although both sources are theological, their deployment
of praxis reveals enormous sociological, political, and economic implications.
Gustavo Gutiérrez’s A Theology of Liberation, largely a product of the reflections of
CELAM meetings, symbolized a significant shift in understanding praxis. Gutiérrez redefined
theology as “a critical reflection on Christian praxis in light of the Word” enables the
radicalization of the same praxis of liberation.322 For Gutiérrez, praxis is conscious human action
that affects economic and political structures aimed at liberative transformation of human
history.323 Theory and praxis are not separate; there is an inseparable and intimate relationship
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between the two.324 Juan Luis Segundo expands the concept of praxis by arguing that any
theological ethics worthy of attention stems from a commitment to change and improve the
world.325 Praxis leads to a new interpretation of sociological realities which in turn leads to a
fresh reading of the Bible and an impetuous to change the world and then go back and
reinterpret the Bible again, and so on.326 This is Segundo’s “hermeneutic circle,” a circular
interpretation of the world, word, and work towards transformation (praxis).
Latina/o thinking’s praxis of decolonization enables an approach to ethics that moves
beyond the subject-object distortion that continues to characterize the modern/colonial
project.327 It moves ethics from the rarefied atmosphere of academia to the world of the
formally colonized people. It’s starting point is not the “European I” but solidarity with the poor
that “experience death before their time,” as the bishop from Chiapas put it. The praxis of
decolonization challenges the historical practice of Christian ethics by reconceptualizing its
social parameters and calling for a transformation of its social and intellectual basis. Social
ethicists must begin to develop a critical consciousness about society’s neocolonial existence
and to correct these perceptions by engaging in relationships with those who do not benefit
from the current system. Latina/o thinking’s praxis of decolonization sets out to actively reflect
on and critique existing forms of domination and exploitation that have become normative.
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Lived Experience and Epistemic Privilege
“You’ll understand when you’re older” is an aphorism young people are no doubt tired
of hearing. The statement might represent an argument from authority, a logical fallacy that
argued that the statement is true or correct because of its source. Or it might be used as a form
of deflection, a patronizing way for adults to evade difficult or uncomfortable questions. But it
can also mean a legitimate appeal to experience as a way of gaining knowledge. A three year old
does not understand love, but experience offers the opportunity to learn of love in its various
expressions. “You’ll understand when you’re older” because experience is the great teacher and
there are some lessons only experience can teach.
Yet, the underlying assumption is of a common experience. You will understand later
because all human beings go through similar experiences. Here the European self creeps back
into the analysis: all human beings are in some basic way the same. Latina/o thinking starts at a
different place. Attempting to grapple with the inadequacies of Euro-American systems of
thought, its widespread inapplicability—and even utter irrelevance—to Latina/o communities,
experience takes precedence as a teacher. On this basis Latina/o thinking appeals to lived
experience as a counter-hegemonic source of epistemological, theological, and ethical
reflection.
Lived experience is sometimes coded in Latina/o scholarship as lo cotidiano.328 Lo
cotidiano is a key element in the meaning making and the struggle for liberation. It corrects the
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fixation of liberation theologies on social structural elements by pointing to daily lived
experience. Lo cotidiano refers everyday struggles/experiences of Latina/os. Experiences “deal
with the substance and the form of lo cotidiano” but do not constitute all of it.329 Lo cotidiano
refers both to the material reality and the interpretation of it.330 It is the cultural, historical, and
locative milieu around experience and through which experience has meaning. Lo cotidiano is
tied to the work of Latina/o justice pointing to both to “the struggle (la lucha) against the
present social order and to the liberating alterative” of the la comunidad (community).331
Despite the underlying wisdom revealed through the common aphorism with which this
section began, the prevailing assumption among many academics (trapped by the European “I”)
that the everyday does not matter or at the least it cannot be accessed. In a now famous
lecture, Heidegger criticizes philosophical attempts to access life and life experience.332 He
argues that attempts to grasp life experience ultimately distort the thing they hope to
discover.333 Certainly the philosophical question of how to grasp life experience in a
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comprehensible way constitutes a rich and treacherous area of philosophical exploration.334
However, the appeal to lived experience in this chapter is pragmatic. Lived experience focuses
attention on the violent and oppressive realities of the marginalized people around the world
and sets one on the path to liberation.335
As a social space, lived experience refers to the impact of class, gender, poverty and
work on relationships within families, friends, and neighbors, and religious authorities.336 As
folk-wisdom, it is the engine that generates pragmatic, prudent, and levelheadedness in dealing
effectively with situations.337 In Isasi-Díaz’s conception, lo cotidiano has at least three functions:
a 1) descriptive, 2) hermeneutical, and 3) epistemological one. Its descriptive function feeds
“new narratives” that have the capacity to “break the hegemony established mainly by men”
that has produced oppressive structures.338 As a hermeneutical device, which “deals with
context” and the “use of power,” it describes how day-to-day oppression operate and “unmasks
those who benefit from them.”339 Epistemologically, lo cotidiano points to the fragmentary,
provisional, and conjectural aspects of knowledge.340 Lived experience, as part of Latina/o
thinking, appeals to the daily realities of marginalized Latina/os. Identifying with the reality of
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marginalized groups can begin to transform mainstream Christian ethics into a counterhegemonic process.

Fifth Movement: Latina/o Thinking in the World System
Latina/o thinking begins at the moment reflection on conquest/discovery of the
Americas. While Latina/o thinking of the sixteenth century has gone unnoticed by modern
philosophy, it has contemporary relevance because it was that generation that experienced the
creation of the first world system.341 The central ethical question of that era was the following:
what right has the European to occupy, dominate and manage the recently discovered cultures,
conquered by the military, and in the process of being colonized?342 The discussion of this
question within the School of Salamanca on the “rights of people” began with the well-known
debate of Valladolid between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan de Sepúlveda. This debate was
erased in the eighteenth century, when the declaration of the “rights of men and of the citizen”
came into existence. The eighteenth century redefined the imaginary of the modern/colonial
world system in a manner consistent with the new imperial powers of Britain, France, and
Holland.343 Conceived of as a new beginning, it erased for future generations the crucial
importance of the Renaissance and the Reformation. The entire theological, ethical, and legal
debates on colonialism and the rights of colonized people vanished. Postcolonial thinking
341
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promoted an imaginary that begins in the eighteenth century. This is due in no small part to the
work of Edward Said.
Many scholars cite Edward Said’s publication of Orientalism344 as the starting point of
postcolonial studies. In Orientalism, Said, a Palestinian American and literary critique, focuses
not on colonial history or the psychological effects of the colonial aftermath (as Franz Fanon and
Albert Memmi had already done and Ashis Nandy did independently) but in European textual
and discursive representations of the Orient, by which he meant primarily the Arab Middle East.
Said’s main argument in that the Orient is a discursive invention of the West used to engender
and maintain control. Orientalist discourse portrays the Orient as sensual, erotic, emotional, and
fundamentalist, while “Occidental” is rational, cool, logical, and secular. Said limited his analysis
primarily to British and French colonial representations of the eighteenth and nineteenth
century and thus emerged the idea that the field begins there. The entire Americas, including
the Caribbean, North Africa, and most of Sub-Saharan Africa were left out of the picture.
“Postcolonial” criticism and theory, as Walter Mignolo argues, increasingly became employed by
critics and intellectuals writing in English to refer to the domain of the British empires and their
ex-colonies (Australia, India, and New Zealand).345
The intention here is not to critique Said on that basis of what the book does or does
not do (as Aijaz Ahmad has done).346 The intention instead is to point to the enormous silence
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that Said’s work enforces: orientalism is only the second hegemonic cultural imaginary of the
modern world system. This second world system marks the transitions when the image of
“modern/secular Europe” (England, France, Germany) replaced “Christian Europe” of the
fifteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries (Italy, Portugal, Spain).347 It was the theft of nearly
incalculable amounts of wealth, in the form of gold and silver, that reached Spain and the rest of
Europe that made the second modernity possible. These enormous riches made possible the
rapid growth of world trade. The great beneficiaries of such intense trade were the European
middle-men, the merchants, the bankers, and other industries. It was also this influx of hard
currency that enabled subsequent economic development.348
Said is right when he argues that the Orient become Europe’s Other during the
eighteenth century. However the extreme West, the Occident, was never Europe’s other but its
child, the “daughter” of Europe. That is why, in the words of Mignolo, “without Occidentalism
there is no Orientalism.”349 Occidentalism envisioned the Americas as an expansion of Europe.
Here is Mignolo’s basic definition:
Occidentalism, in other words, is the overarching geopolitical imaginary of the
modern/colonial world system, to which Orientalism was appended in its first
radical transformation, when the center of the system moved from the Iberian
Peninsula to the North Sea, between Holland and Britain.350
chief cultural artifact. He examines the sometimes conscious ways in which the novels of Jane Austin,
Joseph Conrad, Mary Shelly and others support and legitimize European imperial adventures. He also
examines resistance literature—the novels of Salmon Rushdie, Chenua Achebe, and others. To his credit,
towards the end of Culture and Imperialism, Said calls on postcolonial intellectuals to move beyond the
complacent rhetoric of nation-state. Nevertheless, this is only a faint echo of Fanon some thirty-two years
previous.
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The modern/colonial world system that emerged in the sixteenth century proved far
more discriminatory and destructive to nature than the system it replaced.351 At the moment,
societies around the world are facing a new horizon of historical change. Among the possible
scenarios is the creation of a new historical system worse than the current one in which
capitalist elites follow the familiar strategies of feudal aristocracy, shaping the world to ensure
they maintain their own power. Another possible scenario is the subaltern groups around the
world, the ones that Fanon called the wretched of the earth, mobilize to create a more
diversified system. These groups consciously resist or simply resist homogenization, cultural
assimilation, and co-optation by U.S. nation and empire. Transformation of the metropolitan
centers is crucial for the future to take this second path. One of the factors in bringing about the
transformations is the growth of Latina/o population the United States, one of the most
powerful core countries in the world system.352
Latina/os arrive in metropolitan spaces with the conceptual distinctions elaborated
above. They are polluted by a colonial history, colonial knowledges, and a history linked to
empire.353 In Huntington’s Who Are We?, a follow up to The Clash of Civilizations, seeks a
strategy for justifying and maintaining white supremacy in the U.S. domestic area in light of the
fast growing Hispanic population.354 Huntington provides a racist, xenophobic response to justify
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the exclusive leadership of WASP elites when they are no longer the demographic majority.
Huntington insists on the assimilation of Latina/os which for him are non-English speaking
foreigners. The challenge and the opportunity for Latina/os is to change the terms of the
debate, to bring their consciousness of colonial history into the mainstream. Thus, Latina/o
thinking can form part of the larger project of decolonizing knowledge in the U.S. and other
parts of the globe by decolonizing moral visions of the political economy.

Latina/o Thinking and Border Thinking
A related concept to Latina/o thinking is border thinking. Both concepts exhibit
epistemic and ethical potential; both are analytical and critical tools for dislodging
modern/colonial imaginary. Border thinking attempts to restore what has been eliminated
through colonial difference.355 Colonial difference names what distinguishes—within the
colonial imaginary—the European from the other in the configuration of the world into a
modern/colonial system. 356 In the sixteenth century, colonial difference revolved around the
lack of alphabetic writing. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, it was history. In the
twentieth century, it was development. Thus, border thinking is linked to but not synonymous
with subjugated or subaltern or knowledges. It exploits the “cracks” in the imaginary of the
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world/colonial system to allow the percolation of repressed forms of knowledges.357 The
recognition of colonial difference demands an exploration of border thinking.358
Border thinking emerges both within and without the geopolitical borders of the
modern world system: within the “local histories” of metropolitan centers of Europe and the
U.S., but also in the local histories of its margins: Latin American under Spanish control, India
under British rule, Algeria and Tunisia under French colonialism.359 For Mignolo, “border thinking
and double critique are the necessary conditions for ‘an other thinking,’ a thinking that is no
longer conceivable in Hegel’s dialectics, but located at the border of coloniality of power in the
modern world system.”360 This other thinking constitutes a way of thinking “that is not inspired
in its own limitations and is not intended to dominate and to humiliate; a way of thinking that is
universally marginal, fragmentary, and unachieved; and, as such, a way of thinking that, because
universally marginal and fragmentary, is not ethnocidal.”361
While border thinking’s recovery of subjugated knowledges is worthy of admiration, it
also displays two troubling tendencies. First border thinking itself, with its refusal to take any
particularized stance, can become a type of universal gaze with no accountability except itself.
For Mignolo the “key configuration of border thinking” lies in “thinking from dichotomous
subjects rather than ordering the world in dichotomies”; it is a “dichotomous locus of
enunciation.”362 It seems that this may amount to a positing of a new universal subject position.
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Second, Mignolo is more concerned with how border thinking applies to the disciplines (the
academies) than the underlying material realities. In this sense border thinking becomes a
constant cultural critique of and between schools of thought.
Despite these short-comings, border thinking helps to illuminate an aspect of Latina/o
thinking that moves between subaltern and hegemonic knowledges. Both offer a double
critique, that is critical both of monovision western epistemology and Christianity, that can think
from both traditions and at the same time neither of them, that has potential to decolonize
Christian moral vision of the political economy.

Latina/o Thinking and Transmodernity
Another concept that can be related to Latina/o thinking is transmodernity.
Transmodernity arises out of the observation that for some theorists talk about postmodernism
indicates that, at least in some essential aspects, modernity has ended.363 But this begs the
question: which parts of modernity have concluded? If the center of modernity has been the
conception of history as a progressive realization of authentic humanity, a process of
emancipation, then certainly the center is in crisis. The twilight of modernity, that is
postmodernity, was initiated by Nietzsche and Heideggar. However, according to Dussel,
postmodern critique largely remains provisionalized. All the accomplishments of modernity are
the fruits of a dialectic between center and periphery; that is, the periphery helped create
modernity.364 The periphery of modernity is its side: like two sides of the same coin.365 The
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strategy of forgetting, concealing, and covering over has justified violence against the periphery
as rational in the name of civilization, portraying its killers and perpetrators (conquistadores,
traders, imperial colonizers) as innocent and its victims as guilty.366 The refusal (of Vatimo,
Nietzsche, or Heideggar) to include the annihilation of non-European cultures of the planet
reduces postmodernity to the same colonizing, dominating, and excluding conception.
Transmodernity is the name Dussel gives to an ethics of liberation that moves beyond
Eurocentricism and singularity of modernity and postmodernity. Transmodernity refers to a new
project of liberation of the victims of modernity and the development of its potential
alternatives.367 It is an attempt to strengthen the twentieth-century project of decolonization. In
the current system, only liberal notions of democracy are accepted and legitimated. There is no
recognition for indigenous, African, Islamic, or other non-European forms of democracy.368 A
transmodern world, a world beyond modernity, is open to diverse views of democracy, liberty,
and human rights of the dominated and colonized world.369 Transmodernity names a current
crisis in capitalism/modernity that covers over the periphery that has lead to our current global
configuration.
While Dussel’s concept of Transmodernity is enormously valuable two critical comments
are in order. First, it is worth noting that Dussel did not invent the “transmodern” phenomenon.
What he did was to expand old ways of framing the interaction between the pre-modern,
modern, and postmodern and to propose and application of the coloniality of power. Dussel’s
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work flies high but people on the ground have been working on the disruption of modernity for
decades (as other parts of this chapter make clear). Dussel’s account slights the efforts of
Feminist, Latina/o, and Black rereadings of history and philosophy. He takes insights from them,
but does not engage them. Second, some claim that Dussel is a Latin American liberation
theologian, but he says nothing about Christianity, the church, or religion. That blinds him to the
ordinary discourses of most of the people most of the time. This is somewhat surprising, given
his attention to liberation. Along with transmodernity, Latina/o thinking affirms the need to
recognize the dignity of the negated alterity. Both transmodernity and Latina/o thinking point to
other epistemologies and an openness to otherness that can help to decolonize moral visions
that move beyond modern/colonial/capitalist world system.

Conclusion
Social location shapes the analysis of the social situation, the reading of the tradition,
and the resulting elaboration of Christian moral visions. Insofar as Christian social ethics is
meant to address the problems of life concretely, the influence of social location cannot be
treated as a matter of indifference, nor should the tension between social location and moral
imagination be minimized.370 Christian ethics that continues to be elaborated from no place,
from a zero point perspective, ironically speaks to no one and certainly not to the marginalized
and oppressed communities it purports to champion.
Envisioning and enacting a moral vision of the political economy requires moving
beyond the formula of more of the same with some modifications. Latina/o thinking challenges
mainstream Christian ethicists by asking what their moral visions would like from the underside
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of modernity. It insists that any vision of the political economy that refuses to acknowledge the
majority of the world and continues to impose provincial or regional European thinking as global
is critically inadequate. The agenda of Latino/a thinking is to allow for the simultaneity of a
multiple perspectives; it seeks to acknowledge, respect, and value other vantage points.
Latina/o thinking, as expressed by U.S. Latina/o and Latin American intellectuals, emphasizes
that there is a twofold condition of the subject: the Christian tradition and concrete social
realities. Both must be taken into account in constructing moral visions.
The lived experience of Latino/a peoples demonstrate that the present political
economic order can be traced to Indian-annihilating and African-enslaving policies of the
Spanish monarchy and of Anglo-American “democracy.”371 Hostile government policies continue
to target Hispanics who are descended from populations that have been routinely and
systematically conquered, renamed, and killed by Euro-American colonists. Conquest,
colonization, and capitalist expansion are tied together in the Latina/o experience. From the
perspective of Latino/a thinking, the horrific events of the past haunt the present with
memories of conquest, killing, and deculturalizing.
Latino/a thinking further reveals that the past not only haunts the present, but
continues to shape the present through the continuing imposition of the Euro-American
epistemological tradition, the “cultural archive” of the West, built in the service of imperialist
expansion and colonial rule.372 The discursive covering of the majority of the world constitutes a
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strategy of modernity that continues to justify violent acts of the privileged few as rational in the
name of progress and development. The contemporary political economy of the U.S. is not only
rooted in the mutually reinforcing systems of colonial and capitalist domination but perpetuates
past imperial policies of genocide and cultural holocaust, now affecting an ever greater number
of people through the globalization of the market.373
A political economy that benefits a privileged few at the expense of the many can hardly
be worth sustaining. Latino/a thinking can support the struggle to envision a moral, inclusive,
and egalitarian political economy. What then are the implications of Latina/o thinking for
Christian ethics of the political economy? They are rearticulated briefly here:
1. Identity and social location are tied to knowledge production. Latina/o thinking makes
clear that the present order is result of theft, violence, and oppression and a
rationalizing of those actions. As such, Latina/o thinking holds potential for restructuring
moral visions of the political economy by reconfiguring the self according to border
imaginary, which makes clear that misery, poverty, discrimination are the norm, not the
exception. Through a reconceptualization of difference, Latina/o thinking allows
movement beyond identity politics and creates the possibility of elaborating anticapitalist moral visions of the political economy, visions that are not designed around
one group’s efforts to control and exploit others.
2. Latina/o thinking, through a revitalized praxis (that transcends the limitations of the
Aristotelian /Hegelian /Marxian conceptualization), moves ethics beyond the subjectobject distortion and dichotomization of the modern/colonial project and into the world
of formally colonized people. It calls on Christian ethicists to abandon the theory to
practice approach to knowledge that prioritizes developing a tidy abstract thought
world without reference to (except as abstract categories) the misery and suffering of
the majority of the world’s people. Latina/o thinking’s decolonizing praxis challenges
Christian ethicists to develop a critical consciousness about society’s neocolonial
arrangement.
3. Latina/o thinking draws on lived experience as a counter-hegemonic source of ethical
reflection. As part of Latina/o thinking, lived experience focuses attention on the violent
and oppressive realities of the marginalized people around the world. Thus Latino/a
thinking, by acknowledging the reality of marginalized groups, has the potential to
transform mainstream Christian ethics into a counter-hegemonic process.
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4. Lastly, Latina/o thinking brings Latina/os consciousness of colonial history into the
mainstream and offers a point of departure other than this modern/colonial complex of
conquest and inequality. Latina/o thinking theorizes from both subaltern and
hegemonic knowledges, enabling it to be critical of the tradition while drawing from it. It
moves beyond the Eurocentrism of both modernity and postmodernity by
acknowledging diverse notions of democracy, liberty, and human rights covered by the
current capitalist/modern configuration of the world. It recovers subjugated knowleges
lost through colonial difference and affirms the dignity of the neglected alterity.
Thus, Latina/o thinking provides an alternative ethical space from which to decolonize and
construct new moral visions of the political economy. Christian ethicists heeding the insights of
Latino/a thinking are far better equipped to begin to rupture the status quo of inequality and
oppression and make way for a socially just reimagining of the political economy. Yet,
accounting for the failure of the Christian moral imagination and decolonizing moral visions of
the political economy requires more than just addressing the epistemic limits of theorizing from
a universalizing point of view. It also requires addressing the underlying economic framework
upon which mainstream Christian ethics build its moral visions of the political economy. The
next chapter examines these structural weaknesses using the insights of heterodox economics.
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CHAPTER 4: REFRAMING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

Introduction
The last chapter analyzed the way in which social location limits mainstream Christian
moral visions of the political economy. It was argued that Latina/o thinking offers a way of
addressing the limitations of social location. This chapter continues to delineate the limits of the
Christian moral imagination by examining mainstream Christian ethics’ economic thinking. The
argument in this chapter is that insistence of mainstream Christian ethics on “orthodox”
neoclassical economics as the singular viable basis for the political economy limits the spectrum
of possible moral visions to reformed capitalism (which remains essentially capitalist) and that
heterodox economics offers a way to destabilize the entrenched position of neoclassical theory
and expands the limits of the moral imagination.374 Heterodox economics imagines and realizes
non-essentialist economic approaches, which accepts some concepts associated with
neoclassical theory, such as market mechanisms, but are not reducible to these. Furthermore,
heterodox economics shows that non-capitalist forms of economic activity are already present
and prevalent. Incorporating heterodox economic principles expands the limited Christian moral
374
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imagination to transcend the old left-right dichotomy and moves towards the creation of
decolonized moral visions.

Reliance on Neoclassical Economics
The premise of mainstream Christian ethical thought is that a reformed capitalism and
neoclassical economics constitute the only viable framework on which to build a moral vision of
the political economy. It presumes that reformed capitalism, capitalism curbed of the excesses
of laissez-faire ideology, can bring the political economy into closer alignment with the Christian
faith. The attempt is to integrate Christian values with “realistic” economic patterns and to
envision strategies to transform free-market relationships to deliver on the promise of economic
prosperity for many.
A brief survey of the Christian ethicists introduced in chapter two reveals their reliance
on the neoclassical economic model. Conceptually, mainstream Christian ethics adopts its
definition of economics, its relationship to other disciplines, and largely accept the neoclassical
account of the human person in relationship to market realities. Their reliance on these
neoclassical conceptual models is also manifested in the limited scope of their economic
analysis and their tendency to emphasize its promises and minimize its problems.

Defining Economics and Its Relationship to Ethics
Finn uses the terms “economics” and “economist” as synonyms for neoclassical
economics. He concedes that there are other “significant” schools of economic thought
(“Institutionalism, social economics, Marxism, feminist economics, Austrian economics, and so
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forth”) that offer substantive and “badly needed” critique of economic orthodoxy.375 It is for the
sake of simplicity, he explains, and not to disparage heterodox economics that he makes this
theoretical move.376 In terms of its relationship with ethics, Finn affirms that economics—as a
social science—plays an important part by correcting ideological perceptions about how the
world “works.” Moral conviction, Finn argues, should not be allowed to trump or substitute for
scientific social analysis.377
If Stackhouse does not explicitly label his understanding of economics neoclassical, it is
partly because for him it goes without saying: neoclassical theory is the only viable form of
economics. Stackhouse does acknowledge that there are schools of economic thought outside
of neoclassic economics.378 They are not however, for Stackhouse, economics proper. For
Stackhouse, the discipline of economics is useful as a technical tool that has the ability to
accurately describe and explain how political economic systems work. Economics analyzes how
societies respond in the aggregate to economic pressures and trends of one kind or another.
Stackhouse emphasizes that the advances in economics are so monumentally significant that
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they are analogous to the discoveries of Galileo, Newton, and Einstein in physics.379 Here
Stackhouse echoes the claims of some neoclassical economists themselves: that economics is a
progressive process of refinement in modeling economic reality; that like the physical sciences it
is a detached, objective, and value-free enterprise; that they are simply describing economic
phenomenon through the process of hypothesis formulation and empirical testing.380
In Stackhouse’s view, economics offers a set of theoretical tools that are the necessary
but not sufficient basis for creating a moral political economy, just as physics is the necessary
but not sufficient basis for launching a probe into space (for example). Public theology is the
hand that wields the tools of economics to determine economics organizations and practices
that correspond to the laws, purposes, and mercies of God appropriate under a globally
competitive and pluralistic life.381 Stackhouse insists that whatever these economic
organizations and practices look like, they must be grounded in modern economics, law, and
culture: “whatever ethical vision we propose must be socially viable” and that is revealed
through neoclassical economics.382 Stackhouse takes economics (of the neoclassical variety) as
given. Economics provides basic models, such as the law of supply and demand, that describe
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economic realities and allow for the construction of moral visions of the political economy that
cohere with economics, law, and culture.
Wogaman also defines economics according to a neoclassical understanding. For
Wogaman, economics is “the process of making or developing or distributing goods and services
and the system of allocating those goods and services.”383 It is “concerned with the systems of
production and distribution of scarce values.”384 Despite defining economics in this limited
fashion, he recognizes that there have been many economic “ideologies,” including
traditionalist, feudalism, mercantilism, and various forms of socialism. But these systems are
mostly of historical interest. In the late 20th century, there is only one reasonable form of
economics and it lies between the extremes of laissez-faire capitalism and socialism.385 For
Wogaman, the proper role of the economist is to clarify technical questions in such a way that
the non-economist can participate in the discussion since “economics is too important to the
human enterprise to leave in the hands of economists alone.”386
Moreover, because these Christian ethicists utilize such a narrow definition of
economics, large portions of human economic activity are ignored. For example, Stackhouse
recognizes that household (or family, clan, villages, or estates) based economic activity exists,
but their significance is minimal in comparison to the influence and allocative efficiencies of the
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corporation.387 For Wogaman, scarcity is a necessary characteristic of economics. Unless a value
is scarce, it should not be considered in economic models. Goods that are normally abundant
can become scarce—such as clean air in the context of pollution—and thus are rendered
“economic.” But unless they are construed as scarce, goods are not perceptible to economic
analysis.

Individualism, Self-Interest, and Economic Activity
Neoclassical economics is built upon the idea of homo economicus, a portrayal of the
human person characterized by radical individualism and unlimited self-interestedness. While
mainstream Christian ethics repudiates the first, it accepts the second as part of economic
reality. Finn and Pemberton argue that free-market advocates that uphold individual freedom as
the most important element in human life have misunderstood the lessons of modern
psychology and sociology about what human life is and the Judeo-Christian tradition in terms of
what human life ought to be.388 Along with neoclassical economics, Finn and Pemberton affirm
that self-interest (which they equate with “sin”) is part of human nature. For example, choosing
to obtain a luxury good when those resources might have been used to secure basic needs of
others is a selfish/sinful choice. Social evils are a result of sinful choices, rather than the model
of capitalism. They applaud free-market economics for accounting for this aspect of the human
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person. Since sinfulness is not created by capitalism, they discredit the notion that doing away
with capitalism will end social evils.389
Stackhouse critiques the radical individualism characteristic of unfettered markets.
Protestant Christian ethics must oppose this framing of economic life.390 But in Stackhouse’s
opinion, this is not the kind of human agency operative within the current political economy.
The radically individualistic capitalism proposed by Friedman has been displaced by the present
political economy, a new type of capitalism, sometimes called a mixed economy or free-market
society. The charge that this revitalized capitalism is individualistic is for Stackhouse untrue. He
admits that it does break up old communal relationships, but it immediately creates new
associations.391 Revitalized capitalist society furnishes the connections of association and
networks people require to sustain them. In this system, people are related to each other in
literally hundreds of ways: through information in mass media, classes, political parties, religious
groups, and last, but not least, through work in corporations. Stackhouse does not imagine that
self-interest and individualism continue to operate within these new associations.
Stackhouse describes economists as defining homo economicus as a view of humanity
“basically driven by material interests, rationally calculated,”392 but expresses doubts that this
homo economicus is in fact as rational as economists claim. While Finn and Pemberton argue
389

Ibid., 43. This is particularly instructive because it provides insight into their reasons for
rejecting socialism. Unlike socialism, capitalism accounts for sin in making self-interest part of its
economic models and so it is more in line with the Christian account of the human person. What they fail
to acknowledge is that capitalism rewards and glories in unlimited egoism. Ironically, they adopt the
framework which sanitizes and institutionalize what they consider sin.
390

It must also oppose liberation thought for its wrong-headed analysis of the causes of
oppression and its goal of liberty as self-sufficient, Stackhouse, "Christian Social Ethics in a Global Era," 3739.
391

Stackhouse says much the same thing about judgments of Protestantism, Ibid., 65-66.

392

Stackhouse, Public Theology and Political Economy, 48.
142

that markets account for sin, Stackhouse argues instead that “sin . . . deflects the *sic] rational
capacities.”393 “Only God can bring about the transformation of the will” so that people can
make truly rational decisions.394 Nevertheless, Stackhouse believes that this model of the human
person can be made useful by extending the concept of rationality to include cultural and
religious interests. He argues that people ought to be driven as much by rational calculations
based on cultural norms and religious values as by calculations of material gains and losses.
Stackhouse does not so much challenge the neoclassical account of the human person as he
creates a more robust version of homo economicus.
Like Finn, Wogaman critiques the radical individualism of laissez-faire capitalist ideology
on anthropological grounds.395 He also critiques the “naked pursuit of self-interest” on moral
grounds. Acquisitiveness or “principled selfishness,” Wogaman affirms, is both idolatrous and
socially divisive, and thus unsuitable as an economic model for Christians.396 The market
provides incentives for irresponsible behavior when such behavior serves self-interest.397 Selfinterest, however, is a reality of economic life. The solution is setting priorities from outside the
market mechanism. Whereas various forms of capitalism that rely on “the indirect visitation of
the ‘invisible hand,” social market capitalism and democratic socialism embody “prophetic
judgment upon” laissez-faire capitalism’s encouragement of selfishness.398 Wogaman concludes
that principled selfishness is sufficiently reined in by these centrist forms of political economy.
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Even though these Christian ethicists reject radical individualism as the basis for
Christian ethics, they accept self-interestedness as reality of economic life that must be
managed. Self-interestedness is an organizing principle for the market. They may have some
reservations about self-interested behavior, but they affirm that the notion of self-interest
accurately describes the basis for economic decision-making. Thus, the essence of neoclassical
theory, of homo economicus, remains intact.

Emphasizes Promises, Minimizes Problems
Mainstream Christian social ethics emphasizes the promises of the neoclassical
framework while minimizing or dismissing its problems altogether. Finn is aware of the
problems wrought by capitalism. In various places he makes reference to the threat multinational corporations pose to democracy, the power differentials that lead to extraction of
unfavorable terms for workers and the poor, and the increasing levels of unemployment
matched by downward pressure on wages. But then he makes a theoretical move analogous to
neoliberal economists: he treats these as “background commitments” that are asides from the
“main” economic issues.399
Stackhouse argues that capitalist-style globalization not only can deliver on its promises,
it already has delivered on some major fronts. Stackhouse sees the story of capitalism as the
story of the great expansion of the middle class.400 Increased population and industrialization
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initially lead to increases in inequality, but eventually they result in a less stratified and more
egalitarian society.401 The best evidence, Stackhouse claims, reveals that capitalism has:







Raised millions of poor people into a new middle class402
Exploited less than economies that are centrally planned
Shaken confidence in state managed economies
Provided a place of refuge for immigrants in democratic, capitalist areas
Allowed people to adopt its patters in a selective and locally sensitive manner
Improved nutrition levels, health, life span, leisure time, and openness to religious
values403

Given such overwhelming evidence of reformed capitalism’s positive effect on economic
development and social progress, reformed capitalism must be the more just and humane
political economic system Christians have been looking for: “Is it possible that, in the face of the
new evidence, everyone who holds to a ‘preferential option for the poor’ must now embrace
capitalism, since socialism itself impoverishes? In some measure, the answer is Yes. But it must
be a reformed capitalism.”404
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For Wogaman, the chief priority of economic life is productivity and capitalism is
responsible for the vast expansion of productivity and growth in recent centuries.405 But unlike
Stackhouse, Wogaman acknowledges the tendency of even welfare capitalism to concentrate
economic power and thus permit great inequality.406 Examining the data on poverty, Wogaman
concludes that the tendency both within and among nations is for the relative gap between the
rich and the poor to increase, even when the poor are improving their situation in absolute
terms. In the U.S., despite enormous expansion in productive capacity, the proportion of poor
people has remained fairly constant over the last 30 years. Among rich and poor nations the
contrast between wealth and poverty is even more dramatic. Wogaman argues that it is an
undeniable economic reality that the poor people of the world, who lack basic necessities, are
the vast majority while the rich constitute a much smaller number. He remains agnostic,
however, as to the cause of such enormous disparities.407

A Heterodox Economic Assessment
A Narrow Approach to Economics
Heterodox economic analysis addresses each of the flaws in neoclassical theory that
Christian ethicists either discount as an inescapable part of economic life or consider solvable
through superficial changes. The first flaw is a narrow approach to economics, marked by
defining economics as the study of efficient allocation of scarce resources and accompanied by
economic orthodoxy’s fundamental accoutrement: the pivotal assumption of economic
405
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rationality, which includes the features of self-interest, exogenous preference formation, and
strict optimizing behavior.408 The assumption of economic rationality is a necessary condition for
neoclassical economics: without it, neoclassical theory is left adrift. Neoclassical thought
presumes that what economics is, what it does, and how to go about “improving” economic
outcomes are settled issues. Yet the narrow approach that neoclassical economics have chosen
for themselves ignores the historically contingent character of the economy. Economic
processes evolve over time along with social order. The neoclassical definition of economics is
but one way of theorizing the political economy. Heterodox schools of economic thought
(Keynseian, Austrian, feminist, neo-Marxian, institutionalist, etc) do not adhere to its narrow
economic definition. Instead of the neoclassical preoccupation with abstract theorizing,
methodological individualism, and equilibrium, heterodox economics is concerned with the
effects of economic and social institutions on human beings and the environment, the social and
cultural embeddedness of economic agents and their activities, and the myriad of ways in which
capitalism generates oppression.409
The narrow neoclassical approach yields unintended economic, social, and historical
consequences which are not accounted for in its economic models. In many heterodox
perspectives, capitalism is seen to be directly and indirectly connected with racism, ethnical

408

For a critique of the assumption of economic rationality from a feminist perspective, see Myra
H. Strober, "Rethinking Economics through a Feminist Lens," in Women and the Economy: A Reader, ed.
Ellen Mutari and Deborah M. Figart (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 8.
409

David F. Ruccio and Jack Amariglio, Postmodern Moments in Modern Economics (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 175. Austrian, Neo-Marxist, Post-Keynesians, Feminists, and New
Institutional economics have provided various critics of the neoclassical preoccupation cited above. Some
of these theorists are mentioned throughout this chapter. For a volume that brings together some of
these various perspective together see John T. Harvey and Robert F. Garnett, eds., Future Directions for
Heterodox Economics, Advances in Heterodox Economics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008).
147

prejudice, and imperialism.410 The capitalist appetite for cheap labor led to the enslavement of
millions of Africans to meet the demand for cotton, sugar, and tobacco.411 After the end of the
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Civil War, the same appetite led to a system of tenant farming that kept freed blacks in a new
form of bondage: that of perpetual debt. Capitalist logic also led to the acquisition of land and
raw materials through imperialism. To acquire the materials needed to fuel industry and wealth,
Europe and the U.S. relied on a combination of military conquest, political domination, and
economic exploitation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.412 The U.S. harvested the rich natural
resources in North America through a combination of conquest, genocide, and a complex series
of treaties that were routinely ignored.413
Capitalism is also indirectly connected with the creation of a system of oppression based
on racial/ethnic identity after the Civil War. Following emancipation, lower-class whites could no
long point to their freedom as a mark of superiority. The response to this loss was violence
against blacks, including the Ku Klux Klan, with no serious opposition from government or
churches.414 In the west, Chinese immigrants were used to build railways in harsh and
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demeaning conditions. Even further west, Japanese immigrants had similar experiences on
pineapple and sugar plantations in Hawaii.415 The same dynamics operate today. Claims of
reverse racism, concerns about the influx of immigrant workers from Mexico and Asia, and the
outsourcing of jobs to other countries reveals an underlying belief that the greatest challenge
facing U.S. workers is competition from people of color at home and abroad. This belief ignores
the fact that the capitalist system itself increases wealth by exploiting workers and keeping
wages as low as possible. None of these direct or indirect effects of capitalism—slavery,
genocide, racism/ethnic prejudice, theft, imperialism, exploitation—register on neoclassical
models. A narrow conception of economics generates oppressive economic practice.
A narrow approach to economics is also connected to the creation and perpetuation of
the modern/colonial complex. Neoclassical economics has played a central role in constructing
the discourses of poverty and wealth and has framed public policy that has discursively
marginalized millions of communities in the Majority World as underdeveloped or less
developed.416 Economic orthodoxy in the form of capitalism has upheld the narrative of
development which presumes that North Atlantic societies are a desirable model for economic
development.417 Capitalist development, while merely a historical experience of capitalist
industrialization in a few regions, has become universal trajectory and a prescription for
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economic and social intervention in all of the world’s nations.418 It continues to authorize and
support institutional forms of power that center the processes of modernization and progress
encompassed by the modern/colonial developmentalist perspective.
Several heterodox approaches to economics seek a “non-modernist” approach that
reconceptualizes economics from a subaltern perspective, including the hegemonic role that
economics has played in the modernity and the relationship between culture and economics.419
Like postcolonial theory, this strand of heterodox economic theory constitutes a critical
approach, a strategy that maintains an attitude of openness to continuous revision, rather than
a single economic theory. As such, it does not reject any economic paradigm in total. The hybrid
nature of economic heterodoxy proceeds by selecting, contesting, and reappropriating
categories in a syncretistic fashion.420
Postcolonial economics envisions a new political economy by bringing to the fore the
connection between the western telling of history, the production of political economic
knowledge, and the exercise of western power.421 History has served as a synonym for the
development of Euro-American consciousness. Non-Euro-Americans only formed part of that
telling of history to the extent that they are involved in the constitution of the European
historical being. The historical experiences of the West become the templates from which to
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know and measure the world. This vision of history has grounded political economic analysis
from Smith to contemporary scholarship.422 The heterodox task is to “acquire epistemic and
material authority to effect change.” 423 This requires formerly colonized people to interpret
their own histories and to reject the notion of the inevitable movement towards the EuroAmerican prototype of political-economic development. Otherwise, the non-Euro-America
people will continue to be permanently categorized as “pre capitalist, pre modern, or under
developed.”424
Mainstream Christian ethical approaches to political economic ethics begin with
entrenched disciplinary divisions, each maintaining its own methodological tools and
traditions.425 Economics is taken as given, while infusing it with insights from ethics in order to
examine which political economic system is most Christian or how to make market moral.
Christian ethics becomes another constraint on a generally accepted economic rationality.
Therefore, mainstream Christian ethics has compounded neoclassical modeling with even moral
variables while leaving the premise of neoclassical economic rationality intact. Heterodox
economics destabilizes the disciplines’ epistemic authority, unmasking its “metaphysical priors”
in order to understand individual academic disciplines as part of a broader cultural system of
Euro-American modernity.426
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From various heterodox perspective, the narrow, neoclassical approach to economics,
wedded to the development of modernity and colonialism, has little to do with the actual lives
of poor, marginalized, and “less developed” people of the world. It is connected with the
creation and sustaining of a complex matrix of oppression. As a development project, it has
more to do with validating the metaphysical movement of history that culminates in a EuroAmerican type industrial society. Christian social ethics must not accept a culturally hegemonic
definition of economics that operates within modernity. A moral vision of the political economy
must resist the “techniques of specialist knowledge as they work with strategies of power.”427
Instead, with heterodox economics, it must utilize a critical, counter-disciplinary approach in the
hope of transforming the understanding economics and the political economy itself.

A Simplistic Account of the Human Person
Under economic orthodoxy, human beings make economic decisions by rationally
maximizing their utility (or preference satisfaction) through the application of their exogenously
determined preference ordering. Society is a collection of self-interested, preference satisfying,
rational individuals interacting in an open marketplace. The neoclassical assumption about
human rationality, however, represents a profoundly incomplete account of human decision
making. This conception of human decision making excludes people with certain developmental
disabilities, children, and the infirm.428 It also renders invisible a wide variety of economically
significant relationships that do not fit into the rubric of rational utility maximization, such as
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community service or caring labor, undertaken out of a sense of social responsibility or affection
for others. This simplistic view of the human person also covers over differences of gender,
sexuality, class, race, and ethnicity since these have no bearing on economic decision making,
except to the degree that the bear on preferences.
Heterodox economics advocate for a complex view of the human person which
acknowledges that human beings make decision in the midst of complexity and uncertainty.
Human decision making involves (mis-)perceptions, emotions, intuitions, anticipation of
uncertain futures, and involves a “pervasive ignorance” which “renders impossible the full
accounts of costs and benefits that would be necessary to decide whether (or how much) a
particular activity contributes to happiness” or utility.429 In contrast, neoclassical models
adopted a bounded rationality as a mechanism for economic decision making. Individuals
engage in utility-maximizing calculations based on fixed preference order. A desire for simple
and elegant mathematical models, which has become the basis for arguing for neoclassical
formulation, has led neoclassical economics’ reluctance to deal with complexity that is not easily
represented in such models.
The heterodox view of the human person also includes the emotive and social aspects of
human behavior. It recognizes that human beings are epistemically limited individuals making
decisions based on preferences that are developed only on the spot, after coming to market, in
the midst of changing circumstances. Individuals are understood to have subjective perceptions
of both their own goals and the constraints they face.430 Their own subjective perceptions are
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further influenced by others’ subjective preferences and perceptions.431 The result is a nonreductionist view of economic decision making that better accounts for complexity of human
perceptions and imagination. Given this collection of epistemically limited and subjective
individuals, market mechanisms are best described as a sea of “unpredictable change,” not a
rationally predictable process.432

Ignoring the Majority of Economic Activity
A third flaw in the neoclassical economic framework is that it ignores the majority of
economic activity. The neoclassical approach privileges commodity production and wage labor.
Yet, wage-labor for capitalist firms and commodities exchange in a market is only the tip of the
iceberg in terms of diverse activities of the economy.433 Just underneath the surface are a
multitude of non-market transactions which are also economic activities—the hosts of elders
and deacons that serve their location congregations, the grandparents and other relatives who
provide child care for children so their parents can join the workforce, volunteers who donate
several hours a week to shelters, food pantries, and soup kitchens (among other organizations),
the police who turn a blind eye to illicit drug trades in exchange for kick backs, reciprocal forms
of farm labor exchange in which families exchange an equal number of day’s work or attend
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work parties hosted by a neighbor (accompanied by feasting and drinking).434 All of these
economic actors participate in a diverse economy outside of formal market transactions. But
none of their activities are considered as economic within an orthodox economic framework.435
The current global political economy is economically diverse. What is usually considered
the economy—formal markets, wage labor, capitalist firms—is merely a subset of a complex
field of economic relations that sustain livelihoods around the world.436 Acknowledging diverse
economic activities as economic has important consequences for envisioning a moral political
economy. It allows envisioning a political economy that values the vast majority of human
activity and generates and sustains communities that delivers wellbeing “directly rather than
through the circuitous route of capitalist industrialization.”437 It emphasizes a diversity and
richness of human relationships rather than reducing human relationships to those mediated
through capitalist logics. It resists the idea that the endless consumption of commodities and
competition for jobs that enrich capitalist corporations constitutes human progress. Recognizing
the diversity of practices that sustain livelihoods, including paid and unpaid labor, market and
non-market activities, non-capitalist and alternative capitalist business (cooperatives, socially
responsible firms, etc.), opens the possibility of imagining a political economic ethics beyond
434
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capitalism.438 Given that economic difference accounts for perhaps more than 50 percent of
economic activity, Christian social ethics built exclusively on neoclassical theory discursively
covers over a myriad of noncapitalist economic activity and is thus irresponsible and somewhat
irrelevant. Beginning to see capitalism as a “fantasy of wholeness” rather than a “reality” is of
course, difficult.439 Yet it is an important part of decolonizing the economic terrain of the moral
imagination.

Persistent Instability, Growing Inequality, and Exploitative Labor Process
A fourth flaw in the neoclassical framework is the pattern of instabilities, growing
inequalities, and exploitative labor processes. Capitalism is enormously unstable. Over the last
75 years, global capitalism has experienced two major crises—the Great Depression that began
with the 1929 stock market crash and the global economic meltdown that began in 2007—and
smaller contractions every 3 to7 years.440 From the Marxian perspective, these instabilities are
permanent features of capitalism. Attempts to reform capitalism, to perfect it through the
removal of periodic downturns, have failed. Neither Mill nor Hayek, the masters of liberal and
free-market theory, nor Keynes and his followers could do it.441 The instability or crises of
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capitalism takes on diverse forms in different situations. But no amount of tinkering to date has
been able to mend capitalism’s structural instabilities.442
Capitalism is also characterized by massive and growing inequalities. Claims of
capitalism’s track record of poverty reduction mask these inequalities. Despite steady increasing
in U.S. productivity since the 1970s, real wages for lower and working class workers has
stagnated. While it is generally assumed that inequalities are greatest in poor countries, steep
inequalities exist within the U.S. and the U.K. The inequality of both countries is far greater than
that of India, for example.443 The Gini coefficient for the U.K. is now higher than it has been
during the last 30 years at .36, compared with .25 in 1979 when Margaret Thatcher came to
power.444 This trend of growing inequality since the 1980s is being observed in other European
countries as well, including staunchly egalitarian societies such as Scandinavia and the
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Netherlands.445 The same pattern is being repeated elsewhere around the world. The income
gap between North-South and East-West was higher in the late 1990s than it was in the 1980s.
Since the early 1980s, income concentration has risen everywhere: “this trend toward an
increase in inequality is perplexing and marks a clear departure from the move towards greater
egalitarianism observed during the 1950s and 1960s.”446 The conventional neoclassical wisdom,
that free trade and global economic integration will create a rising tide that will lift all boats, has
lost its credibility.
Of course, distributive inequalities are not a problem in the neoclassical model because
equality is ignored in favor of individual freedom and absolute preference satisfaction.
Neoclassical economists are concerned with achieving economic efficiency through Pareto
optimal solutions, which say nothing about equality or fairness.447 Neoclassical economic models
also ignore uneven distributions that favor whites over blacks (or another other privileged over
oppressed group).448 While capitalism has produced an overall abundance of goods, it
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distributes these goods so unevenly that it creates conditions of scarcity for most of the world’s
population.
In the Marxian view, capitalism is the exploitative labor process in which surplus value is
extracted from the working class.449 While on the surface markets appears to be based on equal
exchange—or liberty and freedom—a deep analysis of capitalism’s production process reveals
how workers are exploited. In Marx’s terms, the processes of production and exchange are
exploitative because capitalist control forces workers into a relationship in which their labor
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power takes on the status of a commodity along with land and raw materials. Workers have no
choice but to exchange their labor power for a wage that does not fully compensate for the
labor performed. Commodities are produced through the exploitative practice of extracting
surplus labor. Exploitation is the unavoidable grounds of capitalist production processes.
Ownership of the means of production in the hands of a small group of elites renders impossible
a non-exploitative economic system under which genuine equality and human capabilities can
flourish.
The neoclassical approach to economics is structurally flawed. Instability, unequal
distribution of income and wealth, and exploitative production processes are all part of
capitalism’s structural problems. Many have tried to repair capitalism’s faults, among them
mainstream Christian social ethicists. Structurally, however, the capitalist setup is unjust. It
promises fairness through the market and democratic representation, but in practice it depends
necessarily on exploitative systems, results in oligopolies rather than competitive markets, and
creates a privileged class that maintains inequality.450 Envisioning a moral political economy
requires critically addressing these features of capitalism, rather than accepting them as a
necessary part of economic reality.

Lack of Alternatives
While recognizing the shortcomings of capitalism and the neoclassical framework
addressed in the previous section, mainstream Christian ethicists offer no alternatives. Chapter
two referred to Finn and Pemberton’s critique of certain concepts within the neoclassic school
of economics: scarcity, the market, efficiency, property, and the human person and self-interest.
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Finn also finds “persuasive” Cobb and Daly’s critique of neoclassical/capitalist economics,
including problems with Ricardo’s argument for comparative advantage, the reduction of
environment damage to an externality, the disregard for democratic control, and the loss of
community.451 Moreover, Finn cautions that neoclassical economists’ confidence in their
theories as the science of social policy is at same time arrogant and out of sync with the recent
philosophical consensus that science itself is a social project. Christian ethics must navigate the
hazardous waters between having to rely heavily on economics for understanding economic
reality and adjudicating between competing economic explanations on ethical and “scientific”
grounds.452
These critiques have deep resonances with heterodox economic theory. But it is there
that the resonance ends. Finn does not treat these critiques as definitive nor does he move
away from a neoclassical economic understanding because for him there is no alternative. The
small, disciplined communities of Christian stewards Finn and Pemberton envision will work
hard to strengthen social reforms, but they will do so within the context of the existing political
economic order. For Finn, the Biblical challenge of radical redistribution—described by the Year
of Jubilee (Lev 25:8-17) and in the practices of the first century Jerusalem church (Acts 2:4455)—is to be held out as an ideal. Finn defends his position here by appealing to sin. While sin
creates a temptation for the wealthy to exploit the poor it also tempts individuals to shirk their
responsibilities to work hard if they were guaranteed an equal share without regard to work.453
Despite the Biblical challenge of radical redistribution, Finn argues that there must be a better
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solution to the problems of inequality than simple redistribution. He does not discuss, however,
what that solution might be. By arguing that “an adequate analysis of markets, whether a
defense or a critique, must include an articulation” of its moral ecology he upholds the division
in neoclassical economics between moral arguments and morally neutral markets.454 Having
acknowledged the difficulties with the neoclassical model’s strict distinction between fact and
values, between empirical and moral analysis, Finn then reinscribes them.
Stackhouse also acknowledges the faults with democratic capitalist systems: structural
inequalities; the hypocrisy of advocating “free trade” while passing protectionist laws; and the
inconsistency of advocating for democracy accompanied with a manipulation of elections.455
Stackhouse is adamant that all of this can be corrected by a robust public theology guiding the
development of the global political economy. Public theology will create social change not by
challenging the domination of the world economy by technocratic corporations and militaristic
nation-states, but by transforming their ethos. There is no need to raise up prophetic protest
against the crucifying of the weaker people of the world and the destruction of ecological
systems which make life possible.456 Instead, one should concentrate on forming a new moral
and spiritual basis of global institutions to create a more ethical economic globalization.457
Wogaman notes a number of problems with free-market capitalism. He acknowledges
that it has lead directly to the “exploitation of child labor (and of the labor of men and women),
hazardous working conditions, dehumanizingly long hours of work, low wage, periodic times of
depression with high unemployment, shoddy and dangerous products, ruin of the natural
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environment, racial, religious, and gender discrimination.”458 The most serious failing of the
free-market mechanism is that it allows free market processes to establish and set priorities,
neglecting the “social nature” of human beings.459 Conceptualizing human beings as individuals
and society as the sum of individual transactions leads to social inefficiencies (such as the
inability to provide community wide facilities, highways, and national defense) and incentivizes
cost cutting in ways that are damaging to people and communities (it treats harmful practices as
externalities). Free-market capitalism, left unchecked, is destructive to human society and the
ecology. In Wogaman’s view, these issues can be and have been successfully addressed by a
mixed political economy, a system in which the economic order is subject to a political order:
either democratic capitalism or democratic socialism.460 For example, while social discrimination
on the basis of gender, race, or ethnicity has a long history in the U.S., Wogaman argues that
“sweeping social revolutions changed all this in the twentieth century.”461 Government
intervention sparked by democratic, grass-roots movements, such as the woman’s movement,
labor movements, and the civil rights movement, have largely succeeded in restraining the
worst practices of free-market capitalism.
In contemporary debates within mainstream social ethics the biggest obstacle to
constructing non-capitalist alternatives is the representation of capitalism as hegemonic.462
While mainstream Christian social ethics acknowledges problems with capitalism—even
identifying capitalism as source of exploitation, inequality, and dehumanizing conditions—the
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only alternative it offers is a reformed capitalism. Thus, mainstream Christian social ethics
succumbs to an “inevitability” syndrome. The solution to capitalism’s problems is capitalism.

Alternative Economic Frameworks
The more just and sustainable world political economy that mainstream Christian
ethicists so desire cannot be built on a neoclassical framework. Conceptually, neoclassical
theory defines the science of economics narrowly and builds on an untenable and reductive
account that overlooks the complexity of human behavior. In practice, it has yielded massive
income disparity, growing global inequality, social instability, and ecological devastation; it also
overlooks over a vast array of economic activity.
Fortunately, there is more than one way to theorize the political economy. There are
non-capitalist forms of economic activity, both in terms of present practices and envisioned
futures. One cannot conclude that capitalism is co-terminus with the political economy.463 The
research of certain heterodox economists is uncovering evidence of these non-capitalist
theories and practices. In short, their work has the ability to rupture the limits and open
potentials in the economic understanding of mainstream Christian social ethics and provides
insight into alternative frameworks of the political economy.

Conceptually
Conceptually, heterodox economics offers some crucial concepts that can help Christian
ethicists make adjustments to their operative political economic framework (and thereby
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achieve something like a prophetic vision). This subsection develops some conceptual categories
that are sometimes underdeveloped in the social theorizing of Christian ethicists.
The first conceptual insight is the recognition that the world is already a combination of
capitalist and non-capitalist economic activity. Heterodox economists insist on the need to
disrupt the portrayal of economic life as dominated by capitalist logics. A sampling of the wide
variety of non-market based economic activities is listed above. Feminist economics in particular
has paid particular attention to the variety of non-market-oriented, non-capitalist economic
production that takes place within the context of the home (such as cooking, cleaning, and
caring for children and elders).464 Some studies estimate that unpaid household labor and
production accounts for 30 to 50 percent of total economic activity465 while other studies
estimate that non-capitalist economic activity accounts for more hours of work per week in both
rich and poor countries than hours of work performed for capitalist firms.466
Unpaid domestic work and production within the household are significant examples of
“economic difference,” non-capitalist practices operative in the world. Gibson-Graham, Resnick,
and Wolff warn of the danger of portraying economic difference as “less significant, less
productive, less world-shaping, *and+ less real” than capitalist practices.467 Gibson-Graham has
named this dynamic “capitalocentrism.” Capitalocentrism values capitalist economic activities
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over all other processes of production and distribution by identifying them “in relation to
capitalism as the same as, the opposite of, a complement to, or contained within.”468
Capitalocentrism treats noncapitalist economic processes “as obsolete remnants of a
precapitalist ‘traditional’ economy, or as seedbeds of truly capitalist endeavor, or as ultimately
‘capitalist’ because they involve commodification or markets.” Christian social ethicists should
be wary of falling into capitalocentrism because it limits the moral imagination.
The process of identifying noncapitalist economic activities and practices begins with
recognizing that economic differences have been confined, naturalized, or integrated into
capitalocentric discourse of political economics. Heterodox economists call for engendering an
identity crisis in capitalism, relativizing it as simply one mode of production among many.
Mainstream social ethicists, on the other hand, are caught up in a dualistic political economic
imagination are unable to call forth any non-capitalist alternatives.
The second conceptual insight is tied to the first; since economic activities are far more
varied than imagined by neoclassical theory, a different, anti-essentialist, non-reductive,
overdetermined approach is needed to theorize the political economy. Non-reductionist/antiessentialist theory rejects the notion of timeless, contextless, and universal determinants of
social interaction—such as rationality and scarcity—as neoclassical economists tend to do.469
Human nature and social affairs are understood to be the result of the interaction of complex
and often contradictory economic, social, political, and natural factors.470 Non-reductionist/antiessentialist theory also asserts that the world is too complex to naïvely pretend, as neoclassical
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economists do, that economic rationality explains all human behavior at every time and place,
or that all choices should be made using only one criteria (the strength of desire) without
reference to the validity of the desires, or that some aspects of human existence are ethically
weightier than people’s subjective states.471
Christian social ethics attempts to discipline social structures and realities in accordance
with theological convictions, motifs, and systems of thought. It presupposes a theoretical
formulation that approximates the essence of reality and draws on modern epistemologies that
provide an absolute grounding for all knowledge as a mirror representation to an external
reality. Reality is seen as a singular phenomena whose nature makes it accessible to theory.
Thus, for Dan Finn, markets can be considered moral within the proper legal framework and
under the right conditions. Stackhouse holds that if only the appropriate theological convictions
were to underlie social processes, then society will be transformed. Each of these theorists holds
to a rationalist epistemological position by which true observation of the reality depends on a
true theory of the correct essence of social reality.472 This common epistemological position of
knowledge as an accurate representation of a single external reality, as Richard Rorty and others
have pointed out, is largely misguided and self-deceptive.473
On a macro level, heterodox economics abandons the starting assumption that perfectly
competitive markets are the norm.474 While the assumption of perfectly competitive markets

471

Ibid., 80.

472

Stephen A. Resnick and Richard D. Wolff, Knowledge and Class: A Marxian Critique of Political
Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 9-10.
473

474

Cited in Ibid., 18.

For Neva Goodwin, this marks the difference between “contextual” and neoclassic economics.
See From Neva Goodwin, "From Outer Circle to Center State: The Maturation of Heterodox Economics," in
Future Directions for Heterodox Economics, ed. John T. Harvey and Robert F. Garnett, Advances in
Heterodox Economics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 45-46.
168

makes for an elegant and simplified world that neoclassical economics finds useful for analysis,
heterodox economics holds that it is “neither intellectually or morally justifiable.”475 From a nonessentialist perspective, the economy is the result of the complex interplay of factors, including
existing cultural, historical, social, natural, and political ones, without prioritizing any of these.476
The overdetermined approach to economics rejects the idea of a unified linear history of
economic evolution towards some economic ideal. Instead, the economy is seen as contextual
and contingent on a multitude of diverse forces “which together produced the particular sets of
institutions, norms, behaviors and rules that govern economic behavior and outcomes.”477
The third conceptual insight is the need to disrupt the focus on nation-states as the
basic unit of economic activity. To articulate a decolonized vision of the political economy, it is
important to critically examine the way in which orthodox economic theory has imagined the
nation-state. The nation-state is marked in many ways with continuity with EuroAmerican/colonial control. State normalizing theories assume that nations are isolated
economically from the outside world, treating the nation as a natural unit and treating
international trade, migration, and finance as additive elements.478
For postcolonial heterodox thinkers, the nation-state represents a continuation of
colonial/modernist control. Instead of the rigid and compartmentalized world of nation-states,
Colin Danby envisions a world that moves beyond “state-normalizing modernity.” He ruptures
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the notion of nation-states by noting the transnational economic activity that is already
prevalent: the Hakka Chinese living in Calcutta but with business interests in China, India, and
Canada; the Mexican elites who move assets on both sides of the border with ease. Households
also earn income across nations: “Zambian men working in South Africa coal mines, Filipina
women working as maids in Singapore, [and] a country like El Salvador with at least a quarter of
its labor force earning incomes in the United States.”479 Given the deep transnational
connections already present, Danby argues that treating nation-states as the basic unit of the
political-economy is largely misguided. He develops an alternative model, called “constitutive
openness,” which is more attentive to transnational and international links that are
fundamental to certain domestic centers, such as export industries and import-dependent firms
and sectors.
Ultimately, Danby’s postcolonial heterodox economics troubles and problematizes the
neatness of state-normalizing modernity. Orthodox economics assumes modernist nation-states
and conceptualizes the world as a collection of such states.480 Danby opens the door to the
possibility of moving beyond a state-normalizing modernity and effectively develops a picture of
an integration and connected “migrant, overlapping, contested world.”481 Heterodox economics
offers transgressive ways to think about the state, as a porous subject of both endogenous and
exogenous zones.
The lesson from postcolonial heterodox economics for Christian social ethics is that the
contemporary configuration of nation-states is part of a deeper ideology of
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modernity/coloniality rather than any form of social ontology. The arbitrary bounding of nationstates as economic units masks the often unequal distribution of benefits derived from a
country’s resources. The centrality of the nation-state in mainstream economic analysis
reinforces the leveling of difference and portrays large numbers of people under a single
interest, a technique that began with colonialism. Continuing to theorizing the nation-state as a
primary source of resistance to the negative effects of global capital limits the moral imagination
in terms of constructing regional, local, and communal sources of resistance.482 Decolonized
moral visions must move beyond nation-centric economic theorizing by opting for economic
theories that decentralize the nation-state in economic models in order to better capture the
devastation visited upon the non-elite majority through neoclassical development.
The last conceptual insight is a disruption of the idea of detachment in economics, a
destabilizing of the fictive positive/normative split. Heterodox economists contend that the
sacrosanct idea of economic as “science” is a modernist theoretical construction. Economics is
not an objective, value-free science. Instead, all economic analysis is value-laden “to the extent
that it is guided—implicitly or explicitly—by an approach to economic and social problems that
combines issues of ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be.’”483
Neoclassical economic theory rests on a set of normative commitments that
mainstream Christian ethicists would find objectionable. Indeed, the normative objections to
neoclassical theory are perhaps more damning than all the empirical, analytical, and practical
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objections raised so far. But because mainstream Christian ethicists accept economics as a tool
which is neither moral or amoral in itself, they have largely ignored its normative underpinnings.
The set of normative commitments shared by neoclassical economists is called
“welfarism” or welfare consequentialism.484 Without it, neoclassical economists would have
little basis for adopting their positions about free trade and market economies.485 Welfarism
derived from utilitarianism that assesses outcomes based exclusively on the subjective states—
the internal mental workings—of those affected by the outcome.486 Neoclassical economics is
concerned with achieving “efficient” outcomes. An “efficient” outcome, one in which no one is
made better off without making at least one person worse off. Consider a scenario described by
DeMartino:
assume that I walk into my classroom with $100 and distribute this money
equally among my students. Once this distribution is completed, the situation
that obtains is efficient in the neoclassical sense. This is because any one
student can be made better off at this point only if at least one other student is
made worse off (e.g. if I take money away from the second to give to the first) . .
. What if, instead of distributing the money equally, I were to give all $100 to
one student, leaving nothing for the others. Would this situation be efficient?
Indeed it is, because the only way that one of the unfortunates could be made
better off after the initial distribution is made is for me to take away some
money from the lucky recipient, making her worse off.487
This example makes clear that efficiency is not concerned at all with equity or fairness.488
Whenever there is an efficient outcome of this sort, it is called a “Pareto optimality,” or
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maximum social welfare.489 The goal of neoclassic economics is to maximize social welfare or to
achieve Pareto optimality, which in no way implies that society is equitable. In fact, as the above
example illustrates, a state of maximum social welfare is consistent with highly unequal
distributions of income. Welfarism (seemingly) offers neoclassical economists a way to
adjudicate between policy alternatives with reference to the purportedly positive concept of
efficiency rather than value judgments.
Why should the discipline of economics be concerned with efficiency and achieving
Pareto optimality instead of reducing poverty or ensuring equality? Should economics deal with
maximizing output given limited resources, or should it be directed at minimizing harm to the
natural world while ensuring a sufficient level of sustenance? These questions begin to make
clear that “the notion of economics as value-free is a value-laden fiction.”490 Value judgments are
already implicit in the choice of initial assumptions, theoretical bases, and the choice of what to
make the object of study.491 When Christian social ethicists accept the neoclassical vision as
indicative of “economic reality,” they are accepting a questionable set of policies derived from
normative choices about what constitutes economic reality.
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Heterodox economists agree that the normative commitments of the neoclassical vision
are morally bankrupt.492 DeMartino carefully parses out five objections to purported valueneutrality of neoclassical theory, which when taken together seriously undermine welfarism.
The first objection deals with the exogeneity of preferences. Neoclassicals assume that
individual preference ordering remains unaffected by economic activity, a vital assumption for
assessing the social benefit of economic outcomes. Critics point out that social culture, religious
institutions, level of wealth, and other institutions are not innocent “with respect to the content
of people’s preferences.”493 One of the chief economic agents, corporations, consciously acts as
if preference ordering is endogenous. Why else would these corporations spend vast amounts
of resources on advertising to induce consumer desires if preferences were merely exogenous?
Preferences, DeMartino insists, are endogenous: they change as a result of participation in
economic processes.
The second objection is over the neoclassical tendency to mistake values for
preferences. Neoclassicals use people’s preferences, based on their willingness to pay, as the
basis for determining all policy outcomes.494 Critics argue that this is a categorical error. The
strength of desires (preferences) should be tempered by the reasons for the desires (values).
The neoclassical vision fails to distinguish between private affairs, with little or no social effect
(like preferences for a blue shirt) and decisions involving values with “broad social (and natural)
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effects” (like paving over wetlands to make way for a new mall).495 The third, closely related
objection concerns the rejection of utility or preferences as the sole criteria for assessing
outcomes. The neoclassical strategy bans interpersonal utility comparisons, or the comparison
of subjective states. Critics affirm that the “capacity to avoid starvation” or “avoid preventable
morbidity” are comparable interpersonally.496 Thus critics of neoliberalism would have little
difficulty, for e.g., in demanding redistribution of $100,000 of a billionaire’s wealth for
immunizations of impoverished people without reference to the psychic damage that this
transfer causes the billionaire.
The fourth objection is the agnosticism that neoliberal visionaries bestow on economic
agents. This agnosticism shields the economic agent from having to account for her actions
(they are simply rational) and the economists from the sticky business of normative evaluation.
Critics reject agnosticism of people’s preferences, insisting that the reasons behind an economic
agent’s desire should be brought to bear on assessing its significance.497 The last objection
concerns the legitimacy of unequal resource endowments that are “convertible to inequality in
other domains.”498 Critics recognize inequalities in the domains of “education, housing, nutrition
and so forth” perpetuate and deepen inequalities in resource endowments. Unequal resources
distribution is granted by unequal opportunities rather than by free choice.
The political economy is complex. Economic modeling that requires excessively
simplified and essentialized assumptions about society and humanity misses important
information that is relevant to constructing a moral imagination. The positive-normative
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distinction upheld by neoclassical theory is a social construction. Its models are based on a set of
normative commitments that are designed to maximize social welfare, defined narrowly as
Pareto optimality. Their policies might increase efficiency (though even claims to capitalism’s
efficiency are under attack by heterodox thinkers), but they have little regard for equality and
ecological sustainability. This makes neoclassical economics morally suspect, an unworthy
theory for those concerned with developing a political economy centered on community and
the common good. In choosing theoretical economic models, Christian social ethicists should
choose models concerned with social equality and ecological sustainability over models that
than focus on “efficiency” in the neoclassical sense.

In Present Practices
The representation of the economy as essentially capitalist excludes many other types
of non-capitalist economic transactions. Household production, child-rearing, cooperatives,
voluntary labor, and gift giving are just some of the economic activities that do not register
within a capitalist framework. There are many, many other examples of non-capitalist economic
activity, actually existing non-capitalist practices. This subsection examines such practices as
models and proposals for reimagining the political economy by examining three sites studied by
the Community Economies Collective (the Republic of Kiribati, the Latrobe Valley Community
Partnering Project, and Mondragon). Community Economies Collective is a group of activists and
scholars who are committed to envisioning and enacting just and ecologically-sustainable
economic communities. The project is particularly concerned with community economies in
which “the material well-being of people and the sustainability of the community are priority

176

objectives.”499 The goal of the collaborative is to bring together theorizing about conceptual
possibilities based on “already existing alternative economies.”500 While the three studies
highlighted below do not encompass all possible models of economic difference, they serve as a
sample for the possibilities of real world economic experimentation.

Community-Centered Economy of the Republic of Kiribati
The community-centered economy of the Micronesian island state, the Republic of
Kiribati serves as an example of unconventional notions of economic development and
noncapitalist economic forms.501 Kiribati is comprised of 34 islands, including the Gilbert Islands,
the Phoenix Islands, and the Line Islands, with combined area of 811 km2. All but one of the
islands are coral atolls. Its population is about 100,000, with over half of the populace living in
the capitals South Tarawa.
Kiribati’s economy embodies some of the noncapitalist elements that are discussed
above. The country’s experience serves as a counterpoint to modern/colonial developmentalist
notions of development from a Euro-American experience of industrial growth and capitalist
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series of visits by 19 century whalers and traders. Except for a few Protestant and Catholic missionaries,
who largely converted to Christianity, the islands attracted little European settlement, due to the poor
quality of soil. Kiribati came under British colonial rule in 1892. By 1937 the rest of the islands also came
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expansion.502 The nation has managed to develop a stable economy based on independent
subsistence farming, the sale of offshore fishing licenses, seafarers’ remittances, and a trust
fund which plays a major role in stabilizing the economy and supplementing income flows. The
nation’s trust fund does not operate according to capitalist logics. Initially funded through
windfall gain from non-renewal resources (phosphate from 1900-79), it is now used for the fiscal
support for the community. The fund administrators (a committee chaired by the Minister of
Finance) are charged to act in the best interests of the people, rather than shareholders. The
goal of the fund is not to maximize return or even to accumulate ever-expanding levels of
wealth, but to serve the collective interest of the nation. All income generated by the fund is
reinvested unless the government authorizes a drawdown in order to augment government
revenue.
Indicators of poverty and hardship that depend on income generating activity is less
than meaningful in a largely subsistence or semi-subsistence environment.503 What does
poverty, measured by income, mean when basic means of livelihood are provided for without
money?504 More relevant indicators of well-being are life expectancy, access to health, and
mortality (or death) rate. While data that is useable for comparison is not available for all these
indicators, the crude death rate, the number of deaths during a year per 1,000 population at
midyear, is 7.4 in July 2011 for Kiribati, but 8.4 for the U.S. While the death rate is only a rough
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estimate of mortality, it is widely accepted as an accurate indicator of mortality impact on
population growth. 505
Kiribati provides an example of an economy centered on community interests (rather
than individual interest), the very thing for which mainstream Christian ethicists advocate, but
have been unable to imagine.

The Latrobe Valley Community Partnering Project
Like towns across the U.S., including Detroit, MI, the Latrobe area in Australia, a region
two hours east of Melbourne, was once a bustling industrial town.506 It has served the electricity
needs of the State of Victoria since the 1920s and developed ancillary manufacturing and
services industries until the 1970s. But in the 1980s, the decision to privatize the State Electricity
Commission of Victoria (SEC) led to a cascading effect of downsizing, deindustrialization,
population loss, unemployment, and despair. Having witnessed the effects of the neoliberal
agenda, Jenny Cameron and Katherine Gibson understood that orthodox approaches to
505
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community and economic development, which focuses on attracting firms that promise
employment, could not work. Instead, they developed an “action research intervention,” the
Latrobe Valley Community Partnering Project.507
Over a two year period, they developed four different community initiatives: the
Latrobe Valley Community Environmental Gardens, Santa’s Workshop, the Latrobe Valley
Community Partnering Project, and the Latrobe Valley Community Partnering Project.508 These
initiatives were developed with members of the Latrobe Valley community in discussions about
four challenges to common representations of community development. These “key ideas” are:
1. Identify and build on assets already in place
2. Diverse economic practices, guided by non-capitalist values and dynamics, support
and sustain the economic world
3. Community brings into being new and yet unknown identities, generated by
difference and diverse of life experiences, not common identities, interests or
locales
4. “People with different knowledges and forms of expertise can jointly research and
develop strategies for producing change in the world”509
Each initiative fared differently, but each represented non-capitalist economic activity that could
become full-fledged enterprises. Moreover, the project overall “revealed the richness and depth
of skills and capacities . . . of those who had been marginalized by the SEC’s restructuring.”510
Development that focuses on business growth and job creation through offering
concessions and tax breaks has often hurt the long-term well being of communities. The assetbased community development and action research experiment in the Latrobe Valley
Community Partnering Project destabilizes that unitary paradigm and demonstrates the
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potential of economic development on different terms. By foregrounding communities of
differences, and through collaboration between professionals and those that have been
marginalized, it produced rich tangible outcomes that surpass the scope of formal economic
development. And it provides Christian social ethics with noncapitalist model for
community/economic development.

Rethinking the Mondragon Story
Such economic innovations are not limited to the Pacific.511 The Mondragon cooperative
of the Basque region of Spain contradicts Stackhouse’s insistence that the ability of capitaliststyle corporations in handling the complexities of production and distribution on a massive scale
is inimitable.512 At the end of 2010, Mondragon had over 85,000 employees (88 percent of
which are partners in the cooperative), 13.8 million Euros in total sales, and 33 million Euros in
assets.513 The cooperative continues to expand its presence in international markets, with 13.3
percent increase in 2010 over the previous year in international sales and 77 overseas
511
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production plants, in countries such as Brazil, China, Russia, and India. No other Spanish
industrial company has managed to achieve Mondragon’s size, financial diversification, or
international scope.514
Rather than the self-interested pursuit of profits that mainstream ethicists scorn,
Mondragon’s activities are guided by the principles of democratic organization. All ownerworkers are equal members of the cooperative. The sovereignty of the workers, the
subordination of capital to people, pay solidarity, and social transformation (the goal of creating
a more just and free Basque society).515 When the cooperatives were first set-up, they sought to
produce domestic appliances not already found in the region out of a commitment to an ethic of
regional business solidarity.516 Since then, Mondragon has expanded its manufacturing in ways
that have strengthened the regional economy. More recently it has moved into retail and
service industries out of a desire to increase employment. In terms of pay, wages are
determined through a democratic process, according to the principles of “equilibrio and
solidarity.”517 Wages are pegged to that comparable to workers in neighboring industries to
guard against the creation of a new wealthy social class. Differences in wages within any
cooperative are set at a fixed ratio, most recently 1:6, between the lowest and highest paid
worker. Profits are distributed into owner-worker saving accounts, “apportioned according to
number of hours worked and salary grade.”518 Individuals have a right to draw on the interest
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accumulated or to use their accounts as collateral for personal loans, “but the principle cannot
normally be touched until they resign or retire.”519 Management of operations represents one of
the clearest advantages over capitalist corporations. The cooperatives are “not burdened by
layers of supervisors and managers who act as enforcers” and must be paid out of surplus.520
Instead, each cooperative elects general members to four year terms on a council that oversees
the day to day operations. The governing council meets before the beginning of the working day
and then resumes their specific jobs at the conclusion of the meeting.521
The choices of production, the process of setting wages, the handling of profits, and the
terms and conditions of management all reveal a strong commit to an ethics of equilibrio and
solidarity and a respect for the individual and collective rights of owner-workers.522 It is not
surprising that Mondragon has been the focus of so much study from groups around the world
who are interested in efficient business practices that emphasize cooperative and community
values. Mondragon cooperative serves as a model for how to organize economic activity
ethically that centers on community-interests and is free from exploitative labor processes.
All of these examples represent diverse economies that are not dependent on the
engine of global capitalism. They are community economies that are currently in place,
operating according to values and policies that do not correspond to capitalist logic.
Commentators have often framed these alternative spaces as ultimately beholden to or
dominated by capitalist forces. Positioned as “alternatives” to capitalism, they cannot help but
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disappoint.523 The solution, as noted above, is to reform the story outside of a capitalocentric
framing.524 Read instead as “local practices of economic experimentation” they open up the
space for reimagining the political economy. It cannot be said, in the face of these community
economies, that capitalism is the only alternative, and thus the ethical one.
The goal of non-reductive political economics is not to force all economies to fit one
model, but to insist that there are many local non-capitalist models through which to bring
about human flourishing. In building sustainable, equitable political economies there are no
fixed paths to follow, there are no off-the-shelf solutions.525 The process of combining Christian
ethics with communal values will begin to create pathways to just and sustainable economic
communities. Through this process, the decolonizing of the moral imagination is made into
concrete, actually existing practices and institutions.

Conclusion
Mainstream Christian social ethics builds upon the framework of neoclassical economic
consensus. Because of this framing, alternatives to “enlightened” capitalism are dismissed as
utopian nonsense: capitalism is the only possible (and conveniently most moral) configuration of
the political economy. Rather than examine the reasons for this commitment to such a narrow
conception of economics, mainstream Christian social ethicists take it for granted that it
represents the best of economic thinking, perhaps because it is the most prevalent
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perspective.526 Finn cites Roger Hutchinson on this topic, who warns against insisting on a
“‘framework for discussion’ which itself ‘predetermines the outcome of the debate,’” but
ironically succumbs to this very error by failing to critically examine the neoclassical framework
in his own work.527
Christian ethicists might be forgiven for advocating reformed capitalism given that their
research question is about the big picture. What’s the political economic system most in line
with Christian values in every situation, for the whole world? One of the insights of this project
is the recognition that this is the wrong sort of question. There is no one-size-fits-all form of
political economy, or rather there does not have to be. What constitutes a moral political
economy may have to be determined on a local and regional level, in conversation with
community interests and values.
Economic monism is evidence of the colonization of hegemonic conceptions in the
economic terrain.528 The challenge to Christian ethicists is to read the economic landscape of
economic difference, “populated by various capitalist and non-capitalist institutions and
practice.”529 The goal is a counter-hegemonic theorizing that eschews the view of the political
economy as essentially, unavoidably, capitalist.530
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This restructuring of the Christian political economic imagination is a difficult task, for it
means contending not only with colonized imaginations, but naturalized conceptions of the
economy and long held beliefs about politics.531 What is needed is a non-reductive principle of
social change, which recognizes that the unfeasibility of immediately implementing certain
policy regimes does not constitute a sufficient warrant to dismiss these policy initiatives.532
Certainly the kinds of policy changes necessary to create a more just and sustainable world
require a deeper level of international cooperation and solidarity than is currently available. But
it does not follow that the world then should sit on its hands. The politics of today must build
cooperation and solidarity to ensure the possibility of implementing these policies tomorrow.
The non-reductive principle of social change counteracts the passivity and immobility resulting
from the portrayal of class oppression and capitalism as an all-encompassing phenomenon that
cannot be challenged except by a unified global political movement, a movement that is unlikely
to ever materialize.533
Thus, the non-reductive principle of social change accomplishes several feats: 1) it
provides a way out of the dilemma proposed by Gibson-Graham and the reform-revolution
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dichotomy by producing a form of politics better suited to the overdetermined character of
human beings and social structures; 2) responds to liberationists and radical social ethicists that
reject out of hand “cosmetic” reforms, citing their inadequacy in bringing about revolutionary
changes to our current institutions and global structures; 3) frees the Christian moral
imagination to undertake the task of elaborating a moral vision that encourages piecemeal
policy initiatives while still holding out for more comprehensive social transformation, without
being constrained by the artificial intellectual constrains that are implicit within neoclassical
thought.534
Heterodox approaches sensitive to postmodern and postcolonial theoretical
developments are more than just new configurations of the neoclassical model. In a sense, they
represent a fundamental challenge to orthodox economic thinking.535 Heterodox economics is
not generally interested in making the argument that it better represents the economy “out
there.” Rather, it relinquishes the “‘mirror of nature’ view of knowledge” and emphasize the
“constitutive, as against the representational, view of economic thinking.”536 That is, each theory
of economics creates what economics is and does through producing a specific discourse. One
particular approach to economics no more mirrors the “real economy” than any of the other
existing theories with the discipline.
The implications for social ethics are enormous. It opens up an ethical space for social
ethicists to create new points of encounter across the disciplinary landscape of economics. One
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discourses of the economic world cannot be demonstrated as more objective than another.537
Since there is no objective standpoint from which to evaluate, the social ethicist is free to chose
the school of economics that best helps him or her to articulate a vision of economics and
economic relationships that best corresponds to Christian moral theory rather the constraints
and requirements of capitalism.
The next and final chapter identifies some themes and concerns about which the
conversation among social ethicists can usefully center.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND PROSPECTS

The Argument Revisited
The Problem: Modern/Colonial Limits of the Christian Moral Imagination
The moral visions of mainstream Christian social ethicists fall within a narrow spectrum
of political economic possibilities. Conditioned by their subject position within
modernity/colonialism and committed to a neoclassical understanding of the political economy,
they have largely failed to account for the multiple forms of oppression that form part and
parcel of the capitalist political economy. While they write against neoliberalism—understood
as an extreme ideological position which advocates for unrestricted free markets, the
maximization of individual freedom, and unapologetic pursuit of self-interest—they argue that
reformed capitalism can serve as the basis for a moral political economy, ignoring its
exploitative, neocolonial arrangements. The form of Christian social ethics which reifies
capitalism as the only viable form of the political economy is a Christian social ethics that deals
death to millions of people. A political economy ethics in the trajectory of Jesus’ consistent life
ethic would focus on life.538 But, as many social ethicists have recognized, instead of promoting
life, capitalism focuses on industrialization, development (narrowly conceived), and growth.
Mainstream Christian social ethics takes the orthodox, neoclassical approach as the only
relevant way to conceive of the political economy, enervating the ability to imagine an economic
538
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order that is intended to reduce the exploitation of one group over the other. Even when
heterodox approaches are acknowledged (Finn), they are dismissed as secondary or tangential,
unworthy of consideration. Instead of undertaking an analysis of the exploitative and oppressive
practices that may flourish under capitalism, these social ethicists write about the “moral
ecology” of markets (Finn), the spirituality of corporations (Stackhouse), or power of democratic
processes to curb economic injustices (Wogaman). They claim that attacks against MNCs,
market mechanisms, and the state are unwarranted, since all three have produced enormous
benefits to humanity. Analysis of mainstream Christian social ethics of the political economy
reveals colonized moral visions and a short-circuiting of moral imagination, whereby the
conditions that frame the discussion impede the possibility for the construction of solutions to
political economic problems outside of a moderated version of the existing state of affairs.

The Solution: Embracing Latina/o Thinking and Economic Heterodoxy
Part of the solution is to embrace Latina/o thinking. Latina/o thinking is not a nativist
project, which rejects modernity, attempts to expel the colonizing other, and castoffs all things
Euro-American because of their geographical origin. Latina/o’s existential reality suggests the
method of Latina/o thinking: a people who embody the oppressor and the oppressed, the
colonizer and the colonized. Thus, Latina/o thinking points to something much more difficult
than a nativist project: a retrieval of the best of all traditions. The goal of this retrieval is not to
create some sort of conglomerated ethnicity/culture/race, an artificial social location from
which to theorize. Rather, it is a cross-border, trans-cultural, cross-social location that
recognizes the horrors and atrocities of the past and insists on keeping exploitation before the
mind’s eye both as a warning of what may happen if the least of these are forgotten and as a
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guide for constructive theorizing. Latina/o thinking is a subversive epistemology that rejects
entanglements with modern/colonial logics, such as patriarchy, anthropocentrism, and
heterosexuality. It constitutes a border-crossing, transmodern, queering gnosis that explodes
categories, invalidates binaries, and disrupts stability of the Christian moral imagination. It offers
tools to question, rethink, and reconceptualize established ethical paradigms and point towards
the development of a decolonized Christian political economic ethic.
This leads directly to the embrace of the rich variety of heterodox economic views.
Heterodox economics offers a multi-dimensional challenge to neoclassic economics’ claim to
value-neutrality, theorizes economics itself through non-reductive and non-essencialist
paradigms that better accounts for the complexity of the human person, and offers guidance for
how to envision an egalitarian, just political economy. Envisioning a pragmatic and workable
solution that is substantively different than the status quo is an important part of moving ethical
analysis to a new level since, ironically, social ethicists, who have in a sense no problem in
articulating dreamy eyed visions of an eschatological future, tend to reject as “impractical” or
“unworkable” any solution that does not involved markets and corporations as the primary
mechanisms of distribution and production. They have in a sense given up on the possibility of
an egalitarian and just future for the politics of the possible. But the worst of it is that the
“possible” constitutes an enormously narrow range: one that takes as self-evident the
supremacy of capitalist structures and institutions. In order to construct decolonized moral
visions, Christian social ethics must embrace, along with Latina/o thinking, heterodox economic
thought. Latina/o thinking combined with theoretical suggestions and practical examples of
economic heterodoxy, disrupt and destabilize the modern/colonial imaginary. Together they
offer a more supple and flexible framework for constructing a Christian political economic
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ethics, one that is responsive to plight of those most vulnerable in the face of the systems of
domination and oppression of modern/colonial complex.

Contributions of the Project
To Christian Social Ethicists
The project’s overall contribution to Christian social ethics is to call for decolonization of
the way that ethics is done in terms of the political economy. The proposals in this dissertation
suggest new possibilities that expand the options to engage political economic ethics, proposals
that respond to and differ from the mainstream perspective. These proposals should free and
empower other theorists to pursue their own projects, in political economy or otherwise, in an
enhanced way. Within this broad contribution, this dissertation offers three specific
contributions. First, the dissertation emphasizes the need for an examination of the underlying
normative principles in neoclassical thought as part of Christian ethical analysis.539 As observed
in chapter four, neoclassical economics is grounded in normative principles that Christian
ethicists would find objectionable if these underlying normative principles were made explicit.540
Christian political economic ethics that continues to take for granted the viability of neoclassical
539
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economics as a basis for moral visions of the political economy builds on a framework
incongruent with Christian concerns. The neoclassical approach is based on simplistic
assumptions about human beings as self-interested, utility maximizing, self-actualized, rational
individuals. Ethically significant categories of difference, such as race/ethnicity, gender,
sexuality, and (dis)ability, are irrelevant in neoclassical theorizing and thus it is inadequate as the
basis for Christian social ethics. A decolonized moral vision of the political economy recognizes
these ethically significant categories and identifies human beings as epistemologically limited
individuals-in-community, who base their decision making both on their own subjective
perceptions of their goals; the social, psychological, and physical constraints they face; and their
commitments and internal turmoil.
A second contribution to social ethics lies in the deployment of postcolonial
hermeneutics and tools as a method for articulating Christian social ethics. Religious scholars,
such as Richard King and David Chidester, and biblical scholars such as Musa Dube, Fernando
Segovia, and R. S. Sugirtharajah, have successfully deployed the insights of postcolonial theory
and criticism to the fundamental questions within their field of study.541 In contrast, Christian
social ethicists, with a few exceptions, have paid scant attention to postcolonial studies. As
Kwok Pui Lan remarks, “this oversight is unwarranted, given the lengthy history of [Christian]
theology’s relation with empire building, especially in the modern period.”542 Within the context
of the ascendancy of U.S. imperialism, failing to attend to the collusion with colonialism in
541

See David Chidester, Savage Systems: Colonialism and Comparative Religion in Southern
Africa, Studies in Religion and Culture (Charlottesville, Va) (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1996); Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and 'the Mystic East' (London;
New York: Routledge, 1999); Musa W. Dube Shomanah, Postcolonial Feminist Interpretation of the Bible
(St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 2000); Fernando F. Segovia, Decolonizing Biblical Studies: A View from the
Margins (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2000); R. S. Sugirtharajah, Postcolonial Reconfigurations: An
Alternative Way of Reading the Bible and Doing Theology (St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 2003).
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Kwok, Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist Theology, 6.
193

ethical frameworks amounts to complicity with empire. Christian social ethicists should be
concerned that if they continue along the lines of homogenizing colonial tendency, they increase
the danger of becoming irrelevant to shaping a multicultural, multiracial, and polyphonic
society. To the extent that social ethicists desire their discourses be more than academic
production, that they play a part in shaping society and influencing social change, then they
must do better than continue to perpetuate monocultural monstrosities on multicultural
societies.543
The third and related particularized contribution is a more careful analysis of political
economy than is generally found within the liberationist strand of Christian social ethics.544
Many liberationists have utilized the term political economy, and its cognate terms such as late
capitalism, global capital, or globalization, without any precision whatsoever.545 They engage in
prophetic denunciation of capitalism without a serious analysis of the normative basis of
capitalist political economy or attention to non-capitalist forms of economic activity. This
dissertation addresses head on the issue that haunts U.S. liberationist projects, which attempt
to address oppression in various manifestations, but seldom address the configuration of the
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Chandra Suresh, "The Dilemma," in Essays in Comparative Literature, ed. Chandra Suresh
(New Delhi: Amnol Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1998), 111.
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As Gary Dorien has argued in Social Ethics in the Making, the three broad movements in the
development of social ethics have been the social gospel, Christian realism, and liberationist disruptions.
The liberationist paradigm takes on the perspective of excluded and marginalized people. Unlike the two
other major paradigms which attempt to make theology credible and socially relevant to the urban,
educated, upwardly mobile middle class that takes a certain form of Protestant liberalism for granted,
liberation theologies have been devoted to giving voice to the voiceless and liberating people from
oppression and dependency. Dorrien, Social Ethics in the Making: Interpreting an American Tradition, 390.
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If mainstream social ethics affirm the current configuration of the political economy as
generally good, then liberationists take it for granted that the political economy is oppressive. Yet in
general neither group demonstrates familiarity with the discourse of economics beyond neoclassical
frameworks.
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totalizing complex which forms the context of these oppression.546 Thus, it offers a modest
theoretical advancement to the on-going liberationist project by correcting the vagueness about
the term “political economy” that plagues U.S. liberation theologies.

To Latina/o Religious Cultural Studies
The dissertation’s overall contribution to Latina/o religious cultural studies is the
application of Latina/o thinking, which points to the work of U.S. Latina/os, Chicanas, and Latin
America’s religious scholars and theologians, in decolonizing moral visions. It is the first major
research project that attempts to articulate a Latina/o liberation ethics of the political economy.
This general contribution can be particularized in two ways. First, the project moves beyond
identity politics by applying the insights of Latina/o thinking to political economic ethics.547
Latina/o thinking does more than just rethink categories of identity and politics; it shifts the
locus of theorizing political economic ethics. Generations of Latina/o scholars have now
attempted to articulate a critical religious theory and theology which reflected their social
location and the experiences of racial/ ethnic prejudice and cultural imperialism. However, as
has been noted by Miguel De La Torre, Gastón Espinosa, and Benjamin Valentín, among others,

546

On this point see IIvan Petrella, Beyond Liberation Theology: A Polemic, Reclaiming Liberation
Theology (London: SCM Press, 2008).
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Some might object that because they are not of a Latina/o background, then Latina/o thinking
has no relevancy for them. This view is somewhat misguided: embracing the border gnosis represented by
Latina/o thinking offers a method of navigating the waters of cultural criticism without negating any
particular tradition. Latina/o thinking is possible for those who are not Latina/o because knowledge can
be expanded to include areas that are not obviously connected to one’s social location by consciously
inviting conversation partners who have a different social location into one’s process of knowing.
Moreover, as chapter three notes, Latina/o thinking constitutes merely one particular instance of an
entire class of double critiques, in which African theorists and Indian Subcontinent thinkers, among many
others, are engaged. The signifier is less important than what it signifies.
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these theories and theologies have for far too long been stuck in identity politics.548 This project
moves beyond questions of identity, self-determination, and minority rights by addressing the
questions of the political economy.549 Latina/o thinking creates the possibility of a general social
theory and critique, not just a theory of a social minority. It moves beyond deconstruction of
identities and dominant epistemologies to a critique of the political economic conditions which
make imperialist and dominating epistemologies possible.550 Latina/o thinking ties the critical
theory of Latina/o religious scholars to articulate an ethical standpoint that can guide Christian
social ethics.551
A second contribution lies in pointing to non-capitalist theoretical tools for use in
Latina/o religious cultural scholarship. U.S. Latina/o religious scholars and theologians have
generally shied away from analyzing the inner-workings of the economy partly because wariness
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The concern for political economics has deep historical roots in the Latin American
liberationist tradition. From its inception, Latin American liberation theologies has been concerned with
the political economy. Gutiérrez uses the term “liberation” to express the process of radical change—
personal and social, internal, and external—and the break with political economic status quo that for him
is necessary for “the creation of a new humankind and a qualitatively different society.” Gustavo
Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988
[1973]), 25. This project continues this legacy expanding Gutiérrez’s strong critique of a political-economy
that “keeps people from self-fulfillment” (Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 18).
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An alternative to embracing Latina/o thinking’s simultaneous multiple perspectives and
straddling of cultures, languages, and knowledges is entrenchment with mono-culturalism, ethnocentrism, and homogeneity. As discussed in chapter three, at least one scholar of note has advocated for
such a move: Samuel Huntington has proposed the creation of a near-apartheid society with white
minority leaders who exclude a non-white majority from access to resources, power structures, and
decision-making. See Huntington, Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity. This type
of racist, xenophobic response amounts to at best sticking one’s head in the sand and at worst an all-out
declaration of Euro-American’s genocidal intentions against those who embody any form of difference.
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of Marx. This eschewing of Marxism has little or nothing to do with the merits of Marxist
analysis; rather, it is rooted in a complex set of socio-political factors.552 In that sense, Latina/o
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Chief among these factors are: 1) the Roman Catholic Church’s condemnation; 2) the
(justified) demonizing of regimes in their countries of origin; and 3) the wider anti-Marxist attitude in the
U.S. There has been a long history of conflict between Catholic beliefs and organizations and Marxist
theories and movements based on what has been perceived on both sides as an essential incompatibility
between religion and Marxism. Otto Maduro, "Christian Faith and Socialism: A Latin American
Perspective," in Struggles for Solidarity: Liberation Theologies in Tension, ed. Lorine M. Getz and Ruy O.
Costa (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992). In the 1937 papal encyclical Divini Redemptoris, Pius XI
declared Marxism (chiefly manifested in Bolshevism) antithetical to Christianity, though this
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Puebla, Mexico (January 1979), Pope John Paul II warned that those “who sup with Marxism should use a
long spoon.” The Vatican’s Congregational for the Doctrine of the Faith, under then Cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI), issued “Instruction on Certain Aspects of the Theology of Liberation”
(Libertatis Nuntius, 1984) specifically condemning the Marxist strain within liberation theology and noting
that it “constitutes a fundamental threat to the faith of the Church.” See Ratzinger, Joseph Cardinal,
"Liberation Theology" (preliminary notes to 1984 Instruction). Available on-line http://www.christendomawake.org/pages/ratzinger/liberationtheol.htm (accessed February 21, 2011). The major concerns of
Libertatis Nuntius are tendencies towards reductionism in liberation theology, that is, reducing human
liberation to what happens in this world, reducing the notion of sin to social sin, reducing the Kingdom of
God to political changes and human timelines, and especially reducing Christian theology to social
ideology.
The Church has also silenced and/or condemned the writings of some of the most prominent and
articulate proponents of liberation theology, including former Franciscan priest Leonardo Boff of Brazil,
and more recently (in March 2007) the outspoken advocate of the poor in El Salvador, Jesuit Jon Sobrino.
These sharp criticisms of Marxism and actions against those members of the Church who utilized Marxist
552
analysis gave their U.S. counterparts pause. U.S. Latino/a theologians, most of whom are Catholic,
fearing retribution and chastisement from the Church, have focused their writings on liberation from
racism, cultural marginalization, and devaluation of identity rather than addressing the issues of poverty
and economic injustice.
A second important factor that accounts for the persistence of a narrowly conceived liberation is
the association of Marxism with the often-brutal governments in their homelands. As you know, many
Latino/as came to the U.S. fleeing violent Marxist-inspired regimes in countries such as Nicaragua,
Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela, and Cuba. Catholic and Protestant Cuban theologians in particular
strongly associate any form of Marxism with Castro-style so-called socialism. The Cuban perspective is
significant because a disproportionate number of U.S. Hispanic theologians hail from Cuba. Justo L.
González, Ada María Isasi-Díaz, Fernando Segovia, Orlando Espín, Roberto S. Goizueta, and Sixto García,
some of the most prominent Latina/o theologians, are all Cuban. As De La Torre notes, in the religious
milieu of the exilic Cuban community, anything short of an unequivocal distaste of Castro’s government—
equated with Marxism—constitutes treason. De La Torre explores the confluence of religious fever and
political conviction in Miami’s exilic Cuban community, which he calls la lucha, in his book De La Torre, La
Lucha for Cuba: Religion and Politics on the Streets of Miami.
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religious scholars fall prey to the same capitalism or socialism dichotomy exhibited by the
mainstream Christian ethicists. While these scholars intuit that there is something wrong with
the capitalist system, they also are suspicious of socialism, and are thus unable to theorize
alternatives economies. The process of seeing the political economy as something other than
capitalist already breaks apart the binary and counters the argument that neoliberalism is here
to stay.553 Heterodox economic theorizing makes clear that there are many other ways of
conceiving of the political economy and allows theorists to engage in non-capitalist economic
theorizing. The introduction of economic heterodoxy as an alternative way to think about the
political economy empowers scholars by providing them with new analytical tools to combat the
hegemonic conceptualization of capitalism as co-terminus with the political economy.

The wider anti-Marxism/Communist attitude in the United States also contributes to Hispanic
theologians’ weariness of Marxism. Throughout most of the twentieth century the U.S. perceived
Marxism, especially its Communist manifestation, as a threat to the established order (often referred to
by conservatives as the “American way of life”). The Soviet expansion along with the local Communist
victories in China, Korea, the Philippines, and Indochina, created a general wave of anti-Communist
hysteria in the United States. In this context, Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin held hearings to
investigate real or suspected communist and supposed subversives in the federal government and
military. The liberal Truman administration extended “McCarthysim” through its own persecutions and
further intensified the nation’s anti-Communist mood. Hence liberals and conservatives alike jumped on
the anti-Communist bandwagon. During the 1950s, the House Committee on Un-American Activities
interrogated Americans about their Communist connections. See Zinn, A People's History, 420-34.. The
establishment succeeded in making the general public fearful of Communism. The threat of imprisonment
or deportation in this anti-Communist and anti-Marxist culture made it virtually inconceivable for Latino/a
theologians to draw on Marx for liberative insights. See Rodolfo J. Hernández-Díaz, "A Recovery of Marxist
Analysis for U.S. Latino/a Theology" (paper presented at the American Academy of Religion, Chicago, IL,
November 1-3, 2008).
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Gibson-Graham’s observation that capitalism is discursively imagined as an undefeatable
monster is very much alive in Latina/o religious thought. It may even be more prevalent among their
theorizing than in mainstream Christian ethical thought because they see capitalism as the enemy.
Whereas mainstream Christian ethicists think they can tame the beast, liberationists think there is no way
to defeat the beast.
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Prospects: Looking Forward
The reading of mainstream Christian ethics presented in this dissertation suggests some
lines of research and theorizing that will further enhance the decolonization of moral visions.
Chapter four noted some crucial heterodox concepts that can help Christian social ethicists
make the necessary structural adjustments to the economic framework operative in their work.
Heterodox theory and the examples of present non-capitalist economic practices can potentially
reinvigorate the moral imagination by opening ethical space to theorize the political economy
outside the limits of the neoclassic vision. These heterodox ideas formulate at least a starting
point for future conversation. The concern of social ethics is now to consider how to incorporate
heterodox insights into their own work.
At this point, a social ethicist might object, exclaiming “I am no economist, heterodox or
otherwise.” But by tackling the political economy in their work, social ethicists have already
engaged in the task of political economics. The question now facing social ethics is whether it
will do its economics well or whether it will just take prevalent economic conceptions as given.
In one way, social ethics is about drawing on the expertise of various fields around ethical
questions. Social ethicists are jacks of all trades: they dabble, explore, and experiment with all of
the social sciences and humanities. The call here is for social ethicists to do better in by drawing
on the best of economics, the type of economic analysis that begins with the awareness of the
exploitative nature of capitalism, its complicity with the modern/colonial complex, the physical,
mental, and moral degradation that results from it, and its failure to deliver on its promises of
efficiency, equality, and quality of life.554 The model of economics should also acknowledge that
economic ideas are always value-laden and that economic realities are more complex than what
554

Some of this language is derived from Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy; cited in
Paul Burkett, Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective, 1st ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999),
136.
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can be captured by reductionist and elegant mathematical models. It is a slam-dunk case: from
this point on Christian political economic ethics that does not concern itself with economic
heterodoxy is irrelevant. Beyond irrelevancy, this sort of ethics condones the current deathdealing configuration of the political economy.
A second line of research and theory around which Christian political economic ethics
should proceed involves analyzing how to avoid the hegemonic suppression of subjugated
knowledges. Latina/o thinking suggests one answer: to theorize from multiple places at once.
Latina/o thinking always takes place from a subaltern perspective and well as (unavoidably) a
perspective from within modernity/coloniality, unlike Mignolo’s “border thinking” which can
never be a “form a territorial (e.g., from inside modernity)” perspective.555 However, Latina/o
thinking is, like border thinking, a method for decolonization. As a critical practice, Latina/o
thinking takes the deconstruction of the false contemporary consciousness as starting point. The
goal is to move towards at least a dual perspective, one of which is a non-hegemonic local or
regional history. A catalogue, of sorts, of one’s one local and/or regional history functions as a
transforming initiative that just starts the process of decolonization and a historical anchoring of
one’s production of knowledge.556 Engaging in this process of Latina/o thinking may be as
straight forward as asking the question: what is the effect of this work on the subaltern, on the
oppressed and marginalized of society? If the answer is “this work is concerned with broader
issues,” or on the other extreme “much in every way: these changes will trickle-down to those
on the margins.” the work has failed to consider the subaltern.
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Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs, 45.

Transforming initiative refers to a practice that breaks the cycles of traditional teachings and
moves towards change. See Glen Harold Stassen and David P. Gushee, Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in
Contemporary Context (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003).
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A third line of research and theorizing around which the conversation among social
ethicists can usefully center is the enduring entanglement of history, culture, and political
economy. Modernity and the capitalist political economy were born together with the 16th
century. Both together led to the genocide of Amerindians, the enslavement of Africans, and
annihilation of the culture, difference, and heterogeneity. The birth place of modernity, along
with Eurocentric culture, was 1492, though, as Dussel notes, it gestated in the cities of medieval
Europe.557 The lessons European nobility and clergy had learned in geopolitical control of
conquered bodies, from lower aristocracy to free serfs and unfree peasants, yield enormous
benefits in the control and domination on a global scale. The European cultural conception of
history as a progressive realization of authentic humanity has collaborated with and contributed
to violence of modernity/colonialism. Social ethics must contest and repudiate modernity/
coloniality’s long-standing history of strategically forgetting violence against non-Europeans or
justifying it in the name of civilization and of portraying the perpetrators of violence as innocent
and even heroic.558
There may be a good reason that social ethics is ignorant of historical and cultural
matters: this inattention to history and culture is paralleled by neoclassic economics. The static
universality and rational-choice individualism of neoclassical economics excluded culture from
economic theory.559 While history and cultural ideas and the analysis of culture have greatly
influenced the humanities and other social sciences, neoclassical economics remains
impoverished in terms of cultural analysis. It seems that social ethics has unwittingly adopted
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For suggestions on how economics can overcome the economic/culture divide and learn from
cultural criticism and its methods, see William A. Jackson, Economics, Culture and Social Theory, New
Horizons in Institutional and Evolutionary Economics (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar,
2009).
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this economic/historical-cultural divide present in neoclassical economics, impoverishing its own
research. In any case, continuing to ask questions about the influence of history and culture and
political-economics on one another constitutes a useful area of research.
The final point concerns multi-dimensional analysis and the non-reductive, nonessentialist approach to social ethics. The decolonization of moral visions, as noted in chapter
three, cannot be reduced to one dimension of life; it involves thinking broadly about social
transformation, including epistemic and hermeneutical hierarchies. As discussed in chapter four,
the non-reductive/non-essentialist approach refuses to reduce social interactions to a set of
predetermined universal determinants: the social world is a complex interplay of cultural (as
noted above), historical, natural, and political-economic factors. This “overdetermined” view of
social world rejects linear historical narratives of the social evolution towards some ideal. It is a
view consistent with postcolonial hermeneutics and Latina/o thinking. Decolonizing moral
visions requires that Christian social ethics must reflect on how to capture this complexity in
their own theoretical elaborations of political economy ethics.
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